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OPSOMMING
Die oogmerk van hierdie tesis is om die inhoud en status van die beginsel van dubbelkriminaliteit
in internasionale uitleweringsreg te ondersoek. Hierdie beginsel behels dat die handeling ten
opsigte waarvan die uitlewering versoek is, misdade in beide die staat wat uitlewering versoek as
die staat waarvan uitlewering versoek word, is. Die metode wat hierdie tesis onderlê is 'n
literatuurstudie van bronne in die internasionale en nasionale reg.
Die dubbelkriminaliteitsbeginsel het oor etlike eeue ontwikkel. Dit word gevind in die meeste
regstelsels. Die beginsel dien verskeie oogmerke, waarvan staatsoewereiniteit sekerlik die
belangrikste is. State pas die beginselop verskillende maniere toe weens die verskeie
bestaansredes vir die beginsel. Regsliteratuur tref 'n onderskeid tussen twee belangrike metodes
van interpretasie, naamlik die in abstracto en in concreto benaderings. Terwyl die in abstracto
metode op die teoretiese strafbaarheid van die handeling fokus, plaas die in concreto benadering
klem op die feitelike, persoonlike en konkrete regsaspekte. Daar is kombinasies van hierdie
metodes. Meeste state kan geklassifiseer word volgens die twee benaderings, maar tog pas state
hierdie benaderings by hul besondere behoeftes aan. Daar is dus geen uniforme metode van
interpretasie in internasionale uitleweringsreg nie.
Hierdie tesis poog om te bepaal of die dubbelkriminaliteitsbeginsel 'n reël van gemeenregtelike
internasionale reg geword het. Alhoewel meeste wetgewing op die terrein van internasionale en
nasionale uitleweringsreg die beginsel van dubbelkriminalitiet insluit, is daar sterk
meningsverskilonder regsgeleerdes tov die status van die beinsel. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die
beginsel nie 'n algemene reël van die internasionale reg is nie.
Ten slotte word daar gekyk of die dubbelkriminaliteitsbeginsel as 'n beginsel van internasionale
menseregte geklassifiseer kan word. Alhoewel die beginsel ooreemste met menseregtenorme toon
- veral die beskerming van die individu in uitleweringsaangeleenthede - is daar 'n aantal aspekte
wat d it van menseregte 0 nderskei. I nternasionale uitleweringsreg en internasionale menseregte
deel nie dieselfde ontwikkelingsgeskiedenis nie. Die gevolgtrekking is dus dat die
dubbelkriminaliteitsbeginsel nie deel vorm van internasionale menseregte nie.
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ABSTRACT
The object of the thesis is to examine the content and status of the double criminality principle
in international extradition law. The double criminality principle says a fugitive c annat be
extradited unless the conduct for which his extradition is sought is criminal in both the
requesting state and the requested state. This thesis is based on a study of sources of
international law and domestic law and ideas presented in legal literature.
The double criminality principle has developed over several centuries and it has been
embraced by most states in one form or the other. The principle serves several purposes, of
which the most dominant is the notion of state sovereignty. States apply the double
criminality principle differently due to its multiple rationale. Legal literature has distinguished
two main methods of interpretation, called interpretation in abstracto and in concreto.
Whereas the in abstracto method focuses on the theoretical punishability of the conduct, the
in concreto method attaches importance to all factual, personal and legal aspects. There are
also ways of interpretation that are a combination of these two methods. Most states can be
classified into one of the two main groups of interpretation, but in general most states have
adopted a specific method of interpretation that is unique to each particular state. There is thus
no uniform method of interpretation in international extradition law.
This thesis attempts to determine whether the double criminality principle has become a rule
of customary international law. Though most instruments on international or domestic
extradition law include the double criminality principle, the strong disagreement among legal
scholars as to the legal status of the principle leads to the conclusion that the double
criminality principle is not a rule of international law today.
This thesis contains an examination of whether the principle of double criminality can be
classified as an international human rights norm. Though the principle of double criminality
has striking similarities with human rights as it partly aims at protecting individuals facing
extradition, there are also a number of aspects that distinguish the principle from traditional
human rights. This is partly attributable to the fact that international extradition law is not the
arena where general international human rights have developed. It is therefore concluded that
the double criminality principle does not form part of international human rights law.
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1 Double Criminality in Context
11 The Principle of Double Criminality
Double criminality means, in short, that an act or omission must be considered criminal in two
states, one of which is the state where the crime is prosecuted.' When conduct is criminal in
two states, its "criminality" is "double". A crime is an act with a penalty sanctioned by law.'
The double criminality requirement is found in criminal proceedings with an international
element and is one of the most common prerequisites for international co-operation in
criminal matters. It is usually a condition to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction and to various
forms of international co-operation in criminal matters, such as extradition, judicial
assistance, transfer of criminal proceedings, recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgements, etc.' The requirement is, however, approached differently in these cases, as it
serves different purposes. Originally the double criminality requirement developed in
extradition law.4 This thesis analyses the content and position of the double criminality
principle in international extradition law.
For double criminality to be a condition of extradition, the offence must be criminal in the
state that wants to prosecute the putative offender and thus requests his extradition (the
requesting state) and in the custodian state to which the fugitive has fled (the requested statej.'
1 Van den Wyngaert, "Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdiction" in Jareborg (ed) Double Criminality.
Studies in International Criminal Law (1989), 43.
2 Bedi, Extradition in International Law and Practice (1966), 61. An administrative sanction does not qualify as
a crime, Cornils, "The Use of Foreign Law in D omestic Adjudication" in Jareborg (ed) Double Criminality.
Studies in International Criminal Law (1989), 73. The legality principle determines how conduct must be
criminalised in law. See chapter 1 5 4.
3 Plachta, "The Role of Double Criminality in International Cooperation in Penal Matters", in Jareborg (ed)
Double Criminality. Studies in International Criminal Law (1989), 86-87. Double criminality is found for
instance int he European Convention on Mutual A ssistance inC riminal Matters, Article 5 on the search and
seizure of property, which requires that the offence motivating the letters rogatory must be punishable under both
the law of the requesting party and the law of the requested party. International cooperation could be divided into
six modalities; extradition, mutual assistance in criminal matters, transfer of prisoners, seizure and forfeiture of
illicit proceeds 0 f crime, recognition of foreign judgments, and transfer of criminal proceedings, Kemp, "The
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: A Milestone in International Criminal
Law", South African Journal of Criminal Justice p. 152 (2001), 162.
4 Plachta, 107.
5 Joyner & Rothbaum, "Libya and the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie: What Lessons for International Extradition
Law?", Michigan Journal of International Law p. 222 (1993), 241, Aughterson, Extradition. Australian Law and
Procedure (1995), 4, Hafen "International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement",
Brigham Young University Law Review p. 191 (1992), 194.
3
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The law of the state of which the alleged perpetrator is a national or a resident is of no
relevance. Where the crime was committed in neither the prosecuting nor the custodian state,
but on the territory of a third state, the law of the latter will in principle not be relevant. This
may seem awkward as criminal laws are predominantly territorial in the sense that the
criminal statutes of a state normally apply to crimes committed within the territory of that
state.
The requirement of double criminality has acquired many names'' and formulations in statutes
and treaties. When talking about this requirement in general, one usually refers to the "rule"
or "principle" of double criminality.' Scholars use these terms as alternatives and there seems
not to be any legal difference between them, despite attempts by some to point out a
distinction between rules and principles in general. The dividing line is rather arbitrary,
though principles are said to be more abstract, general and important than rules."
For the purpose of this thesis, deciding on the correct terminology is not necessary, as it will
not affect the interpretation or legal status of this requirement. Due to the vagueness of double
criminality, the more general term "principle" will be preferred. This is also the most common
term among scholars. However, where mention i s made 0 f a specific provision on double
criminality in a statute or treaty, the more concrete term "rule" is preferred. The neutral term
"requirement" of double criminality is used as well. This term is not directed at solving any
legal problems of extradition law, but its role and significance lies in the limitation of the
scope of extradition."
6 The two most common denominations of this principle are double criminality and dual criminality. Other
names are double punishability, double penalization, double prosecution, dual (criminal) liability, dual
incrimination, dual culpability, equivalency of offences, reciprocity of offences, P lachta, 104-107; identity of
rules, Duk, "Principles underlying the European Convention on Extradition", Legal Aspects of Extradition
among European States, Council of Europe (1970), 37; identical norm, Schultz, "The Principles of the
Traditional Law of Extradition", Legal Aspects of Extradition among European States, Council of Europe
(1970), 12, and double extraditability. Denominations in German jurisprudence are das Prinzip der identischen
Norm, Rintelen, Die Grundsiitze des Heutigen Volkerrechts tiber die Auslieferung von Verbrechern (1909), 15,
das Prinzip der identischen Strafrechtsnorm, der Normenidentitiit, der zweiseitiger Strafbarkeit and der
beiderseitiger Strafbarkeit.
7 Plachta, 106. The term "doctrine" is also used, for instance by Bedi, Aughterson and Hafen.
8 Duk, 31.
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12 Outline of the Thesis and Methodology
Double criminality is a widely practised and accepted rule of extradition law, yet it is a
requirement that is difficult to understand and apply. Most states accept the propriety of this
requirement, but its lack of clarity has led to a wide variety of interpretations amongst
national courts.l" The proliferation of additional requirements attached to double criminality
also makes a generalisation of this principle difficult. II
The examination of double criminality in international extradition law will be conducted
through international law and comparative domestic law. Bilateral and multilateral
conventions, domestic statutes, domestic a nd international court decisions as well a s legal
literature will illustrate current interpretations.
Ideally, to establish how the rule of double criminality in international extradition law is to be
interpreted, a strict comparative analysis of every state's law and practice should be
undertaken. The criminal and constitutional law of each state as well as the relationship in
each state between municipal and international law would have to be dealt with. That would
be too comprehensive. The thesis sets out to describe the more general perceptions of double
criminality in international extradition I aw a nd to e valuate its role in modem international
extradition law, while municipal law will only be examined where it may shed some light on
general approaches to double criminality in the international community.V
Chapter 1 of the thesis addresses some preliminary issues and draws the main lines of general
international law that are relevant to the following discussion. Chapter 2 examines how the
principle of double criminality in international extradition law is interpreted. Chapter 3
discusses whether the principle of double criminality has become part of customary
international law or the general principles of international law. Chapter 4 examines double
criminality in the light of international human rights law. And finally, Chapter 5 evaluates the
9 Plachta, 106.
10 Aughterson, 60.
II Hafen, 195.
12 Domestic statutes of the different states will not be interpreted thoroughly, as this is a venture that easily could
lead to mistakes. Adler, "Translating and Interpreting Foreign Statutes", Michigan Journal of International Law,
Vol 19 p. 37 (1997/98), 39-40, says research of foreign statutes can lead to naive interpretations as the
interpreter does not know the values underlying foreign legal systems and thus unconsciously perceives foreign
law as similar to domestic law. This thesis does not intend to find the complete content of foreign statutes on
5
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principle de lege ferenda. Questions of re-extradition, 13 extradition from and rendition within
federal states and commonwealth systems," and extradition in the form of surrender/transfer
to international tribunals" will not be examined in this thesis.
13 The International Law of Extradition
Extradition is generally defmed as the formal surrender, for purposes of trial or punishment,
by one state at the request of another of a person accused or convicted of a crime committed
within the jurisdiction of the latter." Jurisdiction here means the competence of the latter to
try and punish the alleged offender, though it is interpreted by some states as the territory of
the requesting s tate. A mere suspicion is not enough for extradition. The alleged 0 ffender
must be formally charged with the crime. Extradition law has traditionally been seen a s a
means by which states promote states' interests, but it also offers protection to the
individual.I7
Scholars disagree on how to classify the extradition process within the legal system. It has
been characterised as a civil process, a criminal process, or a blend of these two. Extradition is
not an aim in itself, but a mechanism for surrendering criminals to stand trial. Because
extradition does not involve a decision on guilt or innocence, some would argue it is not a
criminal process. But as it forms part of the legal proceedings against an indicted person, it
could be argued it is part of criminal procedure. Is
double criminality i n extradition, but w ill use the statutes as illustations 0 f the existence 0 f such ap rinciple.
There will thus be no textual or contextual interpretations of the statutes at hand.
13 Re-extradition means the requesting state, whose request was granted, extradites the person to a third state.
14 In federal and commonwealth systems several criminal codes exist within one state, which may differ from
each other. The question of which law shall be interpreted and related questions will not be examined in the
thesis.
IS The establishment of supra-national tribunals interferes with the traditional extradition system, and possibly
also the practice of t he double criminality principle, as domestic courts are given a subsidiary position. The
international community has established several international criminal courts, starting with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994.
As for these two tribunals, Gilbert, Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law (1998), 49, says
"[n]ecessarily, the rules of extradition law are inapplicable in so far as they are not expressly incorporated within
the Statutes, Rules or domestic implementing legislation, or are part of customary international law." A
diplomatic conference in Rome 1998 adopted the Statute for the International Criminal Court, which according
to article 126 will enter into force after 60 states have ratified it.
16 Gilbert, 15, Shearer, Extradition in International Law (1971), 21, La Forest, Extradition to andfrom Canada 2
ed (1977), 16, Aughterson, 2, Henning, "Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions Can Lead to
International Incidents", Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (1999) p. 347, 349.
17 Bassiouni & Wise, 37, Plachta, 94.
18 This view was taken in the Irish Supreme Court case of Aamand v. Smithwick, see chapter 2 3 6.
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The ends of criminal law may be summarised as conditioning human conduct, compensating
the victim and pacifying the offender.19 Principles of criminal law, such as the legality
principle and the requirement of criminal jurisdiction, have been transferred into the law of
extradition. The general philosophy of criminal law and procedure and policy considerations
have influenced extradition law. The basic aims of extradition and criminal procedure are
concurrent, namely the protection of law and order. The object of extradition is thus
retribution and deterrence.i'' Due to the international element in a criminal case involving
extradition, the law of extradition has developed into a system for the protection of several
interests. The purposes of extradition could be summarised as being to obtain the reciprocal
return of fugitive offenders, to help promote justice in the requesting state, to avoid safe
havens in the requested state, and to avoid international tension.i!
The necessity of international co-operation in criminal matters becomes tangible due to the
increasing number of criminal cases with a foreign element. States cannot act alone where the
crime takes place 0 r affects several states, or where t he criminal flees a broad. An 0 ffence
injuring values generally recognised by the society of a state may imperil similar interests in
other states.22 Extradition is in the interest of all states.23 A person who commits a crime in
one state today may commit a new crime in another state tomorrow.i" Engaging in extradition
shows solidarity with other countries.
In most states a request for extradition requires a court hearing, but the executive may have
the final word_25A few states exercise pure administrative extradition. There is a wide variety
of ways in which states regulate the process. It should be noted that wherever reference in this
thesis is made to hypothetical examinations of the judiciary, this includes executive
examinations as well.
19 Duk, 29-30.
20 Bassiouni & Wise, "Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law" 1995,
26, Aughterson, 38.
21 Henning, 350.
22 Plachta, 85.
23 Bassiouni & Wise, 26.
24 Plachta, 85.
25 This is for instance the situation in the United States, Henning, 351. Gilbert says "the ususal procedure is for
the executive to approve the issuing 0 f an authority top roceed, then t he request for extradition is dealt with
through the courts, and, if the decision is to allow return, the executive has a final discretion as to whether to
order the fugitive's surrender", 78.
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1 3 1 The Nature of International Law
International extradition law is part of the field of public international law called international
criminal law." There have been many attempts at defining the term international law, which
is the law between states, and the term international criminal law, which is the law regulating
co-operation between states in criminal matters. For the purpose of this thesis, there is no need
to give more thorough definitions of these terms.
Though legal philosophy gives various definitions of international law, its sources are
nevertheless identical in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945.
The three most important sources are treaties, international custom and general principles of
law. Intended as a precept to the Court, the enumeration oflegal sources also serves as a
guideline for other courts deciding cases on international law. The enumeration is not
exhaustive. Modern international law accepts that other factors that do not qualify as legally
binding rules of I aw, such as" soft law" ,27 may i nfluence the i nterpretation 0 f the sources
listed in article 38.
Domestic legislation employs conflict rules, for instance, the principle of lex superior, where
two or more sources of law contradict one another. Lex superior is not applicable to sources
of international law. Though the legal sources listed in article 38 are not expressly stated to
represent a hierarchical system, they are nevertheless expected to be applied successively." It
is common to first interpret existing treaties and then supply them with customary
international law. General principles of law are mostly used as an argument supporting
solutions found in treaties and customs and are rarely applied independently.r" Nevertheless,
international customary law and conventions are independent sources of law.
The International Court of Justice has developed guidelines on how to apply international law.
Though treaty and custom are equal sources of law, a natural starting point is to interpret any
existing conventions, whose very object is to create reciprocal obligations. Where the treaty
26 Gilbert, 3, 14, Rintelen, 15.
27 Dugard, International Law. A South African Perspective (2000), describes soft law as "imprecise standards,
generated by declarations adopted by diplomatic conferences or resolutions of international organizations, that
are intended to serve as guidelines to states in their conduct, but which lack the status of 'law'", 36.
28 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 5 ed (1998),3.
29 Ruud & Ulfstein, Inn/ering iFolkerett (1998),54.
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provisions are vague or silent on the pertinent issue, the courts examine customary law. In the
absence of treaty and custom, the courts apply general principles oflaw.30
The existence of rules of jus cogens is presupposed in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of the Treaties, 1969.31 Article 53 introduced a limit to states' freedom to conclude
treaties where there had been no limits before.32 These norms protect fundamental interests
and values in the international community and have the highest position in international law,
from which no derogation is permitted.r' There is no general formula on how rules achieve
jus cogens status, nor is there consensus on which rules have reached this status. Some
authors define jus cogens as rules of customary international law or simply general principles
of international law; others classify it as a set of rules separate from traditional sources of
international law, based on the nature of the subject matter.i" The latter seems to be the
dominant view." What constitutes jus cogens should be accepted and recognised as such by
the international community as a whole and could be revealed by a study of state practice and
international jurisprudence. 36
The principle of sovereignty IS a term of international law describing each state's
30 Dugard, 36. Article 38 d of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" as one of the sources of international law. These are municipal principles of law
common to many states that are applicable to international relations, Dugard, 36-37.
31 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 53 on "Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of
general international law (jus cogens)" declares "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with
a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community 0 f states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character." Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in
International Law {I988) says "norms of 'general international law' are of general applicability, i.e. they create
obligations and/or rights for at least a great majority of states or other subjects of international law, and are thus
not created as such by 'regional law'. On the other hand, there have been statements to the fact that norms of
'general international law' are 'universal"', 208. As to the phrase "accepted and recognized by the International
Community as a whole" Hannikainen says the general view among scholars on this subject is that it would be
"sufficient that all the essential components of the international community recognizes it. In practice that would
mean nearly all states." This means that states cannot veto against a peremptory rule.
32 De Hoogh, "The Relationship between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes:
Peremptory Norms in Perspective," Austrian Journal of Public and Internaitonal Law p. 183 (1991), 185.
33 De Hoogh, 187, Bassiouni, "International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes", Law and
Contemporary Problems, www.law.duke.eduJjournals/lcp.reprintedinJoyner(ed).Reining in Impunity for
International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights" p. 133 (1998), 138. All references
of this article will be made to the latter publication, hereinafter called "Bassiouni in Joyner (ed)".
34 Bassiouni in Joyner (ed), 138-139, De Hoogh, 189, Steven, "Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute:
Why the United States is in Breach of Its International Obligations", Virginia Journal of International Law p.
425 (1999), 448.
35 Byers, "Conceptual ising the Relationship between Jus C ogens and Erga Omnes Rules," Nordic Journal of
International Law p. 211 (1997),211.
36 De Hoogh, 190.
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independence. It consists of the liberty to exercise absolute and exclusive legislative,
administrative and judicial powers within its territory, irrespective of the will and opinions of
other states. Sovereignty is a territorial concept, and all individuals and properties on the
state's territory are under its authority.V Obviously, a state's authority ends at its border, and
any foreign interference in the domestic affairs of another state is forbidden.38 State
sovereignty is naturally subject to self-imposed limitations.39
The freedom that states enjoy through the sovereignty principle has always been in conflict
with international crirninal law.t" International criminal law requires that states give up some
of their sovereignty in order to promote international co-operation in criminal matters.
Extradition i s only one element of t he international community's scheme for assistance in
criminal matters." States have to a large extent waived their sovereign rights through
extradition treaties that establish international obligations.
When interpreting conventions and customs, one must take into account the effectiveness of
international law and the principle of sovereignty. State sovereignty is also reflected in the
formal sources and substantive rules of international law. International extradition law is not
void of provisions and principles that purport to protect state sovereignty. For instance, the
newly adopted United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000
ensures that state parties respect the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.42
1 3 2 Treaties and Domestic Statutes as Bases for Extradition
Each state decides on what legal grounds extradition can be granted. Usually a state has
enacted a domestic extradition statute as well as concluded bilateral or multilateral extradition
treaties. International law does not preclude extradition in the absence of a treaty,43 but as
37 Bedi, 27, 62, Bassiouni & Wise, xi.
38 Plachta, 84, Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (1983), Il, Fleischer, Folkerett 6 ed (1994), 71.
The Charter 0 f the United Nations article 2 paragraph 7 forbids i ntervention in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, but exceptions are listed in chapter VII.
39 Bedi, 31, Henning, 350.
40 Kemp, 154.
41 Gilbert, 59, Aughterson, 7.
42 Kemp, 154.
43 Aughterson, 7.
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there exists no general duty toe xtradite i n international law," states enter into extradition
treaties in order to create reciprocal obligations." Extradition thus takes place according to
domestic legislation or self-executing treaties.Ï"
The interaction between treaties and statutes also vanes among states. For instance, in
England and Australia treaties have to be implemented in domestic law to become operative.
The treaties can then only be used to fill in gaps in the law or to improve the individual's
rights.47 Norway adheres to a strict dualistic system and only domestic law regulates
extradition.Y In France and Switzerland extradition treaties are self-executing and the
domestic statute will fill in the gaps of the treaty, or stand in where no treaty exists.49
The domestic law of a few states demands an extradition treaty with the requested state in
order to extradite. This prevents extradition agreements reached on an ad hoc basis. Common
law countries in particular have required formalised agreements on an international level in
order to extradite. 50This is, for instance, the case with the United States" and Canada,52 and
was also practised by A ustralia up to 1974, w hen domestic law introduced the reciprocity
system,53 as was also done in the United Kingdom up to the Extradition Act of 1989.
Most states do not demand a treaty with the requested state to approve an extradition. Treaties
are concluded nevertheless in order to establish reciprocal obligations and to ensure the return
of fugitives who have fled to states that do require a treaty. Some states base their regional
extradition system on m utuall egislation instead of treaties. For instance, t he Nordic states
44 See chapter 1 6.
45 Bassiouni & Wise, 37.
46 Gilbert, 2, Joyner & Rothbaum, 232. Schultz claims treaties and municipal law are the only sources of
extradition law, 9. Bedi operates with a list of four bases for a claim of extradition, which are treateis, national
laws, reciprocity and morality, 32-60.
47 Aughterson, 2, Gilbert, 33.
48 Fleischer, 18.
49 Gilbert, 33, 47.
50 Henning, 350. Acccording to Gilbert common law countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and
Australia traditionally required a formalised arrangement for extradition, but have now adopted legislation which
opens for ad hoc extraditions, 48.
51 In the United States this requirement is of particular importance as the only federal law on extradition deals
with procedural questions. Substantive rights and duties of both state and fugitive must hence be deducted from
the individual extradition treaties entered into by the United States and foreign states, Henning, 350-351.
52 http://www.lawsmart.comlcanada/criminal/extradition.htm. Williams, "The Double Criminality Rule and
Extradition: A Comparative Analysis", Nova Law Review p. 581 (1991),584. Gilbert however says Canada now
allows for extradition on an ad hoc basis, 48.
53 Rezek, "Reciprocity as a Basis of Extradition", British Yearbook of International Law p. 171 (1981), 173.
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have adopted reciprocal legislation that regulates extradition within these five statesr'" the
United Kingdom and the Republic of I reland base extradition between them 0 n reciprocal
legislation rather than convention, and Australia and New Zealand have a similar system as
well.55
As extradition treaties seek to achieve the same result and as states tend to enter into similar
extradition treaties, treaty law has become relatively uniform.i" States tend to conclude
treaties with neighbouring states and states with whom they have close historical and socio-
political ties, as the question of extradition is most likely to arise between them. One could
thus distinguish the development of regional international extradition law, for instance, within
Scandinavia. Multilateral treaties with a large number of state parties, such as the European
Convention on Extradition 1957, can also create and develop regional extradition features.V
Extradition treaties and domestic legislation on extradition mutually influence each other.
Also this contributes to the development of similar domestic laws. Even civil law and
common law jurisdictions, which traditionally have been ideologically separate in their views
on extradition, are mutually influenced this way.58
When deciding on extradition, domestic courts not only look at the relevant treaty provisions
and domestic statutes, but also seek guidance from decisions by foreign courts on the same
matter.Ï" Courts have at times defined the principle of double criminality by immediate resort
to prior judicial authority"
Domestic courts have shown that they base their judgements on domestic law and domestic
jurisprudence r ather than international I aw. Extradition i s after a 11an international process
carried out by domestic institutions. Extradition would not be granted if it does not comply
with all the prerequisites stipulated in domestic statutes. Stanbrook & Stanbrook, for instance,
54 The Nordic Extradition Scheme between Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark lays the foundation
for reciprocal extradition statutes between these five countries. See for instance Norway's Act on Extradition to
Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, March 3rd NO.1 1961.
55 Gilbert, 9, 45.
56 Gilbert, 2.
57 The Council of Europe's extradition convention had by the end of 1997 been ratified by 35 states and forms
the procedural framework for more extraditions than any other treaty. By 1998 many former Soviet Bloc States
joined the treaty as well. The convention represents the outer circle of a series of concentric and overlapping
arrangements between smaller groups of European states, Gilbert, 36, 41.
58 Gilbert, 2.
59 Du Plessis, "The Pinochet Case and South African Extradition Law", South African Journal on Human Rights
p. 669 (2000), 682, Gilbert, 2.
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say that in applying double criminality courts in the United Kingdom are bound by its
legislative expression rather than the abstract principle." Where the reciprocity system is the
basis for extradition, double criminality is obviously required.62 In a pure ad hoc extradition,
the principle of double criminality could possibly be ignored if it does not form part of
domestic law. If, however, the principle is part of general international law, it must be
complied with in any case.'"
Though extradition is a case before a domestic institution applying predominantly domestic
law, it is nevertheless possible to speak of an international law of extradition." Extradition as
a part of international criminal law relies on indirect enforcement through national authorities.
International extradition law has developed into a blend of domestic and international law,
even though domestic law as such is not a source of international law. The decision-maker has
to comply with rules of both domestic and international law. The existence, scope and legal
status of double criminality in international extradition law are determined by domestic
statutes, international treaties and court decisions.f
1 3 3 Reciprocity as a Basis for Extradition
Reciprocity refers to identity or equivalence of rights and duties. It has always been a guiding
principle 0 f extradition treaties, w here i dentical obligations a re normally i mposed u pon all
contracting parties." Reciprocity is not peculiar to the law of extradition, but is a principle of
general international law ensuring respect for state sovereignty."
Reciprocity can be obtained by other means than conventions and mutual legislation. Many
states extradite ad hoc, though in accordance with domestic law. This demands some form of
guarantee of reciprocity in a potential, similar case where the requested state would seek
extradition from the requesting state. This is, for instance, the present system in Germany and
60 Aughterson, 60.
61 Stanbrook & Stanbrook, 21.
62 Rezek, 184.
63 This will be discussed in chapter 3.
64 Gilbert, 2.
65 Aughterson, 60.
66 Rezek, 171.
67 Schultz, 10.
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Switzerland.68 A similar case could mean that extradition would be sought of a person of the
same personal qualities and for the same type of offence/" A strict mutatis mutandis scheme
would, however, be too narrow in its object and probably become inoperative.Ï" Such a
scheme could, for instance, mean that extradition would only be granted for offenders who
have committed the same type of offence, under similar circumstances and with similar
motives, etc., as described in the affidavit ensuring reciprocity. Extradition would thus depend
on how strictly the scheme is construed. Reciprocity as a basis for extradition would prove
more advantageous if applied to the overall arrangement."
The means of regulating extradition through a system of reciprocity has been apprehended by
some authors as a legal source of extradition law,n but this view has been opposed by
others.Ï'' Historically, extradition was granted as an act of comity and, by the end of the
nineteenth century, some states introduced reciprocity as a sufficient basis for extradition.Ï"
An assurance of reciprocity establishes a relationship between two states with regard to future
extradition requests, but cannot be equated with a bilateral treaty. The reciprocity system
relies entirely on the content of municipal extradition law.?5 Double criminality is thus part of
the reciprocity scheme on two levels. It is stipulated in domestic law and it is inherent in the
system itself, as an extradition granted another state would always under the same
circumstances be granted in return.
Today, the reciprocity scheme is generally losing ground in international criminal law as
extradition is gradually transformed from an instrument of state power into an instrument of
criminal justice. The general principle of reciprocity in international law has, however, played
an important role in evolving general principles of extradition law and has particularly
influenced the principle of double criminality.
68 Gilbert, 28-29.
69 Schultz, 10.
70 Rezek, 174.
71 Gilbert, 32.
72 Bedi, 48-53, Rezek 171-172,176-177.
73 Schultz, 11, Gilbert, 32.
74 Bedi, 30, Rezek, 171.
75 Rezek, 176, 183.
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1 3 4 The Influence of Politics on Extradition
Law is a product of politics. This is also true for extradition law. For instance, the American
rule of non-inquiry developed by the judiciary is probably motivated by a wish to avoid
questions of foreign relations.Ï" The political offence exemption is also a product of the same
motiver" Not only the legal theory behind extradition law, but also its practice is influenced
by politics.Ï"
Bassiouni is reported to have said: "The whole history of extradition has been little more than
a reflection of the political relations between the states in question." 79 There i s a fine 1ine
between law and politics in international relations. Many cases of granted or denied
extradition are believed to be motivated by a state's desire to obtain a favourable position in
political terms and to foster international goodwill.t" Returning a suspected criminal creates
goodwill with the requesting state, which ultimately ensures reciprocity and benevolence in
return. The procedure of extradition is thus not entirely regulated by law, though ideally it
should be.81 Granting or denying extradition as a political tool could easily lead to
arbitrariness, injustice and infringement of human rights, or to impunity for criminals who
clearly should have been put to trial. 82
One of the most politically explosive extradition cases in recent times is a good illustration of
the close ties between politics and extradition. The 1988 terrorist bombing of a Pan American
flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people, lead to massive international
investigations resulting in the extradition request of two Libyan nationals from Libya. Libya
refused to extradite because domestic law forbade extradition of nationals and because Libya
could prosecute the putative offenders herself according to the principle aut dedere aut
76 Gilbert, 78-79.
77 This was not always so. In ancient times and up to eighteenth century liberalism in Europe extradition was a
means of retrieving political enemies or persons accused of crimes against state and sovereign, a practice which
today is normally expressly exempted, Aughterson, 4. A treaty from 1280 BC between Ramses II of Egypt and
the Hittite prince Hattushilish III, which is believed to be the first extradition treaty in history, provided for the
surrender of "great men", and not common criminals, Gilbert, 4,17, Hafen, 192, Shearer, 5.
78 Gilbert, 11-12.
79 Hafen quoting Bassiouni in International Extradition and World Public Order 1 (1974), 192.
80 Hafen, 192.
81 Pyle, Extradition, Politics, and Human Rights, 2001, says "most of what has been written on extradition law
has been relentlessly academic, full of repetitious expositions, and largely oblivious to the political forces that
have driven the cases and the law," 2.
82 There have been several cases where terrorists have escaped extradition because the authorities feared reprisals
from other terrorists, Henning, 348, Joyner & Rothbaum, 249.
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judicare. Despite Libya adhering to accepted principles of international extradition law, the
United Nations Security Council in 1992 adopted a resolution urging co-operation by the
Libyan government, basically meaning Libya was to hand over the two suspects. When Libya
refused to comply, the Security Council adopted a nother resolution imposing sanctions on
Libya.83
Whether or not notorious acts such as the Lockerbie bombing justify collective pressure
through the United Nations on a state that exercises its legal rights in international law, one
cannot avoid noticing the political flavour of such pressure. There is a certain danger in this
kind of action, as instruments of international law may become tools of convenience only.
Commentators have speculated on whether these resolutions now show a new trend in
international extradition law. This question will not be addressed in this thesis. However, it is
vital to note that these resolutions may be the first steps towards more collective decision-
making in the development and execution ofinternationallaw.84
Because the constituent units of the international community are sovereign and have adopted
individual legal systems, international criminal law still contains large pockets of anarchy.f
States are still reluctant to give up their sovereign power too widely. Some of these pockets
have to do with considerations of foreign affairs. The lack of a universally accepted rule of
law, leaving the law of extradition to treaties and acts of reciprocity and comity, means that
states can interpret these self-created rules to suit t heir own needs. 86 When discussing the
principle of double criminality, the political undercurrents must not be left out of
consideration. Several extradition cases discussed in the thesis were most likely influenced by
considerations of foreign relations.
83 The case is described by Joyner & Rothbaum, 222-227 and 247-253.
84 It should be borne in mind that there were strong suspicions that the Libyan government itself was involved in
the bombing, and according to the indictment the Libyan Minister of Justice had purchased the detonators for the
bomb. A domestic prosecution 0 f the suspects in Libya would most likely h ave been a mock trial, Joyner &
Rothbaum, 248-256.
85 Bassiouni & Wise, ix-x.
86 Joyner & Rothbaum, 223-224.
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1 3 5 Deportation
Extradition must be distinguished from deportation, which is an instrument of immigration
law. The object of extradition is to send a person to a specific state for the specific purpose of
prosecution, whereas the object of deportation is simply to expel from the state a person
whose presence is undesirable." this also applies in cases where deportation is attributable to
criminal conduct on the behalf of the fugitive.88 One of the most important differences
between extradition and deportation is thus the purpose of the process.
Deportation is furthermore a unilateral act of the deporting state and is not based on a notion
of reciprocity. The deporting state has little preference regarding the destination to which the
deportee is deported as long as he is sent out of its territory. A deportation usually does not
require a court hearing/" The executive usually has a broad discretion in deciding the country
of destination of the deportation." Natural destinations would be the state from which he
crossed the border, the fugitive's native state or a state of the fugitive's wish.
As extradition and deportation serve two different purposes, they are subject to two different
sets of legislation. The fugitive's rights differ. It is important that a deportation does not
substitute for an extradition, as the special individuals' rights designed to protect the extraditee
are violated. However, disguised extraditions in the shape of deportations are known to take
place."
14 The History of Double Criminality
To fully understand the double criminality principle one has to be familiar with its historical
background. The principle originated at a time that was politically and socially very different
from the present. It has survived and developed through different ideological eras, which have
87 Aughterson, 36, La Forest, 38.
88 Nelson, "Swedish and Foreign Crimes in the Swedish Criminal Justice System" in Jareborg (ed) Double
Criminality. Studies in International Criminal Law (1989), says expulsion may be ordered due to crime, grave
antisocial behaviour and illegal stay in the realm, 34.
89 http://www.lawsmart.com!canada!criminal!extradition.htm.
90 Aughterson, 42, La Forest, 37.
91 La Forest, 37-38. See chapter 4.
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influenced its substance. Even its purposes have undergone changes.92
International extradition law as we know it today is the result of a development extending
over two centuries. The present system of extradition and many of its principles developed in
nineteenth-century continental Europe." It has been claimed that the double criminality
doctrine stems from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberalism.94 Particularly after the
French Revolution of 1789 the focus was put on the individual. One of the first instruments to
deal with double criminality was the Anglo-American Jay Treaty of 1794, but the
standardisation of double criminality began with Britain's Extradition Act of 1870.95
Apparently, many states modelled their extradition legislation on this statute.
15 The Rationale of Double Criminality
International extradition law regulates the rights and duties of the three aspects involved in the
process, namely the requesting state, the requested state and the fugitive. The rule of double
criminality guards the interests of the latter two. The requesting state does not benefit from
this rule.
The double criminality principle rests on a rationale with multiple dimensions. Different
authors stress different elements of the rationale." Aspects underlying the principle could be
summed up as the principles of state sovereignty, reciprocity, legality and the protection of
individual rights.
1 5 1 State Sovereignty
In earlier times states were mostly p reoccupied with t heir own positions, eagerly guarding
92 See chapter 1 5.
93 Gilbert, 32, Aughterson, 4, Schultz, 9.
94 Aughterson, 4.
95 Hafen, 194.
96F or instance Van den W yngaert in Jareborg (ed) says t he rationale 0 f double criminality i sb ased 0 n state
sovereignty, international solidarity and the legality principle, 52-54, whereas Shearer claims double criminality
derives from the principle of reciprocity and the principle of legality, 137. Plachta on the other hand says double
criminality does not rest on the notion of equality of states, sovereignty or reciprocity, but solely on the legality
principle, 107, and Hafen ascribes double criminality to the protection of fugitives from unjust punishment, 194.
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their sovereignty." Like many other principles of international extradition law, double
criminality to a large extent owes its existence to the desire of states to affirm their
sovereignty."
A state will not allow its criminal process, including apprehension and incarceration of an
individual, to be used for an act that it does not consider punishable." Otherwise the state
would be giving precedence to the conceptions of justice in the requesting state over its own.
A state's social conscience should not be embarrassed by an obligation to extradite for
something that is not criminal in its domestic statute.IOO This aspect has a practical side too.
States most probably do not wish to initiate a costly extradition process for acts that are
legal.l'"
152 Reciprocity
The principle of reciprocity is closely connected with the principle of sovereignty.i'f As the
constituent subjects of international law are sovereign and equal states, international law must
necessarily rely on reciprocity among states in order to function. Reciprocity as a rationale
behind double criminality does not refer to the formalised reciprocity-based extradition
system described above,103but to the abstract and idealistic principle lying behind that system
and other extradition schemes. Double criminality secures reciprocity by ensuring that a state
does not have to extradite a person of whom it could not ask for extradition itself.l04
1 5 3 Individual Rights
Some argue the double criminality requirement was created in extradition law for purposes of
97 Bedi, 29, Blakesley & Lagodny, "Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement over Extradition, Jurisdiction, the
Role of Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality under International Criminal Law", Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational L aw p. 1 (1991), 44. I n ensuring their sovereignty states h ave even abstained from extraditing
criminals where the requesting state has n ot granted t hem a na ssurance of reciprocity, even i f it entailed the
presence of a dangerous criminal on their territory, Schultz, 10.
98 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 53.
99 Aughterson, 60, Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 52, Rintelen, 17.
100 Shearer, 138.
101 Palmer, The Austrian Law on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1983), 39.
102 Palmer, 39, Stanbrook & Stanbrook, Extradition Law and Practice 2 ed (2000), 21.
103 Chapter 1 3 3.
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protecting individual rights. lOS It is more likely that double criminality was created with
notions of sovereignty and reciprocity in mind, but it nevertheless serves as a protection for
the individual. Movements towards stronger protection of human rights in criminal procedure
neutralise the original selfish rationale behind the double criminality rule.I06 As the procedure
of extradition includes a pprehension a nd incarceration of an individual, double criminality
ensures that a person's liberty is not restricted for acts that are not criminal in the
apprehending state.I07 Protection of the fugitive is the principle's main justification today.
154 Legality
An important individual right i s represented by t he legality principle i n criminal law. I tis
generally acknowledged that the principles of double criminality and legality are related, but
it is not clear how strongly. lOS Restrictions on freedom of action may only be established by
law.I09 Both principles adhere to this well-established rule of law.
The legality principle's twin components - no crime and no punishment without law - are
expressed in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, which establishes that crime and
punishment need to be proclaimed by law.llo Inherent in this principle lies a prohibition
against retroactive punishment. People should always be able to predict their legal rights and
duties by knowing in advance w hat conduct i s punishable. It also follows from this t hat a
heavier penalty than the penalty prescribed at the time the crime was committed, cannot be
imposed. Another consequence is that the law must be accessible to the people, often
interpreted to mean that the conduct must be criminalised in domestic law. The legality
104 Shearer, 138, Gilbert, 84.
105 Hafen, 230, Aughterson, 5.
106 See chapter 4.
107 Shearer, 137.
108 Williams, 582, Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, "Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights", American
Journal of International Law p. 187 (1998), 188, Blakesley, "A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and
Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crimes", Utah Law Review p. 685 (1984), 739. Rezek says "[b]eing an
application of the principle nulla poena sin lege, the double criminality rule bears all features of that principle,"
187-188.
109 Castberg, "Natural Law and Human Rights. An Idea-Historical Survey," International Protection of Human
Rigths, Eide & Schou (eds) (1968), 19-29.
110 According to Loucaides, Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights (1995), the Latin expression of the
legality principle was introduced by Feuerbach, a German jurist, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 33.
Burchell & Milton, Principles of Criminal Law 2 ed (1997), say Feuerbach's theory included "a competent
legislature that announced in advance and with clarity and certainty the definition of crimes and the details of
their punishments," 58.
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principle thus says no one can be punished for an act that did not constitute a crime in
domestic law at the time it was committed.
There are several aspects of legality and double criminality that differ fundamentally. They
form part of legal examinations in two different situations. Some considerations behind the
legality principle do not apply to double criminality. The right of individuals to become
acquainted with the law in order to act in a law-abiding way does not motivate a rule of
double criminality in extradition. A fugitive has already broken the law when the question of
extradition arises. The rule of double criminality is not a substantive rule, such as the legality
principle, but a procedural rule. III The guilt or innocence of the accused is irrelevant to
extradition. Though the law subjected to double criminality examination are the criminal
codes and not the codes of criminal procedure, it will not be applied as such, but used as a
potential obstacle to extradition.
The similarity between the double criminality principle in extradition law and the legality
principle in criminal law is obvious. Both principles demand that a specific conduct should be
criminalised in domestic law. A person should not be treated differently than the rest of the
people present in a state, in the sense that he could be incarcerated for an act that no one else
in that country could be incarcerated for. The basic objects of the legality principle - to avoid
arbitrariness and discrimination - should be presumed to be the objects of extradition law as
well. These objects would be violated if double criminality were not complied with, as any
person could be apprehended and placed in custody facing extradition for an act that happens
to be a crime somewhere else.
16 Is there a General Duty to Extradite in International Law?
Grotius and other early legal scholars argued that there existed an obligation to extradite or
prosecute in international customary law.112 Today there is universal agreement that no such
general obligation exists.i" No state can demand, as a matter of right, an extradition from
III Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 55.
112 Joyner & Rothbaum, 232. Bedi says among scholars advocating an obligation to extradite or try were Grotius,
Vattel, Story and Kent, 29.
113 Gilbert, 14,47, Schultz, 9, Shaw, International Law 4 ed (1997), 482, Bedi, 30, Joyner & Rothbaum, 232,
Aughterson, 2, Henning, 350, La Forest, 16. As for American jurisprudence, any uncertainties to this point were
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another state, unless the demand is authorised in an express treaty stipulation.i'" A sovereign
state has full authority 0ver a 11individuals within its territory and may deport or extradite
anyone it wishes, or grant asylum and immunity from prosecution to fugitives.115 However,
the i nterests of society demand that crimes do not remain unpunished. To a void impunity,
many conventions adopt a system where the signatory states oblige themselves to either
extradite or try the fugitive. This is the principle of aut dedere autjudicare.
Aut dedere aut judicare is encompassed in general extradition treaties as well as treaties
creating international crimes. Depending on the wording of the treaty, it may apply to
domestic crimes as well as international crimes. With regard to ordinary crimes there is
undoubtedly no duty to extradite or prosecute in general internationallaw.116 Only a treaty can
establish this duty. As for international crimes, scholars have distinguished a development in
international criminal law, apart from treaty-obligations, of a general obligation to either
extradite or prosecute. 117
A potential obligation could be based on customary international law, general principles of
law, or jus cogens. Such a duty could conflict with a requirement of double criminality. It is
thus necessary to give an account of the content of this potential rule, its position in
international law and its possible effects on double criminality.
1 6 1 Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in Conventions
An obligation to extradite or try is created to prevent safe havens for criminals and deter them
from committing crimes and fleeing abroad. I IS It imposes a duty of non-asylum on the
custodian state. 119 G rotius defined the principle a s a ut dedere a ut punire, which means to
brushed aside when the Supreme Court in 1840 in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 1840, stated that 0 nly a
treaty could impose a legal obligation to extradite in international law.
114 Bedi, 61, Blakesley & Lagodny, 69.
115 Bassiouni & Wise, xi, La Forest, 37, Bedi, 28-30, 61. Aughterson says "[f]rom antiquity, the right ofa state to
protect persons within its territory was seen as a manifestation of the inviolability and integrity of the state," 34.
116 Bassiouni & Wise, 23.
117 Gilbert, 14, Bassiouni & Wise, 3.
118 Levine, "Cuban Hijackers and the United States: The Need for a Modified Aut Dedere aut Judicare Rule",
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law p. 133 (1995), 133, 137.
119 Enache-Brown & Fried, "Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and Duty: The Obligation of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare
in International Law", McGill Law Journal p. 613 (1998), 626.
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extradite or punish.120 For either element to apply, Grotius presupposed that the offender had
been found guilty.121 The modem version aut dedere aut judicare reflects the fact that the
fugitive may be innocent.
Aut dedere autjudicare a ppears in varying formulations. T here is nop rimacy for the 0ne
alternative to the other, unless stated in the treaty. The principle usually springs to life once
the custodian state receives a request for extradition, and i f extradition is denied, t he case
must be submitted to the competent authorities, which are required to take the ordinary steps
towards prosecution.l" Prosecuting authorities decide on whether and how to proceed, and
the outcome may not be a tria1.123The aut dedere aut judicare principle breaks down if the
state does not make a good faith effort to prosecute the crimes.124 The European Convention
on Extradition enshrines aut dedere autjudicare in article 6 paragraph 2:
"If the requested Party does not extradite its national, it shall at the request of the
requesting Party submit the case to its competent authorities in order that
proceedings may be taken if they are considered appropriate."
1 6 2 Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in International Law
It has been claimed there is a general obligation in international law to extradite or prosecute
for international crimes, detached from the treaties that originally created this system for these
particular crimes. International crimes are founded in customary international law and
treaties.125 The notion of international crimes and obligations following this status were
created because of the need for international co-operation in fighting this particular
conduct.126 Because these crimes directly or indirectly affect other states, the perpetrators are
120 Bassiouni & Wise, 4. The idea is apparently attributable to Baldus in the fourteenth century, 27.
121 Bassiouni & Wise, 39.
122 Levine, 140.
123 Levine, 138-140, Joyner & Rothbaum, 248.
124 Joyner & Rothbaum, 253.
125 For instance, a fier the Second World War the Nazi leaders were tried at the Nuremberg Trial for crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity based on customary international law. After the war
many conventions created international crimes, for example the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1984. The crime of genocide is also part 0 f crimes against humanity in customary
international law.
126 Gardocki, "The Principle of Universality" in Jareborg (ed) Double Criminality. Studies in International
Criminal Law (1989),68.
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hosti humani generis, enemies of all people and humankind. 127
There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes an international crime, but
several factors may give an indication.l" A strong indication is the fact that the conduct has
been defined by an international convention, requiring states to proscribe and prosecute such
conduct.129Another factor is the scope of the crime; some are directed against or are inimical
to the international community as a whole, threatening international peace and order. A third
factor is the heinous nature of certain crimes. International crimes could thus loosely be
defined as offences of sufficient international concern so as to be the subject of international
law requiring states to take steps of some sort to co-operate in their suppression.P"
A few authors argue aut d edere aut judicare for international crimes i s part of customary
international law.l" Opinions on the subject differ. The system is adopted in a large and ever-
increasing n umber 0 f international instruments dealing with international crimes. Domestic
laws on the subject vary.132The rule is, however, often ignored in practice.133 State practice
does thus not furnish consistent evidence of the existence of a general obligation to extradite
or prosecute with respect to international offences in general.i'" Whether a duty to extradite or
prosecute is an implication of international crimes, is by no means clear in international law.
However, the possibility that this custom is in the process of developing for specific
international crimes should not be ruled out.
Aut dedere aut judicare may also have become a general principle of international law. The
incremental number of instruments implementing a ut d edere a ut judicare for international
crimes shows the widespread and increasing recognition of this principle. However, the
abundance of variations of the principle makes it difficult to speak of a uniform principle that
127 Steven, 433-434, Enache-Brown & Fried, 622.
128 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 48.
129 A formal denomination as "international crime" is not necessary as international crimes also exist in
customary international law.
130 Bassiouni & Wise, 5-6. Some authors argue that accompanying principles such as universal jurisdiction and
aut dedere aut judicare designates international crimes. It is however more common to view these principles as
corollaries, and not prerequisites, of international crimes, see for instance Van den Wyngaert, 48.
131 Joyner & Rothbaum, 240, Steven, 430.
132 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 48.
133 Levine, 144.
134 Bassiouni & Wise, 43.
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most states adhere to. And a strict application could easily violate human rights.135
Furthermore, it would be difficult to distinguish whether such a principle applies to a specific
international crime, a certain class of international crimes or to international crimes in
general.136 Authors advocating a general principle do so out of a conviction that it is the most
efficient way of dealing with i nternational 0 ffenders.137 The propriety 0 f deducing general
rules 0 flaw from the necessity in establishing Iaw a nd 0 rder, can be questioned.V" There
seems not to be a general conception that aut dedere aut judicare is a general principle of
international law.
The distinction between international crimes that are jus cogens and those that are not must be
kept in mind when examining the rights and duties of states in enforcing international
criminal law.139 A few international crimes have become rules of jus cogens .140To declare a
rule of international law to be peremptory has no meaning unless there are certain
consequences of this particular status other than not breaching these norms. The question is
whether states merely have a right tot reat these c rimes more firmly than other crimes, or
whether they are obliged to do so. Bassiouni says the answer in international law is uncertain,
but that he supports the view that there are obligations following from jus cogens called
obligatio erga omnes, as otherwise there would be no point in characterising these rules as
peremptory.v" It is widely assumed that there is a relation between jus cogens and erga
omnes rules, but the character of this relationship is disputed.142
The International Court of Justice describes obligatio erga omnes as "obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole."143 Scholars supporting the jus cogens-based
135 For instance if a Jew were to hijack a plane to escape Nazi Germany, Levine, 136. If one were to include
human rights in aut dedere aut judicare the chances that the international community would reach an agreement
on which human rights should be considered are very slim, Levine, 151.
136 Bassiouni & Wise, 21-22.
137 Enache-Brown & Fried adhere to this argumentation, 613, 631-632.
138 Bassiouni & Wise, xiv.
139 Steven, 436.
140 According to Bassiouni in Joyner (ed) legal literature accepts as jus cogens the crimes of aggression,
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practice, and torture.
Indications on such crimes are; the crime must threaten peace and security of humankind, shock the conscience
of humanity, and explicitly or implicitly be characterized by state policy and conduct. Other indications are the
historical legal evolution of the crime, the number of states incorporating the proscriptions in domestic law, the
number of prosecutions of this crime, evidences in general principles oflaw, and scholarly writings, 139-143.
141 Bassiouni in Joyner (ed), 136, 148.
142 Byers, 211. Byers argues erga omnes rules derive from customary international law or treaties, 239.
143 Bassiouni in Joyner (ed) quotes Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, (Belgium v. Spain)
Judgement, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, 146. In this decision however, the court makes no mention of jus cogens, De
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obligatio erga omnes agree that the principle aut dedere autjudicare is included.l44 However,
state practice does not support scholarly writings that there exists an obligatio erga omnes to
prosecute or extradite forjus cogens crimes. On the contrary, evidence shows that such a rule
"is more inchoate than established, other than when it arises out of specific treaty
obligations.,,145
It could thus be concluded that in general international I aw there does not exist a general
obligation to extradite or try for international crimes. The possibility that a general obligation
to extradite or try for certain international crimes is developing gradually, however, should
not be ruled out. Not extraditing or prosecuting may seem to be an abuse of right, but today it
nevertheless still is a state's right.
1 6 3 Double Criminality and Aut Dedere Aut Judicare
A potential obligation to extradite or try for international crimes in general international law
could collide with the principles of double criminality and legality if the offence is not
criminal in the requested state. This scenario is not unlikely where new crimes are involved,
for example, if computer crimes were to become international crimes.l'" or where the
requested s tate in breach 0 f a convention h as not implemented an international crime into
domestic legislation. The requested state cannot extradite due to lack of double criminality
and it cannot prosecute because of the legality principle.
One could argue that the principle of double criminality is inherent in the principle aut dedere
aut judicare, as would be the case where both principles are stipulated in a convention such
as, for instance, the European Convention on Extradition. Conventions including aut dedere
aut judicare still leave extradition subject to other conditions imposed by the pertinent
Hoogh, 193. The concept of obligatio erga omnes for jus cogens crimes has support in statements in other
desicions by the International Court of Justice, Bassiouni in Joyner (ed), 147.
144 Bassiouni in Joyner (ed) includes aut dedere aut judicare, universal jurisdiction, non-applicability of statutes
of limitations, non-applicability of immunities, non-applicability of the defense of "obedience to superior
orders", universal application of these obligations whether in time of peace or war, and non-derogation under
state of emergency, 133. Steven accepts the notion of obligatio erga omnes, but prefers to describe aut dedere
aut judicare as ajus cogens norm, at least where jus cogens crimes are involved, 431, 447-448, 450. Bassiouni &
Wise also accept this proposition, 25.
145 Bassiouni in Joyner (ed), 137.
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extradition treaties or by the extradition law of the state.147 On the other hand, the object of an
obligation to extradite or prosecute is to ensure that perpetrators of the most heinous offences
are brought to justice irrespective of traditional obstacles. Nevertheless, as long as the
principle aut dedere aut judicare is based in a treaty or on customary international law, the
principle of double criminality as well as other principles of extradition law based on the same
legal sources must be complied with as an integral part of aut dedere autjudicare.
The duty to extradite or prosecute may also collide with the legality principle in criminal
law.148 If extradition were refused because the requested state has not criminalised the
conduct in question, this would naturally also obstruct prosecution. Though the legality
principle is not described as a norm of jus cogens, it is a fundamental principle of criminal
law and one can hardly imagine situations where a state would be willing to abrogate this
principle in order to satisfy an obligation to extradite or prosecute. 149
146 For instance, in the Phillipines the masterminds behind inventing and spreading the so-called love bug virus
over the internet in May 2000 could not be prosecuted (and hence not extradited) because computer hacking and
the spreading of viruses were not covered by the penal codes, www.usatoday.comllife/cyber/techicti095.htm.
147 8assiouni & Wise, 10.
148 Levine, 133.
149 Gardocki, 57.
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2 Interpretation of Double Criminality
2 1 Introduction
The requirement of double criminality in extradition means that t he court int he requested
state has to determine whether the conduct for which extradition is requested also constitutes
a criminal offence in domestic law. It is, however, not necessary that the court be competent
to try the fugitive in the specific case. ISO When deciding on double criminality, the court does
not interpret the treaty or the extradition statutes, as would be the case with the condition of
"extraditable crimes", but the criminal statutes. The court has to examine domestic criminal
law.lsi
The core of the double criminality principle has become a standard stipulation in instruments
of domestic and international extradition law. Though simple to express, the principle gives
rise to difficult interpretational problems. First of all, the provisions are vague, individually
formulated and generally omit to specify how double criminality is to be interpreted. For
instance, the European Convention 0 n Extradition article 2 paragraph 1 states" extradition
shall be granted in respect of offences punishable under the laws of the requesting Party and
of the requested Party." Secondly, there is a web of prerequisites attached to it, expanding or
limiting the scope of the principle.l'''
Conformity exists neither in domestic nor international instruments on extradition.P'' There
are also wide variations as to the laws and institutions of the different states.IS4 Despite a long
history 0 f double criminality a nd i ncreasing u niformity among legal standards i n domestic
and international law, there are still tangible differences in the interpretation of the double
criminality principle. The multiple rationale of the double criminality principle will naturally
150 Rintelen, 15-16.
151 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 50.
152 Hafen, 195.
153 Plachta, 110-111.
154 Bedi, 70.
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influence the way that the principle is or should be interpreted. lts ability to serve its purposes
depends on the applicable instrument adopting this principle. ISS
There are three aspects of double criminality that require examination. The first i s how to
interpret the "criminality" of the offence and the required degree of similarity between the
penal laws of the two states and the problem of comparing the laws with the actual conduct.
This is called the substantive question of double criminality. The second aspect that needs
examination is whether the place of the criminal conduct and subsequent extraterritorial
jurisdiction, is of relevance. This is the locational question of double criminality. The third
aspect is the relevance of the point in time at which the conduct was criminalised in the law of
the requested state; t his is called the temporal question 0 f double criminality. These three
issues will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
2 2 The Substantial Question: Interpretation of Criminality
At first sight one would think double criminality represents not too many difficulties as states
generally prohibit the same conduct.156 Ordinary offences, for instance dishonesty offences
such as murder and theft, are criminalised with certainty by all states. There are nevertheless
considerable differences as to what is regarded as deserving of punishment, particularly where
criminalisation is based on moral and religious grounds. Even geographically, culturally and
politically close states show significant discrepancies.l'" For instance, Germany has a more
liberal attitude towards pornography and the Netherlands a more liberal attitude towards
cannabis than most other countries. ISS The double criminality doctrine runs, however, deeper
than analysing general attitudes towards specific types of conduct. As double criminality
provisions do not give any indications on the accuracy of interpretation of domestic law, it has
become the judiciary's task to decide on how to interpret this requirement.
155 Hafen, 195.
156 Plachta, 101.
157 Shearer, 138.
158 Gilbert, 104.
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2 2 1 Interpretation of Domestic and Foreign Law
Double criminality must necessarily involve some form of comparative analysis of the
domestic criminal law and the criminal law in the requesting state. Treaties and domestic
statutes rarely say anything about the nature of this comparison. There has been some
uncertainty as to what extent the court of the requested state needs to examine not only the lex
fori but also lex loci delicti.159 The court of the requested state has basically three choices. It
could presume criminality in the requesting state by virtue of the request; it could demand an
affidavit presenting the law of the requesting state; or it could take the hard way of examining
the foreign criminal law.
Supporters of a strict comparative analysis argue that the extradition request may be a cloak to
obtain custody of a fugitive for the wrong reasons, for instance, for his political beliefs and
activities, violating his human rights. For this reason courts have in the past taken upon them
the difficult task of interpreting foreign criminal law when conducting a comparative analysis
of the two sets of legislation.P" On the other hand, if extradition is sought, for instance, on
political, social, religious or racial grounds, it is not the double criminality requirement, but
other provisions that safeguard the fugitive's rights that need consideration. This may be
apparent in many extradition schemes today, but the protection of human rights in extradition
cases has not always been obvious.
It has been claimed that the requested state, as an act of comity, should put suspicions aside
and take the criminality in the requesting state for granted. It should be assumed that a request
for extradition is based on a violation of the law. A presumption of criminality in the
requesting state is similar to the rule of non-inquiry, which forbids an inquiry into the nature
of other states' criminal laws. But trusting other states blindly in their motives for requesting
extradition could be naive. Extradition is largely influenced by politics and extraditions are
known to have taken place to retrieve political offenders. Furthermore, the strong obstinacy in
protecting sovereignty does not support a presumption of criminality.
Much of the criticism directed against the double criminality requirement has been based on
the assumption that courts have to delve into foreign law through the methods of comparative
IS9 Shearer, 138.
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law.161 Interpreting foreign law is a hazardous venture that could easily go awry as the law
and legal theory are unfamiliar.162 The danger of making a mistake is significant. Domestic
legislation is best interpreted by the courts of that state. This is the main justification of not
scrutinising foreign law today.
Between the two extremes of scrutinising foreign law and simply assuming criminality in the
requesting state, t here is a middle road. A state requesting extradition will usually issue a
warrant or an affidavit describing the elements of the offence. The formal extradition request
includes a description of the crime in the law of the requesting state.163 Australian law
requires only that the magistrate examine such affidavits and not the foreign law itself.164 This
is also the case in Canada.l'"
During the twentieth century courts in the United States have adopted a more liberal approach
towards the requirement of double criminality and most of them do not interpret the law of the
requesting state any longer, but simply assume that the offence constitutes a crime in the
requesting state as certified in an affidavit.166 This is due partly to practical reasons and partly
to a general desire to reduce the obstacles to extradition for serious crimes.167 The European
approach is also to concentrate on domestic law.168
Since the issue of the offender's guilt is not a topic of extensive review in an extradition case
and one can generally suppose that the foreign state will not request extradition unless a crime
has taken place, an examination of the charge or conviction as stated in the requesting
documents should be enough. 169 This is also the case where a s tate has b een requested to
160 Shearer, 139, Stanbrook & Stanbrook, 21, Hafen, 197.
161 Plachta, 129-130, Blakesley & Lagodny, 54.
162 Shearer, 140, Aughterson, 58, 80-81, Adler, 39.
163 Blakesley, "The Law of International Extradition: A Comparative Study" in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert
(eds) International Criminal Law and Procedure (1996), 157.
164 Aughterson, 58-59, 81.
165 http://www.lawsmart.com/canada/criminal/extradition.htm.
166 Hafen, 198, Blakesley & Lagodny, 54. This affidavit could be compared with the complaint and warrant
application for a provisional arrest warrant for fugitives in international extradition matters, which specifies only
a minimum of information, su ch as information on the existence and nature of the foreign charge against the
fugitive and a brief synopsis of the facts underlying the foreign charges, Wiehl, "Extradition Law at the
Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting
Extradition from the United States", Michigan Journal of International Law, p. 729 (1997/98), 748-749.
167 Hafen, 197-198.
168 Palmer, 41.
169 Palmer, 41-42.
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provide judicial assistance, for instance, 0 btaining e vidence.I?O The court 0 nly needs to be
informed of the elements constituting the crime.
The judge examining double criminality must consider a hypothetical situation of the same
conduct taking place in a new jurisdiction under a new set ofrules.I?1 The question is whether
the fugitive's conduct, ifït were committed within the requested state's jurisdiction, would
constitute a crime according to the requested state's law. This is the essence of double
criminality and it leaves a strict examination of foreign law redundant. In
Whether criminality is assumed without further ado or whether the requested state examines
the submitted documents, it is generally accepted that a court should not examine foreign law.
The situation could, however, be different if the fugitive himself claims that the conduct for
which his extradition is sought is not criminal in the requesting state.I?3
2 2 2 Extraditable Crimes
Extradition is a complicated, expensive and time-consuming process and hence states wish to
reserve this process for offences of some gravity. Treaties and domestic statutes on extradition
determine what crimes should be considered extraditable. These crimes are called
"extraditable crimes" and are either positively enumerated or negatively delimited/eliminated.
The enumerative method, a lso called the list method, specifies the crimes by t heir names,
whereas the eliminative method, also called the no-list method, delimits the pertinent crimes
by a general formula of conditions, usually a minimum sentence prerequisite.l "
Apart from the extradition treaties and statutes, conventions on international crimes and co-
operation in criminal matters can also stipulate extraditable crimes. Such conventions can
describe international crimes as extraditable crimes to be included in existing extradition
treaties previously concluded by the State P arties. Furthermore, such conventions c an also
170Murray & Harris, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000), say that the criminal elements of the relevant
offence must be clearly described so that the requested state can be satisfied that the conduct is a crime in the
requesting state, 50.
171Plachta, 105.
172 Shearer, 140.
173Shearer, 140.
174Aughterson, 43.
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stipulate that they are to be considered as extradition treaties between two State Parties where
an extradition treaty does not exist and the domestic law of at least one of the states requires
an extradition treaty in order to extradite. These systems are, for instance, incorporated into
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000.175
The requirement of "extraditable crimes" originated in the enumerative extradition treaty, as
the enumeration itself was the list of extraditable crimes. Early extradition treaties and
domestic extradition statutes named either a specific group of wanted persons or a type or
class 0 f offences. F or instance, a treaty between England and Scotland of 1533 applied to
"homicides, thieves, robbers and fugitives" and a treaty of Netherlands-Hanover of 1817
provided extradition for "murderers, those who have committed robbery by breaking in,
robbers who make the public highway unsafe and others of the like.,,176Later it became
common to list the pertinent crimes by their names.
The scope of the enumerative method was limited. Denominations were vague and
interpretation problems arose as different jurisprudences had different names for and
delimitations of the crimes. A further problem was the time-consuming and costly business of
constantly updating the provisions. The need to expand the lists became more evident as
societies became more sophisticated, creating more crimes. Because of these apparent
disadvantages, modem extradition treaties usually abstain from applying the enumerative
method.177 The "extraditable crime" requirement has persisted, though in a new form.
Extraditable cnmes are today defined by a minimum penalty requirement. Most treaties
regard a minimum imprisonment of one or two years to be sufficient. The Norwegian
Extradition Act 1975 says extradition c an 0 nly take place for a conduct that, according to
Norwegian law, can be punished with one year of imprisonment or more.178 The reciprocal
extradition scheme between the five Nordic countries is less strict. The Norwegian Act on
Extradition between the Nordic Countries 1961 demands a more severe penalty than a fine in
order to extradite a fugitive to Iceland, Sweden, Denmark or Finland.179
175 Kemp, 164.
176 Shearer, 133.
177 Gilbert, 85, Aughterson, 43.
178 Lov 13. juni 1975 Nr. 39 om utlevering av lovbrytere m.v., § I.
179 Lov 3. mars 1961 Nr.lom utlevering av lovbrytere til Danmark, Finnland, Island og Sverige, §§ 1 and 3.
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Despite the eliminative method's clear advantage of not leaving out cnmes, it must be
interpreted with care as its wide ambit and lack of precision can lead to misinterpretations. It
is thus important to couple i t with a requirement of double criminality.l'" The eliminative
method may also be defined in terms of double criminality. The Norwegian Extradition Act
1975,181 the Australian Extradition Act 1988,182 and the United Kingdom Extradition Act
1989183 describe extraditable offences by both a minimum imprisonment and a double
criminality requirement. The European Convention on Extradition describes the extraditable
crimes in terms of double criminality and a minimum imprisonment prerequisite in article 2
paragraph 1:
"Extradition shall be granted in respect of offences punishable under the laws of
the requesting Party and of the requested Party by deprivation of liberty or under a
detention order for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe
penalty. Where a conviction and prison sentence have occurred or a detention
order has been made in the territory of the requesting Party, the punishment
awarded must have been for a period of at least four months."
The phrase "or by a more severe penalty" does not mean corporal punishment or capital
punishment.l'" According to the Explanatory Report 0 f the Council 0 f Europe, this article
means that a maximum imprisonment period of one year is a minimum requirement for
extraditable offences.185
The requirement of a minimum sentence provision may raise difficulties for states that do not
stipulate a mandatory minimum incarceration period in their penal provisions. A strict
interpretation of such articles would mean that these states could not obtain extradition even
for serious crimes like manslaughter. One way of dealing with this question is to exchange the
180 Gilbert, 86.
181 Lov 13. juni 1975 Nr. 39 om utlevering av lovbrytere m.v., §§ 1 and 3.
182 Australian Extradition Act 1988 ss. 5, 16 and 19, Aughterson, 43, 55-56.
183 United Kingdom Extradition Act 1989 s. 2.
184 The convention does not prohibit extradition where the fugitive may receive the death penalty, though article
II gives the requested state the right to refuse extradition under such circumstances. Other instruments exclude
extradition where the fugitive can risk corporal and capital punishments, torture and other inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment.
18S Council of Europe, Revised edition of the Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Extradition of
1957 (1985), in the commentaries on Article 2 Paragraph 1. See www.conventions.coe.int. The Explanatory
Report i s not a I egally binding i nstrument of I aw, but serves a s a means of interpretation of t he convention,
Blakesley & Lagodny, 61.
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minimum imprisonment period with a "possible" imprisonment period. In this way extradition
for severe crimes is not obstructed. On the other hand, lesser crimes also qualify as
extraditable crimes, which they would otherwise not under a strict interpretation of the article.
State practice, however, leaves no evidence of a strict interpretation of minimum period
requirements.l'"
As for convicted criminals, extradition treaties adopt a nummum imposed sentence
requirement. For instance, under the European Convention a convicted criminal can only be
extradited if the imposed sentence was at least four months. According to the Explanatory
Report, the requirement in the first part of the section, namely that the maximum period that
can be awarded must be at least one year, must also be fulfilled where extradition is sought
for a convicted criminal. This is logical, as the opposite assumption would set a lower
threshold for extradition of fugitives that have already been convicted. On the other hand, the
current system gives convicted fugitives stronger protection than fugitives still awaiting their
trials, as there are two sentence requirements to comply with. This ensures that the costly and
time-consuming process of extradition is not applied in insignificant cases.
The requirements of extraditable crimes and double criminality are closely attached to each
other.18? Double criminality must be observed whether the enumerative or eliminative method
is applied.188 Where the enumerative method is used, the condition of extraditable crimes has
an independent function. It is not enough that the conduct in question is criminalised under
the criminal laws of both states; it must also be specifically mentioned in the list of
extraditable crimes in the extradition law and the extradition treaty.
Where the eliminative method is adopted, double criminality is often a qualification of the
extraditable crime.189 It is not possible to establish the extraditability of the crime without it
being criminalised in both states. As more treaties adopt the eliminative method, the fusion of
these requirements becomes more common.
186 Shearer, 136.
187 Hafen describes t he requirement 0 f an extraditable crime as an "embellishment" to the double criminality
requirement, 195.
188 Shearer, 137, Plachta, 112.
189 Shearer, 138.
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2 2 3 Interpretation In Concreto
The interpretation of double criminality varies from state to state and from case to case. The
judiciary has developed theories of interpretation and legal scholars have distinguished two
main approaches. One is to view the offence in legal terms and examine whether it constitutes
a crime in both states, the other is to examine whether the conduct is punishable in both
states. These two lines of interpretation are in legal theory called interpretation in concreto
and in abstracto respectively.i'" There are many variations of the two approaches and states
have to some extent applied a combination of these methods.
Interpretation in concreto, also called qualified double criminality.l'" relied originally on two
factors.l92 The first factor was an identical denomination of the crime in the two statutes. This
strictly formal prerequisite was developed by courts interpreting enumerated extraditable
crimes, but it has been abandoned in modem international extradition law. No state demands a
correspondence of names. 193
In Aamand v. SmithwicJ!94 the Irish Supreme Court said extradition formed part of the penal
codes and hence necessitated a strict interpretation. There should be no room for ambiguity in
the law, which might lead to arbitrary treatment of persons facing extradition. The court said,
however, that provisions of the Irish Extradition Act 1965 section 10 (1) "which speak of an
offence punishable under the laws of the requesting country and of the State could not be too
narrowly construed where, for example, the offence named in the request from the requesting
country could not be matched by any offence of a similar name in Ireland but the acts
constituting the named offence would constitute an offence punishable by the laws of
Ireland."195
The second factor of the in concreto interpretation is an analysis of the elements of the
offence. It includes a strict comparative analysis of the elements of the crime as described in
the laws of the requesting and the requested state. The correspondence of elements test was
190 Aughterson, 61, Hafen, 199, Plachta, 105, Gilbert, 106, Palmer, 44.
191 Plachta, 108.
192 Hafen, 199.
193 Gilbert, 106, Henning, 352.
194 Aamand v. Smithwick [1995] 1 ILRM 61.
195 Aamand v. Smithwick, 68.
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the inducement for courts to scrutinise foreign law. Today courts compare the described
elements in the extradition request with the domestic law.
The correspondence of elements test can be illustrated algebraically. If the offence in the
requesting state consists of the elements a+b+c and the equivalent offence in the requested
state consists of the elements a +b or a+b+c, there is a correspondence of elements as the
offence in the requested state is embraced by the crime in the requesting state. If the elements
of t he 0 ffence in t he requested s tate were a+b+c+d, t here would ben 0 correspondence of
elements as the law of the requesting state falls short of one element in being a crime in the
requested state.196
If the court finds according to the correspondence of elements test that the two statutes match,
the court applies the domestic law theoretically to the conduct of the alleged offender.l'" The
court of the requested state could even be more specific in establishing double criminality. In
the in concreto test one could regard mitigating and aggravating elements of both a
substantive and a procedural character, just like the court deciding the criminal case.
The court deciding the criminal case must examine all personal, factual and legal
circumstances. Consideration must be given to rules related to extraterritorial jurisdiction,
rules of complaints of the injured person, lapse of time, t he age and mental health of t he
offender, degrees 0 f guilt, pardon, a mnesty, immunity, specific circumstances under which
the offence took place, self-defence, force majeure, superior orders, provocation, withdrawal
from attempt, and active efforts to prevent the effects of an already consummated crime, etc.,
and possibly also foreign law.
Does the judge deciding an extradition case have to pay attention to these elements as weIl?
Most authors agree that the in concreto interpretation involves an examination of all objective
and subjective elements as well as the punishability of the perpetrator.l'" The fugitive must be
punishable under the concrete circumstances, meaning he is capable of bearing criminal
liability. Van den Wyngaert says that "it is not sufficient for the crime to be punishable 'in the
books'; the judge must also look at the elements which, in the concrete circumstances, either
196 Gilbert, 109, and Aughterson, 62-63, refer to the Irish Supreme Court case of State (Furlong) v Kelly, [1971]
IR 132, which illustrates the double criminality requirement algebraically.
197 Hafen, 199.
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justify or excuse the act (substantive elements) or make prosecution impossible (procedural
impediments)." 199
A strict in concreto interpretation means that the judge has to consider whether the conduct
theoretically constitutes a crime and whether the perpetrator actually can be punished. This
interpretation is the same as the one that the judge eventually deciding the criminal case in the
requested state has to make. Both judges decide the criminality of the conduct of this
particular offender in that particular situation according to domestic law. Obviously, such an
interpretation would be preferable from the fugitive's point of view as it creates additional
barriers to extradition. Whether none, some or all of these elements will be taken into
consideration in an extradition case depends on the law of each state.
2 2 4 Interpretation In Abstracto
The second method of interpreting double criminality is the in abstracto interpretation, which
involves an examination of the punishability of the conduct.2oo A correspondence of
criminalised conduct focuses on the nature of the acts involved rather than associated factors
such as the name and legal classification of the offences, or the theory of jurisdiction that is
exercised over these acts by the legislature of the requesting state.201 The conduct controls
double criminality. The offence is extraditable when the acts of the fugitive qualify as being a
crime in the requested state_2°2The in abstracto interpretation comports with the principle of
sovereignty, as the extradition state does not impose its specific standards of criminal law and
procedure on the requesting state.
Since focus is on the actual conduct of the fugitive, the in abstracto interpretation does not
compare the crimes a s described in the law of t he two countries. Therefore, the pertinent
crimes need not have identical names or scope. As a consequence, the concrete circumstances
in the case are not considered either.203 Interpretation in abstracto is based exclusively on the
198 Plachta, 105, 109, Palmer, 44-45, Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 51.
199 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 51.
200 Hafen, 199-200.
201 Mullan, "The Concept of Double Criminality in the Context of Extraterritorial Crimes", Criminal Law Review
p. 17 (1997), 21, Plachta, 108-109.
202 Palmer, 44, Aughterson, 61.
203 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 51.
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objective and material circumstances of the offence and disregards subjective and personal
grounds of criminal Iiability.i'" For instance, where the time for prosecution has elapsed in the
lex loci delicti - a fact that would be considered under an in concreto interpretation - it would
be ignored under an in abstracto interpretation as this method only concerns itself with the
criminality of the conduct as such.
The United States has shifted from adhering to an in concreto interpretation to applying an in
abstracto interpretation.i'" This shift came about particularly through three decisions by the
United States Supreme Court where extradition was requested by Great Britain. In Wright v.
HenkeP06 extradition was requested of a person charged with the extraditable crime of fraud.
The elements constituting the crime of fraud in the two jurisdictions, however, were
different.207 The Supreme Court ruled that the double criminality requirement was satisfied, as
the statutes were "substantially analogous.,,208
In the second case, Col/ins v. Loisel,209 a man was charged in Britain with the crime of
cheating, which corresponds i nAmerican jurisprudence tot he crime 0 f obtaining property
under false pretences. The defendant argued that neither the requirement of extraditable
offences nor the requirement of double criminality were satisfied. The court rejected this by
stating "[t]he law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in the two
countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other
respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in
both jurisdictions.Y" The court clearly adopted an in abstracto interpretation.
However, in the third case, Factor v. Laubenheimer.i' ' the defendant was charged in Britain
with the crime of receiving stolen property. This was not a crime in Illinois, but the court said
the conduct was a crime in a majority of American states and thus double criminality was
204 Plachta, 109.
205 Hafen, 200, Blakesley & Lagodny, 54.
206 Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
207 The British statute punished the making, circulating or publishing with intent to deceive or defraud, of false
statements 0 r accounts 0 f a body corporate 0 r public company, known to be false, by a director, manager 0 r
public officer thereof. According to the New York statute it was a misdemeanor if an officer or director of a
corporation knowingly concurred in making or publishing any written report, exhibit or statement of its affairs or
pecuniary condition, containing any material statement which was false.
208 At 58 the Court says "The two statutes are substantially analogous ... Absolute identity is not required. The
essential character of the transaction is the same, and made criminal in both statutes."
209 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
210 At 312.
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satisfied. The court said treaties should be interpreted liberally and in accordance with the
intent 0 f the parties. The policies behind b road treaty i nterpretations i nfluenced the court's
decision.212
This decision has been disputed. It ignored the fact that the conduct of the defendant actually
could be construed as criminal under the laws of Illinois and it did thus not follow the line
drawn by Collins v. Loisel. Factor v. Laubenheimer does not nullify the Collins v. Loisel test,
but expands the double criminality requirement to such extremes that it almost becomes
meaningless.i" Lower courts have divided themselves into following either Wright v. Henkel
or Collins v. Loisel. Even though courts in the United States are not united in their
interpretation of double criminality, they are through these decisions granted sufficient
freedom to balance the opposing interests of states and individuals.t'" Overall, courts in the
United States apply the in abstracto interpretation of double criminality.
An example of an in abstracto interpretation by a United States court is a decision by the
Court of Appeals where the extradition of a juvenile to Hong Kong was requested.i" The
applicable treaty in this case did not include a provision on juveniles, which is a common
provision in extradition treaties. Hu Yau-Leung was charged in Hong Kong with armed
robbery committed at the age of sixteen. The question formulated by the Court of Appeals
was whether the acts committed by Hu Yau-Leung would have been a crime if committed in
the United States. The answer was affirmative. The court said the limited scope of an
extradition hearing does not extend to collateral issues that would be subject to the trial court
deciding on the merits. The enquiry was supposed to end as soon as it was found that the
detainee could be convicted of a felony according to the law of the United States.i"
The replacement by the United Kingdom Extradition Act 1989 of the list system of
extraditable offences in the old extradition law with a minimum punishability standard,
indicates that the offences do not have to be identically named or constituted. This change
may suggest that the focus of the double criminality rule is on the wrongfulness of the
211 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
212 Hafen, 203.
213 The decision allows the requested state to choose between federal law and state law when deciding double
criminality, Hafen, 205.
214 Hafen, 203-204.
215 The case Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.) is described by Levy, "Double Criminality and the
U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty: Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia", Brooklyn Journal of International Law p. 475 (1982).
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particular conduct.217 It is accepted in the United Kingdom that the double criminality
requirement applies to the fugitive's alleged conduct, which will be regarded as if it had been
committed in the United Kingdom. The Extradition Act 1989 concerns the punishability of
the conduct.i'" This is also the approach in Canada219 and Australia.22o
2 2 5 Prevalent Interpretation in International Extradition Law
It is not clear what method of interpretation prevails in practice.221 In 1880 the Institute of
International Law advocated that "as a rule it should be required that the acts to which
extradition applies be punishable by the law of both countries. ,,222In 1909 Rintelen claimed
the principle of double criminality in international law requires an in abstracto interpretation.
The requested state has to satisfy itself of "die Strafbarkeit der fraglichen Handlung", meaning
the" criminality of t he a ct in question. ,,223Shearer also seems to advocate an in abstracto
approach.224
The prevalent view in common law countries is to specify whether the relevant conduct is
criminal in both jurisdictions, rather than requiring that the actual crime charged also is an
offence in the requested state, in other words the in abstracto method_225 Palmer says the in
concreto interpretation is the prevalent approach in Europe and that it is supported by most
European legal scholars, even though the tenth International Congress of Criminal Law
recommended the in abstracto interpretation.F"
Both in concreto and in abstracto interpretations are used in extradition practice.227 The in
concreto interpretation used to be the traditional test. However, the twentieth century has
witnessed a trend towards interpretation in abstracto, which now seems to be the most
216 Levy, 489.
217 Mullan, 21.
218 Stanbrook & Stanbrook, 21.
219 http://www.lawsmart.comlcanada/criminal/extradition.htm.
220 Aughterson, 62.
221 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 51.
222 Aughterson, 61.
223 Rintelen, 16.
224 Shearer, 140.
225 Aughterson, 62.
226 Palmer, 44-45.
227 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 51.
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common approach.228
An explanation of the in abstracto trend may be found in the rationale of double criminality.
Which interpretation method best supports the rationale? In concreto is a very technical
interpretation and does not focus on the actual conduct of the defendant. For instance, where a
person is charged with genocide, this will be a problem for a requested state that has
criminalised only homicide, as the element of "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group,,229 is not part of the crime of homicide.
"Reciprocity and sovereignty do not require that conduct universally considered abhorrent go
unpunished because of the use of unusual elements designed to reach the worst offenders ...,,23o
Considerations of individual rights do not justify the one or the other means of interpreting
double criminality, though the in concreto interpretation is naturally preferable to the
individual, as it creates extra obstacles to extradition. The legality principle, however, may be
an argument in favour of the in concreto interpretation. The principle ensures that the law
covers every aspect of the offender's action and that nothing should be left to chance. Because
extradition is a procedural matter, it could be argued that it requires a lesser degree of
accuracy when examining double criminality. In abstracto is concerned with the
wrongfulness of the action and that should suffice as a basis for extradition.
2 2 6 Double Criminality and Convicted Criminals
Bedi claims that the requirement of double criminality does not apply where extradition is
requested of convicted criminals.Y' This seems to be an uncommon opinion. Most authors on
international extradition law do not make statements on this question, which one would
assume that they would do if they agreed with Bedi, considering that it would represent a
considerable exception to the double criminality requirement.V' Stanbrook & Stanbrook say
double criminality applies to convicted criminals.i" Palmer presupposes that double
228 Gilbert, 106.
229 Article 2 of the Genocide Convention.
230 Hafen quoting Sicalides in discussing truck trafficking offences in the United States, 213.
231 Bedi, 77.
232 La Forest mentions that there might be an exception to the double criminality requirement for convicted
criminals, but seems to base this on Bedi's writings, 55.
233 Stanbrook & Stanbrook, 20.
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criminality is a requirement also where convicted criminals are concerned. She says the
requested state has to examine the conviction in order to establish double criminality.r'"
Extradition treaties and domestic statutes do not exempt convicted criminals from the double
criminality principle. Unless it is expressly stated that double criminality is not required
where the fugitive is convicted, one would assume that all provisions apply to both prosecuted
and convicted fugitives. As the extraditable crime requirement definitely applies to convicted
criminals, exempting them from the double criminality requirement will be technically
impossible where the two requirements are interdependent. There is no reason to treat
suspected and convicted criminals differently. The rationale behind the double criminality
rule is the same in both cases. This could not lead to any other conclusion but that double
criminality also is a requirement where the fugitive is a convicted criminal.
2 3 The Locational Question: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
When a state has custody over a criminal to whom it does not wish to grant asylum and
immunity from prosecution, it can either prosecute the criminal or extradite him to another
state for prosecution. In the first case it must naturally have jurisdiction over the crime. This is
a fundamental rule of criminal law.235
Jurisdiction means the authority, capacity, power and right to act.236 It gives a state authority
to legislate, adjudicate and enforce its laws.237 States enact rules of both civil and criminal
jurisdiction. In this thesis jurisdiction refers to the scope of the penal codes of a state and the
competence of its judiciary to hear criminal cases, regulated in either the criminal code or the
code of criminal procedure. Whether the one or the other method is used, the effect is the
same. It is thus a term for a state's legal competence to act. The term "jurisdiction" as used in
extradition treaties, however, has been interpreted by some states (for instance, the United
States) as refering to the state's territory.238This understanding is not applied in this thesis.
234 Palmer, 42.
235 Gardocki, 57.
236 Bedi, 65.
237 The different forms of jurisdiction match the three branches of government, the legislative, the judicial and
the executive, Gilbert, "Crimes sans Frontiêres: Jurisdictional Problems in English Law" (1993) in Dugard &
Van den Wyngaert (eds) International Criminal Law and Procedure (1996), 102.
238 Blakesly, "A Conceptual Framework. ..", 736.
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The court hearing the criminal case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as
over the person.239 Jurisdiction over the fugitive in person is accomplished where he is
physically present, for instance, after his extradition from another country, though many states
allow for in absentia trials in specific circumstances. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
naturally depends on the law.
Extradition could also depend on jurisdiction. It is disputed to what extent jurisdiction is or
should be part of the double criminality requirement. A few states, mostly common law states,
read a jurisdictional requirement into the double criminality principle.r''" Even when the
crimes match or the conduct as such is criminal in both states, the requested state may refuse
extradition if it does not approve of the jurisdiction asserted by the requesting state.241 In
Anglo-American jurisprudence the locational aspect of double criminality is called "the
special u se of double criminality." In order to give a complete account of this aspect it is
necessary to outline the basic factual and legal properties of criminal jurisdiction.
2 3 1 The Right to Establish Criminal Jurisdiction
According to international law, a state is free to decide the scope of its extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction, u nless there exists an explicit prohibition i n international I aw tot he contrary.
This doctrine was declared by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus
case.242 So far no prohibition has been proved in customary international law.if though some
authors argue there are restrictions.244 There is no uniformly accepted limit to states' right to
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction.v" The principle of freedom of determination on
extraterritorial jurisdiction is a right of the sovereign state and confirmed by uniform state
239 Henning, 349-350.
240 Du Plessis, 676.
241 Blakesley, "A Conceptual Framework ...", 735, Gilbert, 86.
242 Permanent Court ofIntemational Justice, Series A (collection of Judgments) No 10 (1927).
243 Gardocki, 61.
244 Aughterson says "[i]n international law, while it is apparent that there are some, undefined, limitations to the
assumption 0 f criminal jurisdiction, the 0 nus 0 f establishing such limitations is on the state seeking to refute
jurisdiction," 47.
245 Gilbert, 87.
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practice_246 Factors that may affect a state's domestic jurisdictional legislation are its
economic situation, legal history and geographical isolation_247
2 3 2 Jurisdiction over Territorial Crimes and Extraterritorial Crimes
Extradition can be requested for territorial and extraterritorial crimes, provided the requesting
state has jurisdiction. A state always has jurisdiction over crimes committed within its
territory. This is a most fundamental aspect of state sovereignty.t" The courts of the loci
delicti will usually be best equipped to entertain the matter, as witnesses, evidence and the
scene of the crime will be close_249The territorial state is most affected by the crime and is
normally willing to spend sufficient resources on investigation and prosecution.
Extradition ensures that the state most affected by a crime or the state best equipped to
prosecute, will try the fugitive. If a state requests extradition for a crime committed within its
territory, the locational aspect of double criminality will not prevent extradition, as the
requested state naturally accepts the requesting state's territorial jurisdiction.P''
It is common, however, to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the state's
territory. This is where the special use of double criminality may obstruct extradition; some
states, mostly those t hat exercise mainly territorial jurisdiction, don ot extradite for crimes
committed outside the territory of the requesting state, unless they approve of the
extraterritorial jurisdiction claimed by the requesting state.
States are divided in their opinions on what is an acceptable use of extraterritorial jurisdiction
and it is not uncommon to hear states object to other states' exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Common law states generally adopt narrower forms of jurisdiction than is
permitted in most civil law states and international law.25I British and United States
246 Gardocki, 57-59.
247 Mullan points out the factors that caused the United Kingdom to develop a different jurisdictional
jurisprudence than continental Europe, of which particularly the geographical isolation led to "non-, or rather,
extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction," 18.
248 Steven, 432, Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 102.
249 Plachta, 95, La Forest, 16.
250 Hafen says nearly all states recognize territorial jurisdiction, 220. It is not known whether any states do not
recognize this principle.
251 Aughterson, 46.
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jurisdictional policies have been very isolationist, but the list of exceptions is growing.252
Critical voices have been raised against what some view as usurpation of jurisdiction, which
leads to jurisdictional conflicts, and interference with the territorial state's internal affairs and
infringement of its sovereignty. Extraterritorial jurisdiction may even be taken by some as a
general lack of trust in and respect for the criminal laws and procedures of other states.253 The
proximity principle also motivates states to refrain from extraterritorial jurisdiction. The sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution says the accused has the right to a "jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.t't" Similar principles are
stipulated in other states' legislation on criminal procedure, for instance, in the Norwegian
criminal procedure.
Whether the custodian state adopts the special use of double criminality or not, extradition
will rarely be granted for crimes committed in the custodian state itself. This is recognised in
the European Convention on Extradition article 7 paragraph 1:
"The requested Party may refuse to extradite a person claimed for an offence that
is regarded by its law as having been committed in whole or in part in its territory
or in a place treated as its territory."
The principle that territoriality prevails 0 ver extraterritoriality is, however, permissive. For
instance, w here a civil war has I eft t he judiciary with an excessive number 0 f war crimes
cases, it would be legitimate to transfer some cases to foreign courts or international courts.
2 3 3 Jurisdiction over Ordinary Crimes and International Crimes
Fugitives can be extradited for "ordinary" domestic crimes or international crimes. Double
criminality applies irrespective of the type of crime. Whereas various forms of jurisdiction
over ordinary crimes have developed in domestic legislation, which due to widespread
acceptance and use have turned into principles of international law, international law has
252 Stanbrook & Stanbrook, 22, Blakesley & Lagodny, 9.
253 Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 102, 105.
254 Blakesley & Lagodny, 17.
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developed principles of jurisdiction with regard to international crimes.
Because there is no international criminal court adjudicating on international cnmes in
general,255these offences are subject to enforcement through national courts. However, most
courts will only prosecute an international crime if it also amounts to a crime under domestic
law. Furthermore, prosecution will only take place if the court has jurisdiction. Whether
jurisdiction must be endorsed by domestic law, or whether endorsement by international law
is accepted as well, is not clear. Most likely jurisdiction as prescribed by international law
would not suffice for prosecution in most states. It could, however, suffice with regard to the
special use of double criminality in extradition law, depending on each state's approach to the
problem.
2 3 4 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Customary International Law
There are five general principles of criminal jurisdiction under customary international law.
These are the principles of territoriality, nationality, passive personality, the protection
principle and the universality principle.v'" Some authors refer to a sixth principle called the
representation principle_257There probably is a vague hierarchy of these principles,258which
applies where several states ask for the extradition of the same person, but it would not be of
consequence for the rule of double criminality. It should be noted that other forms of
extraterritorial jurisdiction are established in international conventions in order to avoid
jurisdictional loopholes.259
The territoriality principle exists m a simple form that is completely territorial and in a
255 The jurisdiction of the newly established International Criminal Court is limited to the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war c rimes, and the crime 0 fa ggression, see t he Rome Statute of t he International
Criminal Court article 5.
256 Steven, 432-433, Joyner & Rothbaum, 235-236, Aughterson, 48, Hafen, 215, Blakesley & Lagodny, 7.
257 Van den Wyngaert, 49-50, Gardocki, 63, Cornils, 79, Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 109.
258 Gardocki, 62.
259 There exists no convention on criminal jurisdiction as such, but conventions on international crimes assume
jurisdictional bases for specific crimes. For instance, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 gives a state jurisdiction where a hijacked plane lands with the
hijacker still on board, even if it has no connections to the aircraft, offenders or victims, and where the offence
did not 0 ccur within its airspace. This situation unleashes extraterritorial jurisdiction notwithstanding t he fact
that the state cannot claim jurisdiction according to customary international law.
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qualified form that is semi-territorial.é'" It is universally accepted that states can exercise
qualified territorial jurisdiction in the form of objective or subjective territoriality.t'"
Objective territoriality means the offence was committed abroad, but its result or effect was
felt within the territory. Subjective territoriality means the offence was committed within the
territory, but its result or effect was felt abroad. There are many versions of these principles.
The widest version of qualified territoriality is the doctrine of ubiquity, which is a
combination of subjective and objective territoriality.262 A far-fetched use of qualified
territoriality may be perceived as a territorialisation of extraterritorial crimes.
The protective principle, also called compétence réelle, gives a state jurisdiction over crimes
wholly committed abroad that purport to harm the vital and fundamental interests of the
state,263 such as state security, integrity, sovereignty and basic governmental functions_264
What constitutes vital interests is naturally subject to interpretation. Some states include
political, military and economic interests. Terrorist acts are often covered by this principle, as
their aim is to sway foreign policy.265 The protective principle is relied upon by most states.
The nationality principle, also called the active personality principle, gives a state jurisdiction
over crimes committed abroad by its nationals and possibly also its residents. The principle
rests on a double rationale: state sovereignty and international solidarity.i'" Through this
principle a state controls its citizens by perpetually demanding allegiance. Because nationals
benefit from the protection of the law even if they are abroad, they must also respect the law
whilst being abroad. Acts of nationals are said to reflect on the image of the state. The
nationality principle is usually accompanied by a prohibition of extradition of nationals,
particularly in civil law countries.267
The passive personality principle gives a state jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad
against its nationals. Proponents argue the welfare of the state depends on the welfare of its
260 Gilbert, 87. Assimilated with the physical territory, the landmass, of a state are internal waters, territorial sea
and subsoil, air space above these areas, man-made structures on the continental shelf, and airplanes and ships
flying the state's flag, La Forest, 45.
261 Aughterson, 48, Hafen, 216.
262 Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 116, Blakesley & Lagodny, 15.
263 Aughterson, 52, Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 105.
264 Steven, 433, Hafen, 217.
265 Joyner & Rothbaum, 237.
266 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 46.
267 CorniIs, 75, Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 103-104. A few common law countries also forbid
extradition of nationals, for instance Australia, Aughterson, 33.
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citizens.268 This is one of the most disputed and least compelling principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.v" Civil law states like Germany, France and Belgium have adopted it,270 whereas
Norway has not. Common law countries are generally restrictive, but the United States has
adopted it for crimes of terrorism, as some terrorist acts are directed against American
nationals because of their nationality.t"
The universality principle gives a state jurisdiction over crimes committed anywhere,
irrespective of any connection between the offence and the prosecuting state. The principle
depends only on the character of the offence.272 The relevant offences, basically meaning
international crimes such as war crimes and the crime of genocide, are so egregious and
universally condemned, that all states have an interest in punishing the perpetrators.t" The
propriety of universal jurisdiction is controversial and it is by no means universally
adopted.274
The representation principle, also called derived jurisdiction or subsidiary universal
jurisdiction, is derived from other principles of jurisdiction, most likely the universality
principle.275 I tis only effective w here the prosecuting state represents another state, either
where a request for extradition has been denied or where a state with more pressing claims to
prosecution has requested the former state to undertake prosecution, for instance, according to
the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, 1972. The
principle is based on international solidarity_276As one of the conditions of the representation
principle is the presence of the fugitive in the prosecuting state's territory, one can hardly
imagine a request for extradition based on the representation principle.277 The representation
principle will thus never be an issue under the special use of double criminality.
268 Hafen, 218.
269 Aughterson, 51, Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 105, Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 47.
270 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 47.
271 See the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti- Terrorism Act of 1986.
272 Steven, 433, Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 109, Gardocki, 61.
273 Steven, 433, 435-436, see also Hafen, 219. It seems to be a general view that universal jurisdiction is
applicable to most international crimes and lies implicit in the obligation to extradite or prosecute. Without
universal jurisdiction, international crimes are not truly international. Universal jurisdiction seems also to be
accepted in international law where the location of the crime is on the high seas, as is often the case with piracy
and drugh trafficking, Steven, 435. See also La Forest, 44.
274 Belgium has become a pioneer, adopting the Act on the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law which gives Belgian courts universal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide. Lemaitre, "Belgium Rules the World. Universal jurisdiction over Human Rights Atrocities", Jura
Falconis (2000-2001),255.
275 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 49.
276 CorniIs, 79.
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2 3 5 Double Criminality as a Condition to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
As it is up to the discretion of each state to enact jurisdictional rules, each state also decides
which conditions, if any, should be attached to extraterritorial jurisdiction. A common
delimitation is to require that the offence is criminal in both domestic law as well as in the
state where the offence was committed. The requirement of double criminality for
extraterritorial jurisdiction does not mean that one should actually apply the foreign law. lts
function is merely procedural.i" The rather confusing state of law where jurisdiction can be a
condition to double criminality and double criminality can be a condition to jurisdiction, calls
for an explanation.
A court whose jurisdiction is dependent on double criminality is obliged to examine whether
the offence constitutes a crime in the law of the state where the crime was committed, i.e. lex
loci delicti.279 The only exception to this may be where jurisdiction is based on the
representation principle. In this case, it has been argued, the law that needs examination is the
law of the state whose request for extradition was denied.28o In any case, the court is obliged
to examine foreign law. This differs from double criminality as a requirement to extradition,
where the court has to examine domestic law.281
The rationale of double criminality as a condition to extraterritorial jurisdiction is to a large
extent concurrent with that of extradition. Different aspects of the rationale are in focus
depending on the theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction involved.282 First of all, the resentment
against extraterritorial jurisdiction may be softened by taking the law of the territorial state
into consideration. Secondly, the influence of the legality principle is profound. Naturally the
277 Gardocki, 64.
278 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 44.
279 Comils, 73.
280 Whereas the universality principle does not require double criminality, the representational principle does.
Van den Wyngaert, 50, and Gardocki, 64, differ as to what country's law is relevant; lex deprehensionis or lex
loci delicti. In theory both laws could be relevant, creating a requirement of triple criminality. No-one has so far
argued in favour of such a solution.
281 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 50.
282 Double criminality does usually not apply to the protection principle as states tend to enact provisions
protecting themselves and not other states, nor to the universality principle, due to the character of the crimes
involved. The representation principle on the other hand requires that the act is punishable in the place where it
was committed. This is also common with the nationality, passive personality and qualified territoriality
principles. Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 46-47, 52-54, Gardocki, 62-64.
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legality principle is more closely attached to double criminality in jurisdiction than III
extradition as the question of jurisdiction is part of the criminal case itself.
The legality principle makes no mention of the place of crime. Irrespective of where the crime
was committed, domestic courts never apply foreign criminal law. The accused will be tried
and, iff ound guilty, punished according to lex loci fori, e ven if t he crime was committed
abroad.283 This is a manifestation of state sovereignty.i'" but could also be deduced from the
legality principle. Does the legality principle imply that a person should not be prosecuted lex
loci fori for behaviour that was not punishable not only tempore delicti, but also loco
delicti?285
In other words, does the legality principle enshrine a requirement of double criminality?
Though many states do not prosecute for crimes committed in another country unless they
were also criminalised there, this is by no means absolutely and universally practised. Some
states adopt this requirement for certain crimes only; others do not adopt this prerequisite at
all and prosecute without regard to the foreign law. State practice shows that there is no
requirement of double criminality in the principle of legality.
As in the case of extradition, double criminality in jurisdiction is subject to either an in
abstracto or in concreto interpretation.i'" Van den Wyngaert says double criminality in both
extradition and jurisdiction does not mean identity of norms or denominations, but that the
conduct is punishable under the laws of both states.287 This is an in abstracto interpretation.
However, due to the close connection of double criminality in jurisdiction with the legality
principle, Van den Wyngaert favours an in concreto interpretation. Also international
solidarity among states and the interest of a global criminal justice policy favour the in
concreto interpretation. The state prosecuting the case on behalf of the territorial state should
only intervene to the extent that the conduct actually was punishable in the concrete
283 Gardocki, 57, ComiIs, 70. Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed) says the Romans applied foreign criminal law,
but the French revolution and the rise of the nation-state abolished such practices, 45. Comils says a few
countries apply foreign criminal law, for instance Switzerland and Uruguay, who apply locus criminis on crimes
committed by nationals abroad, and that Germany also did so until 1940, 70-71.
284 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 45.
285 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 54.
286 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 51. Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), says where double
criminality is a requirement to jurisdiction "prosecution will only take place if the offence exists in similar form
in both States, or if the alleged conduct would constitute a crime in both states," 103.
287 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 43.
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circumstances.288
Comils says it is not necessary that the foreign definition of or reason for criminalising the
offence corresponds exactly with that of domestic law, nor that the act is legally classified in
the same manner, but the offence must be considered a criminal wrong and punishable in both
countries. Prevailing opinion is that all substantive requirements of punishability must be
fulfilled, meaning the court has to examine the foreign grounds of justification, excuse and
exemption from punishment. It is unclear, however, whether impediment to prosecution in the
foreign law is relevant.i'" For instance, the Norwegian Criminal Act 1902 requires that the
offender can actually be punished in the foreign country in the concrete case. All impediments
in the foreign law must be taken into consideration.F"
In practice it is unclear which method prevails in the law of jurisdiction, but it will probably
depend on the theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction in question and why double criminality
was attached to the jurisdiction.i" Whether the prosecuting state is pursuing its own interests
or those of a foreign state is also relevant. 292
A common additional requirement to double criminality in jurisdiction is the principle of lex
mitior, which says if there is a difference in the penalty between the lex loci delicti and the lex
fori, the lowest applies.293 Lex mitior is, for example, stipulated in the Norwegian Criminal
Act.294 This is a rule of sentencing, applicable if the defendant is found guilty. Naturally this
rule does not affect an extradition case, but could be described as a parallel to the minimum
sentence prerequisite found in the extraditable crime and double criminality requirements in
extradition law.
236 Jurisdiction as a Condition to Double Criminality in Extradition
States applying the special use of double criminality do not extradite unless they accept the
288 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 53-54.
289 Cornils, 73-74.
290 Lov 22. mai 1902 Nr. 10 §§ 12 Nr. 4b, 13 (2).
291 Comils, 75, Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 51-52.
292 ComiIs, 75.
293 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 44. Double criminality as a condition to extraterritorial jurisdiction can
furthermore be delimited by the seriousness of the crime, or to crimes committed by certain persons, 46.
52
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
jurisdictional basis asserted by the requesting state. Extradition can thus be denied even
though the offence as such is criminal in both states. In conformity with international law,
extradition can be refused where the requesting state claims a form of extraterritorial
jurisdiction that actually exists in the requested state, but not in the requesting state itself. This
is, however, not the point of the special use of double criminality. The question is whether the
requested state accepts as such the jurisdictional base existing in and claimed by the other
state as grounds for prosecution. The United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States are
amongst those applying it.
If the requested state attaches importance to the location of the crime, it needs hypothetical
and not actual jurisdiction.f" If one would demand actual jurisdiction, a state could rather
prosecute the alleged offender itself and there would be no point in extraditing. But a state
can, of course, extradite where both states have actual jurisdiction over the specific case.
Whether a principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction is accepted in international law is, not the
decisive point in an extradition proceeding.f" The five main principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction are indisputably established in customary international law, and states recognise
this fact, even though they have not implemented these principles in their domestic statutes
themselves. For instance, in Pinochet (3/97 the House of Lords accepted that the crime of
torture for which extradition was requested was a crime of universal jurisdiction under
customary international law, but that was not sufficient for satisfying the locational element of
double criminality.i'"
The bone of contention is whether the requested state in its domestic law has implemented
extraterritorial jurisdiction. It naturally depends on the judiciary of each state how strictly the
special use of double criminality is to be interpreted. Due to its technical character there are
many problems related to the special use of double criminality. The problems can be
illustrated through three examples.
294 Lov 22. mai 1902 Nr. 10 § 13 (2).
295 Mullan, says the test of double criminality "asks whether the requested state would have jurisdiction 0 ver
equivalent conduct in corresponding circumstances, i.e. it is a test of hypothetical, not actual, jurisdiction," 25.
296 Hafen, 219-220.
297 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3)
(1999) 2 WLR 824, 905 (H). See below for an account of the course of events leading to this case.
298 Du Plessis, 678.
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Where a national of state A commits acts of terrorism in state A against nationals of state B,
which bases its jurisdiction on passive personality, and then flees to state C, the latter state, if
it asserts strict territorial jurisdiction and a dopts the special use of double criminality, can
neither prosecute the offender nor extradite him to state B. The fact that terrorism is a crime
of universal jurisdiction under intemationallaw would not affect state C's position. Only state
A could obtain extradition, based on the territoriality principle, but many reasons may hinder
such a request. Due to the special use of double criminality, the offender would go free and
state C would be a safe haven.
This example can be complicated where state C has criminalised terrorism under the
protection principle. Band C exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over the pertinent crime on
different grounds. Does the special use of double criminality include a correspondence of
jurisdictional bases test in the concrete cases? And what if the requested state accepts the form
of jurisdiction claimed by the requesting s tate, but not 0 ver the s arne crimes, for instance,
where C exercises passive personality jurisdiction over murder, but not over terrorism? If the
special use of double criminality requires a strict correspondence of jurisdictional bases,
extradition cannot take place in these cases.
Another complicating factor is where the crime was never carried out, but had only reached
the planning level. Nationals of s tate A p Ian to kill nationals of state B in state A, which
would have damaging effects in state B, but are cut off by the police before the assassinations
take place and then flee to state C. If state B only exercises objective territoriality, it cannot
apply this jurisdictional basis in this case because the effects of the crime never realised.
Intent to effectuate the crime does not fulfil the objective territoriality principle, unless
conspiracy is a separate offence. The special use of double criminality could here obstruct
extradition.
The first question that needs examination is whether the requested state has implemented
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime in question in its domestic law at all. In the Irish
Supreme Court case Aamand v. SmithwicK99 Denmark sought extradition of a Danish national
charged with narcotics offences committed on the high seas. Denmark based jurisdiction on
the nationality principle. Drug-related crimes are criminal in Ireland, but not on an
299 Aamand v. Smithwick [1995] 1 ILRM 61.
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extraterritorial basis. The Irish Supreme Court based its decision on the European Convention
on Extradition article 7 paragraph 2, which reads:
"When the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed outside
the territory of the requesting Party, extradition may only be refused if the law of
the requested Party does not allow prosecution for the same category of offence
when committed outside the latter Party's territory or does not allow extradition
for the offence concerned."
Despite the permissive wording of the article, the court interpreted it to be mandatory. The
Irish Extradition A ct 1965 incorporating the convention, was held tob e "a penal statutory
code involving penal sanctions on an individual and must therefore be construed strictly as is
contended in the sense that not by anything other than unambiguous provision should a person
be subjected to detention and extradition.,,30o
The request for extradition was turned down on the grounds that Ireland does not exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over narcotics offences. If Ireland had exercised jurisdiction over
drug-related offences based on the nationality principle, Aamand would have been extradited.
The court does not, however, indicate how the problem would have been solved iflreland had
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction on a basis other than nationality.
The Explanatory Report to the European Extradition Convention says article 7 paragraph 2
was inserted to respect states whose laws do not permit extradition for acts that were
committed outside the territory of the requesting country. The special use of double
criminality, however, is not made mandatory by the convention. Furthermore, if the domestic
extradition statute of a state does not stipulate the locational element of double criminality,
that element cannot be used as a bar to extradition.
The special use of double criminality is practised in the United Kingdom too. The Extradition
Act 1989 states that extradition shall be granted for extradition crimes, which are defined in
section 2 partly in terms of double criminality, which again is partly defined according to the
place of commission. This means that the courts have to consider the jurisdictional aspects of
300 Aamand case (supra) 67.
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double criminality. Section 2 reads:
(1) In this Act, except in Schedule I, "extradition crime" means
(a) conduct in the territory of a foreign state, a designated Commonwealth country
or a colony which, i fi t occurred i n the United Kingdom, would constitute an offence
punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment, and
which, however described in the law of the foreign state, Commonwealth country or
colony, is so punishable under that law;
(b) an extra-territorial offence against the law of a foreign state, designated
Commonwealth country or colony which is punishable under that law with imprisonment
for a term of 12 months, or any greater punishment, and which satisfies
(i) the condition specified in subsection (2) below; or
(ii) all the conditions specified in subsection (3) below
(2) The condition mentioned in subsection (I)(b)(i) above is that in corresponding
circumstances equivalent conduct would constitute an extra-territorial offence against the
law of the United Kingdom [punishable similarly]
(3) The conditions mentioned in subsection (I)(b)(ii) are
(a) that the foreign state, Commonwealth country or colony bases its jurisdiction on
the nationality of the offender;
(b) that the conduct constituting the offence occurred outside the United Kingdom;
and
(c) that, if it occurred in the United Kingdom, it would constitute an offence under
the law of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment for a term of 12
months or any greater punishment.
Section 2(1)(a) deals with territorial crimes in the requesting state and section 2(1)(b) deals
with extraterritorial c rimes against the law of the requesting state. According to the latter
section, an extraterritorial offence against the law of a foreign state will be an extraditable
crime, if an equivalent conduct in corresponding circumstances would constitute an
extraterritorial offence against the law of the United Kingdom. The prerequisite "equivalent
conduct" is a question of substantial interpretation of double criminality.
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The courts accept the claims of other countries to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to the
extent that in corresponding circumstances they would exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
themselves.i'" The crucial point is the meaning of "corresponding circumstances", or in other
words, whether any extraterritorial jurisdiction would suffice, or whether the same
extraterritorial jurisdiction is required. Aughterson argues the latter applies as "[i]n the United
Kingdom generally jurisdiction is determined according to the standards of domestic law.
Thus, the issue is whether the United Kingdom courts would have jurisdiction if the conduct
in question had the same nexus to the United Kingdom as to the state seeking extradition.,,302
A question of extraterritorial jurisdiction as part of double criminality in extradition was
raised before the House of Lords in Pinochet (3). In 1998 Senator Pinochet, Chilean head of
state from 1973 to 1990, visited the United Kingdom to undergo surgery. Spain requested his
extradition for crimes committed during his reign, most likely with the government's
knowledge, acceptance or instigation.Y'
The question of "extraditable crimes" slipped the attention of the Divisional Court, holding
that Senator Pinochet as a former head of state was entitled to immunity. The decision was
appealed and in Pinochet (1i04 the House of Lords decided that Senator Pinochet could be
extradited to Spain because his immunity as former head of state did not cover acts of
international crimes. In Pinochet (2i05 this decision was set aside on grounds that the
Appellate Committee was improperly constituted.I'"
A differently constituted House of Lords heard the case again in Pinochet (3). The charges
against Senator Pinochet were widened, causing the focus to tum on the law of extradition
and the requirement of "extraditable crimes." The Law Lords only needed to discuss
extradition for the crime of torture.307 Crimes of torture allegedly took place during and after
301 Stanbrook & Stan brook, 22.
302 Aughterson, 44.
303 Du Plessis, 671-672.
304 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (1998) 4 All ER 936.
305 Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) (1999) 2 WLR
272.
306 Lord Hoffmann, who had been voting in favour of extradition, had an interest in Amnesty International which
supported extradition. Lord Hoffmann was a Director of Amnesty International Charitable Ltd, du Plessis, 674-
675.
307 Home Secretary Jack Straw ruled on December 9, 1998, on what charges could proceed before the Lords,
Wilson, "Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain," http://www.wcl.american.edulpub/humright/brief/v6i3/pinochet.htm.
Originally, Spain charged him inter alia with acts of torture, hostage taking, genocide, terrorism and the crime of
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Pinochet's period as head of state, in Chile and in Spain, Portugal, Italy and France. Most of
these alleged crimes had no relations with Spain, but Spanish courts exercised universal
. . d' . he cri f 308juns ietion over t e cnme 0 torture.
After ratification and incorporation, the 1984 Torture Convention+" came into force in the
United Kingdom in 1988. The House of Lords interpreted this convention to oblige the parties
to provide the courts with universal jurisdiction, making torture a crime of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. The locational aspect of double criminality was in this
case satisfied.3lO Both Spain and the United Kingdom exercised universal jurisdiction over the
crime of torture. The decision gives no clues as to how the case would have been solved had
the United Kingdom exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction on another basis.
In another case before British courts on the question of the locational aspect of double
criminality, Reyat/ II the fugitive was wanted in Canada for planting a bomb in a suitcase on a
plane; it exploded in a Japanese airport, killing two baggage handlers.312 Canada requested
Reyat's extradition from the United Kingdom. Canada based her jurisdiction on the subjective
territoriality principle because the bomb had been made and planted on the plane in Canada.
According to the special use of double criminality, the British court had to consider whether it
would have jurisdiction had the offence taken place in the United Kingdom, resulting in the
deaths in Japan. The Divisional Court avoided this question and instead pointed out that the
United Kingdom actually exercised jurisdiction based on the nationality principle as Reyat
was a subject of Her Majesty.l':' Reyat was extradited to Canada. In reality, the court allowed
extradition for an extraterritorial crime based on a different jurisdictional basis than the
requesting state.
The United States also adopts the special use of double criminality. In 1873 the United States
refused to extradite a Prussian subject to Prussia for offences committed in Belgium, because
"forced disappearance." Because of the double criminality principle, these charges were not followed up in the
extradition proceedings.
308 Wilson, "Prosecuting Pinochet: International Crimes in Spanish Domestic Law", Human Rights Quarterly p.
927 (1999), 951, 964.
309 United Nations Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
1984.
310 Du Plessis, 679.
311 Unreported, QBD, 1989.
312 This case is described in Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), Ill.
313 Gilbert in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert (eds), 112.
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the United States did not accept the nationality principle exercised by Prussia. The term
"jurisdiction" in the extradition treaty was interpreted to be the territory of Prussia.314 In 1940
the United States refused to extradite an American national to Mexico for crimes committed
against a Mexican national. The United States did not accept the passive personality principle
exercised by Mexico.315
The special use of double criminality in these early cases indicates a strict correspondence of
jurisdictional bases. Later the United States apparently accepted any jurisdictional basis
asserted by the requesting state,316 possibly with the exception of the protective principle, due
to this principle's intrusiveness.'!" Canada also seems to attach importance to the
jurisdictional basis asserted by the requesting state.318
Not all common law countries adopt the special use of double criminality. The Australian
extradition statute makes no reference to the special use of double criminality and the
magistrate cannot consider this issue when hearing an extradition case. The Attorney General
may, however, take this aspect into consideration when exercising his discretion whether to
extradite.319
The South African Extradition Act 67 of 1962 says a foreign state may request extradition for
crimes committed within its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction could be equivalent to the territory of
the state or the state's legal competence to prosecute. Du Plessis says the jurisdiction is
presumably territorial, but due to the increasing acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdictions in
international law, one cannot rule out that extraterritorial forms of criminal jurisdiction will be
included in the provision.32o Some statutes like the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of
1998 also provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Civil law countries also adopt the special use of double criminality. France, for instance,
adopts the special use of the double criminality principle. In 1976 France refused to extradite
one Abu Daoud to Israel for crimes committed against Israeli nationals in Germany, because
314 The case In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1873), is described by Blakesley & Lagodny, 32-33,
Blakesley, "A Conceptual Framework. ..", 736.
315 The case is described by Blakesley, "A Conceptual Framework. ..", 747-748, and Hafen, 223.
316 Aughterson, 44.
317 Hafen, 221.
318 http://www.lawsmart.comlcanada/criminal/extradition.htm.
319 Aughterson, 45.
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France did not exercise the passive personality principle.Y' France apparently adopted a strict
test of corresponding jurisdictional bases. A similar a pproach seems to prevail in Austria.
Conduct that occurred outside the territory of the requesting state is viewed as if it occurred
outside Austrian territory. A corresponding extraterritorial jurisdiction would have to be
found in Austrian criminallaw.322
German jurisprudence, on the other hand, is unclear on the locational aspect of double
criminality. Apparently a court once applied it in 1933. German law, however, has no
prohibition on extradition for offences committed outside the territory of the requesting state.
It seems that German courts will not apply the special use of double criminality.323 This
corresponds with the Explanatory Report to the European Extradition Treaty article 7
paragraph 2, which says the locational aspect can only be invoked by the requested state if it
actually has implemented such a rule in domestic extradition law.
The immediate conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that many common law states and
a few civil law states apply the special use of double criminality. It seems to be uncertain
whether any extraterritorial jurisdictional principle will qualify or whether it has to be an
identical jurisdictional principle. Case law on the issue is sparse. A few cases seem to favour
a correspondence of jurisdictional bases and this is also the prevalent view in legal
literature.324 The special use of double criminality thus generally requires a correspondence of
extraterritorial jurisdictional bases over the same crime. However, Gilbert argues that if two
states recognise the authority to prosecute an offender on different grounds, that should not be
of any consequence and the requested state need only examine whether it would have
jurisdiction at all.325
2 3 7 An Evaluation of the "Special Use" of Double Criminality
The divergent systems of c ivill aw and common law are said to complement one another.
320 Du Plessis, 684-685.
321 Blakesley, "A Conceptual Framework. ..", 745, This case is described in chapter 2 4.
322 Palmer, 42.
323 Blakesley & Lagodny, 59-63.
324 See for instance Hafen who says jurisdiction based 0 n passive personality i s likely too bstruct extradition
under the locational aspect of double criminality as not many states adhere to it, 223.
325 Gilbert, 103-104.
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Whereas civil law states exercise broad forms 0 f extraterritorial jurisdiction predominantly
based ont he nationality 0 f the offender and do not extradite their nationals, c ammon I aw
states only rarely exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction but do, on the other hand, extradite their
nationals. Together these systems in theory ensure that a fugitive does not escape trial.
However, where not only prosecution but also extradition unleashes questions of jurisdiction,
this may disrupt the apparent equilibrium. The state can neither prosecute nor extradite on the
same grounds, namely the lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction in domestic law.
The special use of double criminality is disputed because it weakens international co-
operation in criminal matters and makes the custodian states a safe haven for fugitive
criminals. Ireland became a shelter for John Paul Aamand as he could neither be prosecuted
in Ireland nor be extradited to Denmark. One may ask why some states are willing to become
a safe haven for perpetrators whose conduct is criminal in both domestic law and the law of
the requesting state, and over which the requesting state has jurisdiction according to both its
domestic and international law.
The motives behind the use, or rather non-use, of extraterritorial jurisdiction could provide an
explanation. States opposing extraterritorial jurisdiction may feel provoked and could
demonstrate against the exorbitant jurisdiction asserted by the requesting state by denying
extradition. The denial is politically motivated and has a punitive element. The dangers of
construing technical loopholes desirable from a political point of view, are that doing so will
not solve the crime but favour the criminal, and the general trust in the ability of the legal
system to achieve justice will diminish.
As early as 1888 Clarke argued against extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis that it would
be inconvenient to enforce, prosecution would be difficult and expensive and it would be
impossible for an innocent man to provide a satisfactory defence. These arguments were put
forward in a discussion of whether prosecution based on extraterritorial jurisdiction should
substitute extradition, which were seen as two independent solutions to the transnational
crime problem. Clarke argued that extraterritorial jurisdiction does not remove the evil and
"being made a resort for foreign malefactors is as great a mischief to any country as the
escape of offenders against its own laws.,,326 The argument shows that the safe haven risk was
326 Clarke, A Treatise upon the Law of Extradition 3 ed (1888), 13-14.
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by no means ignored by contemporary scholars, but was used as an argument in favour of
extradition and against extraterritorial jurisdiction. The special use of double criminality, a
principle that obviously then developed later, represents a retrograde movement by actually
creating safe havens.
The arguments used against applying extraterritorial jurisdiction can be turned against the
special use of double criminality. By declining extradition by reason of not accepting the
particular principle of jurisdiction, though the conduct in question is clearly criminal, the
requested state could be accused of distrusting and disrespecting the foreign jurisprudence.
States have developed different systems of law and procedure, and the methods and speed of
law enforcement vary; this must be borne in mind when dealing with questions in
international criminal law.
It is obvious that the special use of double criminality submits to the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisdiction. However, the court deciding on extradition is first of all deciding on a
procedural matter and, secondly, it is accepted that, where the special use of double
criminality is a pplied, the court 0 nly needs hypothetical jurisdiction. Its hould suffice that
only the court deciding the criminal case has jurisdiction.
The special use of double criminality, particularly a strict test of corresponding jurisdictional
bases, hampers international co-operation in bringing criminals to justice.327 One should thus
ask whether the special u se of double criminality benefits the rationale behind the double
criminality principle.
It has been established that protecting the individual is an important factor of the double
criminality principle. All individuals within a state's territory should be treated equally. For
instance, if Aamand had an Irish co-criminal, it would seem illogical and unfair that the
Irishman would go free because Ireland does not exercise jurisdiction over narcotics offences
on the high seas, whereas the Dane would be extradited to Denmark to stand trial. The
allocation of punishment would be arbitrary. On the other hand, the Dane has broken the law
of Denmark, whereas the Irishman has not. The special use of double criminality is definitely
desirable from the fugitive's point of view, but it does not protect any fundamental human
327 Williams, 617.
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rights. Individual rights are sufficiently protected through the substantive double criminality
rule.
Some would argue the reciprocity principle is ensured through an equivalence of
jurisdictional bases test. The requested s tate refuses extradition w here it could n ot ask for
extradition from the requesting state under corresponding circumstances. But where the
requesting state does not apply the special use of double criminality, this reasoning is void
because the requesting state would extradite without regard to the jurisdictional aspect. It is
actually the state that applies the special use of double criminality that breaks the reciprocity
principle.
According to the sovereignty rationale, a state should not be forced to restrict the freedom of a
person whose acts are not criminal. Taken to the extreme, a state would not take any measures
against foreign fugitives unless they had violated domestic law. But states do not protect their
sovereignty to such extremes as, for instance, the increasing in abstracto interpretation bears
witness to. It is accepted that the special use of double criminality requires hypothetical
jurisdiction and not actual jurisdiction. The special use of double criminality strengthens the
state's feeling of sovereignty. Where identical jurisdictional bases are required, the
sovereignty principle is practised to the full.
A strict test of correspondence of jurisdictional bases is difficult to apply in practice. The five
general principles of jurisdiction recognised in international law represent broad and
inaccurate categories. States may implement and define these principles differently. This is
particularly prevalent for qualified territorial jurisdiction. Where the conceptualisation differs,
there is not really an equivalence of jurisdictional bases.
For instance, the United States 1986 Anti- Terrorism Act adopts a form of extraterritorial
jurisdiction that is a combination of the protective principle and the passive personality
principle. It covers terrorist offences directed against American citizens abroad and intended
to coerce, intimidate or retaliate against the government or civilian population. A requirement
of corresponding jurisdictional bases could obstruct extradition to the United States for crimes
based on this unique bipartite jurisdictional basis.
Conditions attached to jurisdiction result III extensive divergence III scope and content.
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Though the nationality principle is universally accepted, each state defines and applies it
differently.328 Where criteria for becoming a national in one state may differ radically from
another state, this could lead to one state not accepting a person's nationality, and hence to not
accepting the other state's jurisdiction based on nationality. Similar problems relate to all
principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the requesting state may depend on an interpretation by its
domestic courts. This could mean that the requested state has to construe legal sources in the
requesting state, which is an operation that the requested court clearly is not qualified for.
These difficulties led courts to abstain from examining foreign law under the extraditable
crime requirement.
The tendencies in international extradition law to adopt the eliminative method and an in
abstracto interpretation suggest a focus on the wrongfulness of the conduct rather than
differing legal technicalities. Where a statute obstructing international co-operation in
criminal matters is not justified from a human rights perspective, but purports to protect the
state, it contributes towards disturbing the general faith in justice and the legal system.
24 The Temporal Question: Retroactivity
The rule of non-retroactivity comes from the legality principle in criminal law. Generally it
applies only to substantive provisions and not to procedural provisions.r'" However, what
constitutes a substantive or a procedural issue varies in different states, particularly because
the provisions may appear in the same statute.
The question of non-retroactivity in criminal law has been transferred into the law of
extradition. The temporal aspect of double criminality is concerned with the potential
retroactivity of the extradition law. In extradition law one must distinguish between the
retroactivity of the crime and the retroactivity of its extraterritoriality. The former refers to
the legality principle and the substantial rule of double criminality, whereas the latter refers to
the principle of criminal jurisdiction and the special u se of double criminality. Statutes of
328 Hafen, 222.
329 Lemaitre, 266.
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limitation, etc. may also in theory be subject to non-retroactivity. But in practice they are not.
Such rules are first of all undoubtedly procedural and, secondly, they are ignored where the
requested state engages an in abstracto interpretation.
Extradition treaties and domestic statutes usually omit to specify at what point in time the
conduct was criminalised in the requested state or, if the special use of double criminality is
adopted, at what time extraterritorial jurisdiction was adopted in the requesting state. Courts
have addressed both questions in extradition cases.
2 4 1 Retroactivity of the Crime
The prohibition against retroactive punishment in the legality principle in criminal law has
gained a parallel in the double criminality principle in extradition law. Double criminality
could be interpreted a s prohibiting extradition where domestic law did not c riminalise the
conduct at the time it was committed, at the time of the extradition request, or even on the
extradition date itself. The last alternative is unlikely to become an actual problem, though
one could imagine a situation where conduct is criminalised after an extradition request,
because the authorities wish to extradite a specific person.
It is uncertain whether the pertinent criminal provision in the asylum state ought to precede
the actual events. At the latest the offence must be criminal in the requested state at the time
of the extradition request. Rezek says this interpretation of double criminality can be accepted
without any outrage to the general principles of penology.33oBedi shares this view, saying
that the question of whether an extraditable crime comes within the ambit of the treaty
depends on the domestic law of the two states at the time extradition is applied for.331Unless
an extradition i nstrument expressly stipulates the time of c riminalisation, scholars seem to
favour the date of the extradition request. The Inter-American Convention on Extradition
1981 is one of the few international instruments on extradition that is clear on the point of
time of double criminality, demanding that the offence be punishable in both states at the time
of commission.332
330 Rezek, 187-188.
331 Bedi (1966), 75.
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The United Kingdom Extradition Act 1989 does not specify at what time the conduct has to
be criminal, and thus this question has been construed by the court. In Pinochet (3) the
question was whether an extraditable crime, in the sense of section 2 in the Extradition Act
1989, needed to be a crime at the date i t was committed or a t the date 0 f the extradition
request. The Divisional Court had not decided on this question, though the issue had been
raised by Lord Bingham CJ, who came to the conclusion that the date of the request was the
decisive point in time. The House of Lords construed the Extradition Act and the Extradition
Convention and concluded that the conduct had to be a crime under English law at the date of
the conduct for it to be an extraditable crime. There were, however, dissenting views in the
decision. Itwas held
"that the requirement in section 2 of the Act of 1989 that the alleged conduct
which was the subject of the extradition request be a crime under United Kingdom
law as well as the law of the requesting state was a requirement that the conduct
be a crime in the United Kingdom at the time when the alleged offence was
committed, that... extraterritorial torture did not become a c rime int he United
Kingdom until section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 came into effect on
29 September 1988; and that, accordingly, all the alleged offences of torture and
conspiracy to torture before that date and all the alleged offences of murder and
conspiracy to murder which did not occur in Spain were crimes for which the
applicant could not be extradited.,,333
Both the date of conduct and the date of the extradition request as crucial points of
criminalisation, can be justified. A s tate complying with an extradition request acts int he
interest of the requesting state and of the international community in general. The two
affected states apply their respective laws in order to bring a person to trial. Because of this
close co-operation, the two states' territories c auld be seen a s one entity. It could thus be
demanded that all aspects of the requested state's criminal law apply to this territorial entity.
This philosophy may lead to states adopting the rule that the crime had to be criminal on the
day it was committed not only in the requesting state but also in the requested state. Adopting
the same standard as the prosecuting state may be influenced by the notion of state
sovereignty as well as a desire to give the fugitive maximum protection.
332 Plachta, ll3.
333828 D.
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Protecting the fugitive does not mean, however, that the date of criminalisation in the
custodian state had to be earlier than the date on which the crime took place in another
country. The legality principle in criminal law protects the individual by ensuring that all
subjects within a state can predict their legal position and that nobody is punished for conduct
that was not criminal at the time it was performed. When the fugitive criminal flees to another
state, he has already broken the law of one state. His need to predict his legal situation is no
longer present. As the state is not prosecuting the offender itself, the legality principle does
not demand criminalisation at the time of conduct. It could thus suffice for the requested state
to demand that the conduct is criminal at the time of the extradition request. The fugitive's
rights are sufficiently protected by substantive double criminality, irrespective of when the
criminalisation took place.
State sovereignty is not infringed upon by either cut-off date for non-retroactivity. Irrespective
of the time of criminalisation, states involved in extradition do so because the relevant
conduct actually is criminal in domestic law. Through the in abstracto interpretation, the
requesting state only has to satisfy itself of theoretical criminality.
242 Retroactivity of Jurisdiction
It is not certain whether the fundamental rule of jurisdiction in criminal law includes a
prohibition on retroactivity in the same way as the legality principle includes a prohibition on
retroactivity.r" Rules of jurisdiction could be described as both substantive and procedural
rules. They decide the scope of the crimes as well as the judges' competence to act. Scholars
disagree on these rules and hence also their retroactivity. The highest court in Belgium, the
Cour de Cassation, has held that provisions extending jurisdiction do not apply
retroactively.Y'
The question of retroactivity of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been transferred to extradition
law. When a court adopting the special use of double criminality has approved the
extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by the requesting state, the next question is when that
334 Lemaitre, 266.
335 Lemaitre, 269.
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particular form of extraterritorial jurisdiction was introduced into the domestic law of the
requesting state. Unless this i s specifically stated in the statute, it i s up to the judiciary to
decide whether to interpret a prohibition against retroactivity of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
the special use of double criminality.
In Pinochet (3) the House of Lords applied a rule of non-retroactivity of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. It was held that the crucial point was when the courts acquired extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The Lords ruled t hat the principle 0 f double criminality barred extradition for
torture committed before 8 December 1988, when torture became a crime of universal
jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. Pinochet could only be extradited for extraterritorial acts
of torture that occurred after that date. This decision is suspected of having been motivated by
ulterior considerations.i'"
France has introduced a stricter prohibition against retroactive extraterritorial jurisdiction in
the special use of double criminality in extradition law. In 1976 Israel sought the extradition
of Abu Daoud, a non-Israeli, from France in respect of crimes committed against Israeli
nationals in West Germany.Y' Abu Daoud was the planner of the kidnapping - which turned
into the killing - of eleven Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics in 1972.338 In 1976 he
was arrested in France. Israel wanted his extradition for these murders and based its
jurisdiction on the passive personality principle. France adopted a version of the passive
personality principle in its domestic criminal law in 1975,339 four years after the events in
Munich, but before the extradition request from Israel. F ranee refused toe xtradite him 0 n
grounds that at the time the crime took place France did not exercise the passive personality
principle.P"
This decision has been criticised. The extreme technical construction of the double criminality
principle gave France a legal loophole justifying the refusal. West Germany also wanted Abu
336 Du Plessis, 680.
337 Mullan, 27, Hafen, 223.
338 LoLordo, "Abu Daoud tells all about his role in Munich operation", The Star. Jordan's political, economic
and cultural weekly, Online, 1 July 1999, www.archives.star.arabia.com. says "Abu Daoud's admission that he
planned the Munich operation surfaced with the publication this year [1999] of his autobiography, 'Palestine:
From Jerusalem to Munich',"
339 Gilbert in Dugard & Wyngaert (eds), 105.
340 Mullan, 27, Blakesley, "A Conceptual Framework ...", 745.
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Daoud, but French authorities acted swiftly and Abu Daoud was set free.341 Daoud's hurried
release may indicate that the denial of extradition was politically motivated. It has been
claimed that France acted in fear of terrorist retribution and concerns about Arab oil threats.342
States adopting the special use of double criminality only need hypothetical extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Where a state requires any form of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a prohibition of its
retroactivity would strike one as odd, because it is a very casual basis for the special use of
double criminality. Where a state requires a correspondence of jurisdictional bases, the
chances are high that it requires non-retroactivity. But, as always, states are free to decide on
their interpretation of the double criminality requirement.
2 5 Concluding Remarks
The discussions on the substantive, locational and temporal aspects of the double criminality
principle show that there are wide discrepancies in the interpretation of this requirement even
among geographically, politically and historically close countries. It may be possible to
distinguish between common law and civil law countries, particularly on questions related to
extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, extradition practice is not always related to this
classification of jurisdictions.
Due to manifold variations of the double criminality principle, it is not possible to point out a
predominant line of interpretation that most states adhere to. The principle is under constant
development through new statutes, treaties and case law. In the future different approaches to
this principle will probably tend to become more similar. International extradition law will
gradually become more refined and uniform, the intensity of international co-operation will
increase, and courts interpreting double criminality will more often seek guidance from
foreign court decisions.
Attempting to define a general rule of double criminality that prevails today or distinguishing
a middle course that states should adhere to, would prove to be difficult. It is more fruitful to
341 LoLordo says the French court released Abu Daoud before German authorities could seek his extradition.
Human Rights Watch Report, "International Justice", www.hrw.org, says "when Abu Daoud, accused of the
massacre of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics, was apprehended in France in 1976, Paris gave short
shrift to extradition requests from West Germany and Israel, freeing him only four days after his capture."
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distinguish the main approaches in the international community today and to examine what
line of interpretation most widely supports the rationale behind the double criminality
principle. Though the double criminality requirement most likely had its origin in states'
desire to protect the integrity of the requested state's domestic legislation, it is indisputable
that it is justified today on the basis of a desire to protect the fugitive from unfair
encroachments on his freedom.
Though state sovereignty is still a dominant feature of international criminal law, it has
become common to abstain from protecting sovereignty too strongly so as to co-operate with
other states in ensuring domestic and i nternational law and 0 rder. Multilateral conventions
have been created on international crimes and criminal procedure. With the establishment of
the International Criminal Court, it is more evident than ever that international criminal law is
progressing rapidly. Extradition is in the interest of the international community of states in
general and when double criminality is strictly interpreted, it represents a strong obstacle in
the extradition process. Some states thus allow for a more liberal i nterpretation of double
criminality, though not its total abolition.
This development is not devoid of sporadic retrograde movements. Some cases may be taken
as proof of the fact that states are still reluctant to give up too much sovereignty at anyone
time. Where the rule of double criminality blocks extradition on a technicality, the case will
most likely be suspected of being politically motivated by a desire to protect state sovereignty
or for other ulterior motives that are irrelevant to the case. States should, like the defendant,
have the benefit of the doubt; a strict interpretation of double criminality has the protection of
the fugitive's rights as a primary concern.
The development of a more liberal international extradition law has called for a stronger
protection of the individual affected by the process. The interpretation and importance of the
double criminality principle in future, lies in finding a balance between international co-
operation in criminal matters and the protection of the individual.
342 Joyner & Rothbaum, 249.
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3 The Status of Double Criminality in International Law
3 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 focused on the principle of double criminality in treaties, domestic legislation and
case law. Double criminality is part of international law where it is adopted by conventions.
This chapter examines whether it has become part of general international law. The question
is whether it has become a rule of customary international law or a general principle of law.
The principle of double criminality is a well-established principle in extradition procedures
and is included in most domestic and international instruments on extradition.F ' In this
respect it is a universal principle. Scholars on international criminal law furthermore describe
the principle as a fundamental principle of extradition law.344
A few extradition instruments do not adopt the double criminality requirement, such as the
Nordic Extradition Scheme.r" Due to t he similarity 0 f the criminal systems and the close
cultural, social, historical and political ties between Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and
Norway, these countries extradite despite lack of double criminality.Ï" Double criminality is
furthermore not required for rendition between certain commonwealth countries such as, for
instance, in Canada's Fugitive Offenders ACt.347 The criminal laws of some groups of
countries are very similar, and it is unlikely that a crime for which extradition is requested
will not be criminal in the requested state.
The double criminality requirement has in a few situations become an unwanted barrier to
extradition to both the requesting state and the requested state. Some new treaties adopt it
343 Hafen, 194, Plachta, 112, Williams, 581.
344 For instance Plachta says it is one of the most important and characteristic features of extradition, 112.
345 Traskman, "Should we take the Condition of Double Criminality Seriously?" in Jareborg (ed), Double
Criminality. Studies in International Criminal Law, 140.
346 Iceland was a province of Denmark for more than 500 years. Norway was a province of Denmark for more
than 400 years and then a province of Sweden for close to 100 years before gaining its independence in 1905.
During and after these unions these countries' legislations were largely identical. For instance King Christian V
law of April 15th 1687 is still valid in both Norway and Denmark.
347 Williams, 584.
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only where the requested state requires it.348 Certain crimes are so serious that states are
willing to disregard established rules and procedures in order to counteract these crimes. This
is probably the case with the ever-increasing crimes of drug-trafficking and terrorism, whose
global effects make them a priority issue for all states. Due to these new developments it is
necessary toe valuate the status 0 f the double criminality principle in general international
law.
The legal status of the principle in international law is disputed. Naturally, where double
criminality occurs in a convention it forms part of international treaty-law. The question is
whether double criminality should be complied with where the treaty has omitted the
principle. Has the principle become part of customary international law or a general principle
of law? These two sources of law are binding on all states irrespective of their acceptance. If
double criminality is part of general international law, it must be tacitly included in treaties
and domestic legislation where it is omitted.349
Opinions by legal scholars on the status of double criminality in international law differ.
Some advocate the view that double criminality is not a legally binding rule of international
law, unless stipulated in a treaty. Aughterson says "[d]ouble criminality, though not a
mandatory rule of international law, is a principle which is generally adopted by countries
when enacting municipal extradition laws or entering into treaties. lts existence and scope,
therefore, is governed by the terms of the relevant legislation or treaty.,,350This view is
possibly supported by the decision of Factor v. Laubenheimer, where it was held that "the
principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty.,,351
However, due to the almost universal use and acceptance of the double criminality principle,
quite a number 0 fauthors claim it h as become a r uIe of customary international law or a
general principle of international law. When discussing the principle of double criminality as
a possible customary rule or a general principle of law, one must evaluate other formal
sources of law as well as other factors that may enlighten the issue such as, for instance, non-
348 Hafen, 191.
349 Establishing the legal status of double criminality in international law is not only essential to international
extradition law, but also to certain countries' domestic law, where customary international law forms part of the
law of the land. The South African Constitution of 1996 section 232 says "Customary international law is law in
the Republic unless it is inconsitent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament."
350 Aughterson, 60. Also Williams, 582, and Blakesley & Lagodny, 44, say extradition depends on the
substantive conditions laid down in treaties and domestic legislations.
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binding soft law.
3 2 Is Double Criminality a Rule of Customary International Law?
Where a rule of law is part of both treaty and custom, a state cannot terminate its customary
obligation by withdrawing from the treaty. This was established by the International Court of
Justice in 1986.352 On the other hand, a treaty may be deviated from where certain provisions
have been displaced or amended by a subsequent custom, where this effect is recognised by
the states. Presumably, a treaty contrary to a custom would be void or voidable.353 This view
is disputable. Some argue that, where customary law prescribes a rule of law, states may
derogate from the rule through new conventions, except where the custom has the character of
jus cogens rules.354It has never been claimed, however, that double criminality is ajus cogens
norm. If the principle of double criminality is customary international law, it must be
complied with if a treaty does not include it. It can probably only be derogated from by a new
treaty that explicitly says double criminality does not apply.
In the following analysis of whether the double criminality principle is a rule of customary
international law, conventional law will be most influential. The difference in the nature of
these two sources of law is vast. Treaties are only binding on those states that have expressly
accepted them, whereas customary international law is binding on all states irrespective of
their approval. International law, however, accepts local or regional customary international
law.355 Customary international law thus binds newly formed states that have not been given
the chance to object to the rule or act otherwise.P''
According to article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice international
customary law consists of two elements; the objective element of constant and uniform state
practice ("general practice") and the subjective element of opinio juris ("accepted as law,,).357
Customary international law is state practice that states carry out because they believe it is
351 At 287.
352 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) Merits, 1986 ICI
Rep. 14 (Judgement of27 June).
353 Brownlie, 4.
354 Ruud & Ulfstein, 46.
355 Asylum Case, ICJ Reports 1950.
356 Fleischer, 30.
357 Ruud & Ulfstein, 50.
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obligatory. Because both criteria are vague it is difficult to ascertain the exact content of the
law. By making custom a source of international law one ensures that international law
always reflects current opinions, beliefs, relations and politics among states. It is a dynamic
source of law that adjusts to the general developments of a modern society.
Customary international law consists of the non-written rules of law that lack the precision of
treaty law. These rules are relatively vague, imprecise and general. Customary international
law contains principles of law rather than concrete rules. Even though custom is non-written,
it can be given precision through codification in a convention or in a judicial decision.
Conversely, treaties can lay the foundation of a new customary rule.358 This has been
recognised by the International Court of Justice, stating that the pertinent treaty-based
provision had to be of a "fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as
forming the basis of a general rule of law" and that "a very wide-spread and representative
participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States
whose interests were specially affected.,,359The requirement for a treaty provision to become
customary law was that the practice" including that 0 f States whose interests a re specially
affected, should have been extensive and virtually uniform.,,36o
Evidence of custom can thus be deduced from treaty law. Evidence may also be deduced from
other sources. The two elements of customary international law thus materialise in actual
behaviour, international treaties, domestic legislation, negotiations and voting in international
organisations, statements by state officials and ministers, domestic and international court
decisions, decisions by administrative and executive authorities, protests against other states'
actions, assertions in other forums, etc. Thus both formal and material sources can be
construed to establish customary law. States are bound through acquiescence and estoppel.I"
As the principle of double criminality developed in treaty law, it is primarily the conventions
that will give evidence as to the status of this principle in international law. Domestic
legislation, case law and legal writings are good indicators as well. As states always adhere to
358 Ruud & Ulfstein, 52.
359 Quotations from Ruud & Ulfstein, 52, referring to ICJ Rep. 1969 p. 3 on p. 41-43.
360 Ruud & Ulfstein, 52.
361 Brownlie, 2-4. Acquiescence means that states are bound tacitly where they had an opportunity to act but
chose not to do so, whereas e stoppel, in relation to i nternational customary I aw, means that states are bound
through their acts, which must be interpreted as an approval ofa rule of law, Ruud & Ulfstein, 50.
74
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
domestic extradition law, domestic statutes and case law are the most adequate formal
evidence of international custom on extradition.362
3 2 1 State Practice
State practice develops gradually. State practice is not only what states do, but also what they
say.363 It consists of two elements which can be summarised as consistency and generality.t'"
Consistency refers to the substantial qualities of the practice, whereas generality refers to how
widespread the practice is in the international community. Traditional international law has
also required a third element of state practice: the temporal element.
The first element of state practice, the consistency requirement, says the rule represented by
state practice must be constant and uniform.365 Complete uniformity is not required, however,
which means there could still be a rule of customary law even if it is practised somewhat
differently.
Double criminality is practised by all states. In practically every extradition case the court
somehow ensures respect for double criminality. The few instances where it is not explicitly
stipulated, such as in the Nordic Extradition Scheme, is attributable to the fact that double
criminality is presumed toe xist because 0 f the close ties between the relevant states. The
propriety of double criminality is obviously accepted unanimously. The basic rule of double
criminality is that an offence shall be criminal in two states and the court deciding on
extradition has to examine domestic criminal law only. But from this point onwards states
differ on how to proceed.
The examination of the exercise of the double criminality principle amongst states has
uncovered wide discrepancies as to its interpretation and co-requirements. The most striking
features are the differences of the in concreto and in abstracto interpretations, and the fact
that some states attach importance to the locational and temporal aspects of double
criminality, whereas others completely ignore these aspects. These discrepancies are
362 Rezek, 172.
363 Enache-Brown & Fried, 627.
364 Brownlie, 5-6.
365 Brownlie referring to the Asylum Case, 6.
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attributable to the fact that states emphasise different parts of the double criminality
principle's multiple rationale.
It has been claimed that, when examining the existence of a rule of customary international
law, one should regard the rule's appropriateness and qualities.F" This is a reference to the
rationale of the pertinent rule. The different means of interpretation are reflections of
disagreements between states on how this rule is best served and what aspects it should
protect. States obviously apply the double criminality principle for different reasons.
The notions of state sovereignty and protection of individual rights are the main incentives of
double criminality. The former motive is best carried out through a strict interpretation, but
the need for efficient mutual assistance in criminal matters has led some states to refrain from
this policy. The actual quality of double criminality has thus become the protection of
individual rights. Though a strict interpretation is favourable to the fugitive, it is not essential.
Double criminality in its simplest form provides sufficient protection.
On the one hand, the basic elements of double criminality are practised by virtually all states
and the rule's character of being a protection for the individual in the process, also supports a
customary rule. On the other hand, the differing methods of interpretation cannot be dismissed
as mere technicalities. The discrepancies are too wide. There is a substantial difference
between the in concreto and in abstracto interpretation.
The second element of state practice, the generality requirement, refers to the number of states
that adhere to the practice. A substantial number are required, though universal recognition is
not required. It is impossible to estimate a specific number of states. The difficult part of the
generality requirement is to determine which states abstain from the practice. Silence may be
taken as a token of tacit agreement or as a lack of interest in the subject.
Virtually all states that engage in extradition have adopted a requirement of double criminality
in one form or the other. In earlier times double criminality was latently included in every
treaty adopting the enumerative method of listing extraditable crimes. As the eliminative
method became more common, double criminality was usually explicitly adopted. Most
366 Fleischer, 30.
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domestic laws adopt the principle as well. Trying to find treaties or domestic statutes that
explicitly refrain from the double criminality principle on a general basis has been fruitless.
The principle of double criminality in international extradition law can safely be assumed to
be a general practice.
The third element 0 f state practice is t he period oft ime i t has been exercised. Traditional
international law demands that the state practice has existed for some time in order to become
customary law.367 Naturally it takes time to develop a custom, otherwise the individual acts
would be perceived as isolated incidents. The International Court of Justice, however, has not
stipulated strict temporal requirements.i'" The duration of the custom is not decisive for its
existence, provided the consistency and generality of the practice are proved.369 Though there
is no strict requirement of its duration, state practice that has existed for a long time may serve
as an indication on its firmness.Ï'''
The double criminality requirement in international extradition law has existed for more than
two centuries, since it was stipulated probably for the first time in 1794 in the Anglo-
American Jay Treaty. It has since become a common stipulation in domestic and international
extradition instruments, and courts have also been occupied with the principle since the mid-
nineteenth century. Without doubt, requiring double criminality has been practised by the
international community for a very long time. Any requirements as to the duration of a
custom are obviously fulfilled with regard to this principle. The duration of the double
criminality principle certainly bears witness to the firmness of a potential customary rule.
3 2 2 Opinio Juris
It is pointed out in legal literature and decisions by the International Court of Justice that the
state's conviction of doing what is legally required is essential.V' The Statute of the
International Court of Justice article 38 (b) refers to a "practice accepted as law". For the
practice to become binding as law, it must have been executed in the belief that the acts were
367 Fleischer, 30.
368 Ruud & Ulfstein, 51.
369 States for instance quickly established international customs regarding rules relating to the airspace and
continental shelf, Brownlie, 5.
370 Ruud & Ulfstein, 51.
371 Ruud & Ulfstein, 52.
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mandatory under international law. Motives of courtesy, fairness and morality do not create
customary law.372 This conviction is called opiniojuris. Whether the legal obligation is actual
or imaginary is not crucial. The International Court of Justice has said opinio juris requires a
"wide-spread acceptance". 373 Regional customary law requires an equivalent acceptance.V"
Conviction of obligation is a vague criterion that is difficult to prove. The International Court
of Justice has apparently evaluated this question on a series of grounds. In some cases it has
assumed the existence of opinio juris, or deduced it from a consensus in literature and
previous decisions of the Court and other international tribunals.l"
The status of double criminality in international extradition law has not been decided on by
the International Court or by other international tribunals. Gilbert refers to a Swiss case where
the court held that double criminality was a tacit precondition for all extradition cases, and to
an Irish case where it was held that the principle was fundamental to extradition.V" These
cases were decided, however, on the basis of domestic extradition law. But they show that
domestic courts attach significant importance to this requirement. Gilbert also refers to a case
from Australia where it was held that the requirement of double criminality could be
expressly excluded by domestic statutes or international treaties.377 Domestic courts
apparently view double criminality as mandatory, but this obligation follows from domestic
legislation. It seems that proof of opiniojuris has to be deduced from the writings of scholars.
Literature on the status of the double criminality principle in international extradition law is
divided. A substantial number of scholars on international criminal law claim the principle of
double criminality has become a rule of customary international law.I" This presumption is
based on the facts that treaties habitually recognise and incorporate the principle, that it is
universally recognised and established by practice under a conviction that i t is mandatory.
However, there are also a number of authors who disagree.l" Thus the literature does not give
372 Brownlie, 7.
373 Ruud & Ulfstein, 51, referring to ICJ Rep. 1974 p. 3.
374 Ruud & Ulfstein, 51, referring to ICJ Rep. 1950 p. 266 where the court required "constant and uniform
usage" for regional customary law.
375 Brownlie, 7.
376 Gilbert, referring to the Swiss case of M v Federal Department of Justice and Police, 75 INT'L L REP.107
(Federal Tribunal, 1979) and the Irish case of The State (Furlong) v Kelly, (1971) IR l32, 104.
377 Gilbert, referring to Riley v The Commonwealth of Australia, (1985),159 CLR 1, 105.
378 Among authors arguing double criminality in extradition is a rule of customary international law are Shearer,
138, Stanbrook & Stan brook, 19-20, Hafen, 194, Plachta, 111, and Joyner & Rothbaum, 240.
379 For instance Schultz, 9, and Aughterson, 60.
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sufficient proof of opinio juris.
Basically all states engaging in extradition adopt the double criminality principle in written
legal instruments. "In the books" all states adhere to the principle. Where the principle is not
explicitly adopted, it is 0 ften presumed. The provisions are short, usually only stating the
basic element that the extraditable crime must be criminal in two states. The provisions are
too vague to give directions on interpretation. Hence the practice of this principle becomes
inconsistent.
There exists no consistency on how to decide on the criminality in the requested state and
states have thus developed this principle in different directions, finding individual solutions
on how to satisfy this requirement. States adopt methods of interpretation that suit their own
needs or the interests of the individual. Hence even the purpose of such a requirement is
disagreed upon. Embellishments to the principle, such as the locational and temporal
elements, also contribute to irreconcilable principles of double criminality. Furthermore, it has
so far not been proven that there is a general feeling in the international community of an
obligation to act according to the double criminality principle. The principle of double
criminality is thus not a rule of customary international law.
3 3 Is Double Criminality a General Principle of Law?
"General principles of law recognised by civilised nations" are principles of law that are
common in the domestic law of different states. One does not distinguish between "civilised"
and "uncivilised" nations today. The laws of all states are of relevance. General principles can
also develop within international law; they could, for instance, be based on customary law.380
General principles are binding 0 n all states. They may decide international disputes where
neither convention nor custom exists, but they are rarely used as the sole factor in deciding a
case before the International Court of Justice. They are, however, a useful factor in deciding
on the existence of customary international law.
380 Ruud & Ulfstein, 54.
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Because this source of international law depends on the general law of the states, one must
establish how many states need to have a certain principle in common in order for it to
become a general principle of law in international terms. There are no general guidelines on
how many states must adhere to a specific principle. One can only resort to establishing
whether it is generally, though not necessarily universally, accepted within the international
community.P'
Legal scholars have described double criminality as a general principle of international law.382
Extradition is a practice based on treaty Iaw and general principles could bed erived from
treaties. Shaw claims the double criminality requirement has become such a general principle
of international law, derived from treaty law.383 According to Shaw, this is supported by the
decisions of the House of Lords in Government of Denmark v. Nielsen384 and United States
Government v. McCaffrey.385
Other authors do not view double criminality as a general principle of international law.
Vogler argues that, though the principle is found in national statutes on extradition, the rule
"is not indispensable from the point of view of adherence to the rule oflaw. This follows from
the mere fact that the principle is frequently subject to exceptions with respect to the
geographical, climatic or ethnological conditions of a country.,,386
Unlike customary international law, general principles of law are not dependent on state
practice or opinio juris. They do not depend on written sources of law either.387 The effect of
the difference between relatively uniform provisions in treaties and domestic statutes and
actual practice, is thus difficult to estimate. Principles are generally abstract and do not
necessarily exist in legal instruments.I'" They do not have to be concrete and unambiguous
norms. It should thus not be necessary to demand uniformity of the principle throughout the
international community. The core of the double criminality principle, that the extraditable
381 Ruud & Ulfstein, 54.
382 Among authors arguing double criminality is a general principle of intemationallaw are Plachta, 111-112,
Shaw, 482, Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights (1975), 124, and Bedi, 69-70.
383 Shaw, 482.
384 Government of Denmark v. Nielsen [1984] 2 AlJ ER 81; 74 ILR.
385 United States Government v. McCaffrey [1984] 2 AlJ ER 570.
386 Vogler, "The Scope of Extradition in the Light of the European Convention on Human Rights" in Matseher &
Petzhold (eds), Protectiong Human Rights: The European Dimension (1988), 671.
387 Stanbrook & Stanbrook, 19.
388 Duk, 31, see chapter 1 1.
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crime is criminal in two states, could thus suffice as a general principle of law. But the
literature is divided on this question.
3 4 Concluding Remarks
Authors on international extradition law differ in their opinions as to whether the principle of
double criminality has become a rule of general international law. Several authors are not
specific about what kind of international rule the principle belongs to: customary law or
general principles of law.
As early as 1909 Rintelen claimed that double criminality had become a rule of general
international law that all states had to adhere to and that contemporary authors accepted it.389
In 1970 Schultz claimed that treaties and municipal law were the only sources to extradition
law as it was unlikely that any principle of extradition law had received sufficient universal
recognition to become a principle of general internationallaw.39o Because of the disagreement
among scholars, the presumption is against the existence of a rule of general international law.
It is the existence of a rule of general international law that needs proof, not its non-existence.
The lack of sufficient support of a rule of general international law could mean the principle
of double criminality in extradition has not attained this status. Sources of law other than legal
writings must be consulted.
Double criminality is said to be one of the most elementary - and therefore least contested -
among the substantive requirements in international extradition law.391 Because it is generally
included in all instruments on extradition, its validity as a general rule of international law has
so far not been contested in a case before the courts. Where the double criminality
requirement is left out of a treaty or domestic statute and challenged in an extradition case, the
outcome of the dispute is not predictable.
The double criminality principle is not well defined nor uniformly applied. One could thus
389 Rintelen, 16-17. He argued the only exeption to double criminality was where the requested state had
accepted the criminality of the act, but for obvious reasons had not criminalized the act itself, for instance where
a land-locked country like Switzerland had not criminalized shipping offences. This is today not a question of
the general obligation to comply with the double criminality principle, but a question of its substantive
interpretation.
390 Schultz, 9. Aughterson also claims double criminality is not a mandatory rule in international law, 60.
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argue that it is not so reliable as a principle of international law. lts vagueness makes it
difficult to apply and, if it is a rule of general international law, it will be very difficult to
determine which interpretation of the principle is required. States adopting a lenient
interpretation of double criminality could be accused of violating a general double criminality
principle in international law.
It would be impossible to say how strictly states have to apply the rule. What degree of
strictness is mandatory? Because of all the varieties in interpretations and additional
conditions, it is difficult to find a common interpretation that is or should be a general rule. If
the double criminality principle were to be a rule of general international law, it would have to
be in a very simple and basic version. Probably both the locational and temporal aspects of
double criminality would not be part of it. The fact remains, however, that as long as
extradition within the international community is based on a network of differing domestic
statutes and differing bilateral and multilateral conventions, which depend on interpretations
of domestic courts, there will always be interpretational discrepancies.
Though many factors of the double criminality requirement point in the direction of a rule of
general international law, it cannot be declared with certainty until a court of law, preferably
an international tribunal, has decided on the issue. Due to strong disagreements between legal
scholars, the principle of double criminality in international extradition law is probably not
part of either customary international law or general principles of international law.
391 Rezek, 187-188.
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4 Double Criminality and International Human Rights
4 1 Introduction
International extradition law remained unnoticed for a long time by international human rights
law. However, this picture has gradually changed. Human rights have given international
extradition law new dimensions, influencing the process in several ways. Substantial
extradition law has expanded, with new conditions to be considered by the authorities before
ordering an extradition. Because of the extradition process's international character, states
have been forced to scrutinise human rights not only within their own borders, but also in
foreign states. Procedural extradition law is also about to change as individuals gradually gain
a stronger standing in the process.
At the same time as most states have started considering general human rights aspects in
extradition proceedings, many states are also willing to violate both traditional extradition law
as well as human rights to obtain custody over fugitive criminals. Protection offered the
fugitive in international extradition law such as, for instance, a requirement of double
criminality, is jeopardised where extradition is subject to political considerations, whether by
the executive or the judiciary. Where the extradition process is regulated exclusively by law,
there is a chance that the fugitive could be surrendered by other means. Disguised extradition
through deportations and even abductions, is known to have taken place.392
The unlawful surrendering of fugitives turns the double criminality principle into a dead
letter. However, the increasing application of international human rights in international
extradition law could possibly influence the way states deal with the principle of double
criminality. As human rights gain importance it is necessary to establish which rules form part
of the body of human rights. A discussion of the role of human rights in international
extradition law is thus necessary to complete the picture of the double criminality principle.
Does the body of human rights law only include traditional human rights developed within
human rights-treaties, or does it also encompass other rules protecting the individual
392 Rezek, 172.
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developed in other fields oflaw, such as international extradition law?
It has already been established that the principle of double criminality in international
extradition law probably does not constitute a rule of customary international law or a general
principle of law. The question now is whether double criminality forms part of international
human rights law.
4 2 The Nature of Human Rights
Human rights cover broad fields of law, purporting to protect human beings in many
situations. They range from protecting individuals against encroachments by the authorities to
general rights to peace and a healthy environment. The first group is particularly important in
procedures that affect the individuals the most, namely the criminal process, where the liberty
and reputation of the accused are at stake. It encompasses, for instance, the right to a fair trial.
Just like extradition law, human rights have developed in both domestic and international law.
Domestic human rights are founded in constitutions, statutes, custom and case law. The
jurisprudence of every state decides on the content and the status of these rules within its legal
system a nd hence domestic human rights are unique to each state. Domestic human rights
create no legal obligations in international law unless they are implemented in a convention or
amount to international custom or general principles of law.
Protection offered the individual will, however, gradually become more uniform as
international human rights increasingly influence domestic legislation, for instance, through
conventions that oblige state parties to implement specific provisions in domestic legislation.
The development of international human rights is described below.
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421 Human Rights as "Rights"
The question of what is a "right" has no clear a nswer in legal philosophy. Rights can be
enforceable or merely set out future patterns of behaviour.v" Human rights fall within both
categories. Legal rights can usually be acquired or waived. For example, the right of
ownership is transferred when a n i tern i s inherited and then sold. Human rights cannot be
transferred. Human rights are inalienable and perpetual rights inherent in every person.394
Such a description is based on considerations of ethics and morality, and not on positive law.
However, rights that reflect the ethical and moral values of the community, will more likely
be implemented in positive law.395
The concept of a "right" entails a correlative "duty". The right of one person entails duties on
other persons. In its simplest form, this duty is to respect the right. Other rights have a more
substantive counterpart, requiring some form of action. There is no general agreement on
whether human rights demand some form of active performance or whether merely refraining
from violating them is sufficient. 396
The concomitant duties of individuals' human rights are incumbent on states and not on other
individuals.397 Obligations on behalf of the states are expressed in conventions in terms of
"respecting", "recognising", "ensuring", "secure" or "giving effect to" human rights_398The
extent of the duties depends on the interpretation of the convention, or on other sources of law
laying down human rights. One could a rgue that states fulfil t heir obligations by enacting
appropriate legislation for the protection of these rights.399 For instance, the right to a fair trial
demands legislation on the way that a trial should be conducted.
393 Shaw, 196.
394 Sieghart, 17.
395 Shaw, 197.
396 This issue is similar to the question whether jus cogens rules require action on the behalf of states in the form
of obligatio erga omnes, or whether states comply with these rules by merely refraining from violating them, see
chapter 1 6 2.
397 Sieghart, 17.
398 Sieghart, 43.
399 Sieghart, 43. Strydom, "The Rights and Responsibility of Civil Society to Promote and Protect Human
Rights", South African Yearbook of International Law p. 66 (1995), discusses a draft document of human rights
by the Commission on Human Rights, and describes the corresponding duty of the state as "to adopt legislative,
administrative and other measures to ensure the effective exercise of this right," 72.
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Human rights can thus be divided into two groups according to their effects. T hey can be
general declarations of intent on behalf of the states with no corresponding duties, or concrete
rights on the part of the individual with a corresponding duty on the states. For the purpose of
this thesis, the notion of human rights refers to the broad group of rules that purports to
protect individuals against encroachment from the authorities, entailing a duty on the states to
accept and actively protect these rights where appropriate. When discussing human rights in
the law of criminal procedure, authors usually refer to this general and broadly defined
category of rights.
4 2 2 The Development of International Human Rights
International human rights are generally believed to have originated in natural law. The notion
of natural law was formed in legal philosophy in ancient Greece and then further developed in
Roman law and the law of the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages. Natural law was
perceived to be the law of God, raised above the positively established rules of man, and thus
universal and absolute.4oo It was a product of religion, which later developed into the law of
reason.'?' Its content was disputable, as notions of nature and reason depend on considerations
of religion, ethics, morality and philosophy.Y' These aspects of natural law are also the
foundation of human rights today.
The notion of inalienable and universal rights was carried into the Age of Enlightenment. In
the 1ih century the focus slowly turned to the rights of the individual, reflecting the harsh
reigns of contemporary despotic rulers. Legal philosophy stipulated eternal and inviolable
rights of man to life, freedom and property. These rights were deduced from the social
contract, ending the state of nature.403 Through this notion of natural law developed the
concept of human rights vis-a-vis the state.404 The American Declaration of Independence,
1776, the Bill of Rights, 1791 and the French Human Rights Declaration, 1789, laid down
certain principles of rights of man that could not be violated by the state, by law or
otherwise.405 Before this period the interests of the state prevailed over the interests of the
400 Castberg, 15, Shaw, 197.
401 Castberg, 16.
402 Shaw, 197.
403 Shaw, 197.
404 Castberg, 18-20.
405 Sieghart, 8-9.
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individual. 406 These principles of freedom represent early ideas of what today is recognised as
human rights.
In the late nineteenth century a new school of thought developed, which rejected the concept
of divine or natural law and asserted that only rules that can be enforced could be law. This is
called legal positivism. Together with the doctrine of national sovereignty in international
law, it effectively obstructed states from interfering with other states' treatment of their
subjects.407 Any ill-treatment by a state of its nationals within its territory was purely a matter
of domestic concern. The consequences of this legal philosophy were tragic, as witnessed by
the unprecedented a troeities committed by t he Nazis before and during the Second World
War.
Up to the Second World War states showed concern only for the treatment of their own
subjects in other states.408 After the war international law witnessed the rapid development of
the branch of law called international human rights.409 This is attributable to the disclosure of
the crimes that took place in Central Europe and the desire to avoid a recurrence of similar
events. It became clear that there was a need for a new order where states were not free to
treat their own people as they like.4lo The doctrine of humanitarian intervention allows
foreign intervention in a state whose oppression of its people shocks the conscience of
mankind. The way a state treats its own subjects has become the legitimate concern of
intemational law.l'!
States that breach international human rights obligations have most probably not implemented
domestic remedies to secure these rights. The international community has thus established
international institutions for the surveillance and protection of human rights. The Charter of
the United Nations was established in 1945. Article 55 obligates the global organisation to
promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
With a few vague exceptions, the Charter does not define these rights and freedoms. This task
406 Aughterson, 4.
407 Sieghart, 12.
408 Dugard, 234.
409 Dugard, 234, Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 1 87, Jacobs & White, The European Convention on Human
Rights 2 ed (1996),3.
410 Dugard, 235, Sieghart, 14.
411 Sieghart, 15. Dugard, 234, claims the doctrine was recognised in the seventeenth century, and Sieghart, 13,
says it was an established rule of international law by the nineteenth century. Shaw on the other hand, 802-803,
is sceptical to the content and existence of this doctrine.
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was left for later instruments, starting with the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, stipulating fundamental human rights that states are encouraged to
comply with in their domestic law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a legally binding document, but rather a
proclamation of morally binding norms.412 However, it is possible that the Declaration has
become customary international law, general principles oflaw, or even jus cogens, and should
be consulted where human rights issues appear.413 The Declaration has contributed
significantly to the further development of international human rights, particularly by laying
the foundation for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 1966.414 In the
following decades the international community negotiated and adopted numerous conventions
on general and specific human rights, and through these treaties human rights became positive
international law.
International human rights laws today are no longer the ubiquitous freedoms of man given by
God, nature or reason, but the positive rules for the protection of human beings against
encroachment by the states, as stipulated inc onventions and 0 ther s ources of international
law.
423 The Universality of International Human Rights
The concept of universality was a crucial aspect of natural law. Universality means applicable
to all human beings. Though the idea of a divine law was rejected by modem philosophy, its
characteristic feature of universality lived on in international human rights.415 The universality
as well as the content of these rights is disputed because of conflicting opinions within the
international community on legal philosophy, justice, morality and political ideology.l'" The
notion of universal human rights does not mean that these rights are universally binding, but
is a reflection of the nature of these rights.
412 Castberg, 31, Strydom, 80.
413 Levine, 149-150, Jacobs & White,S.
414 Levine, 150, Ruud & Ulfstein, 54.
415 Shaw, 197-198.
416 Bystricky, "The Universality of Human Rights in a World of Conflicting Ideologies" in Eide & Schou (eds),
International Protection of Human Rights (1968),86-88.
88
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Human rights are to a large extent embodied in international documents. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is, according to both title and content, universal.417 The
preamble presents the Declaration as a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and
all nations." Conventions are denominated "international" and not "universal". The protection
of international human rights depends on two obligations that states have taken upon
themselves: the obligation to ensure protection of human rights within their territories, and the
obligation to participate in international co-operation to promote, protect and develop human
rightS.418 Irrespective of the universal nature of human rights, their enforcement nevertheless
depends on traditional international law, governed by sovereign states.
424 The Status of Human Rights in International Law
While there is widespread acceptance of the importance of international human rights, there is
considerable disagreement as to their precise nature and role in international law. Human
rights are part of international law through numerous treaties on the subject and it has also
been argued that certain human rights form part of customary international law, such as the
prohibition on torture, genocide, slavery and discrimination.419
Human rights have become increasingly important and are, due to their nature, often given
paramount status when conflicting with other rules of domestic or international law. Dugard
and Van den Wyngaert suggest that human rights arise from jus cogens and that they form
part of the ordre public of the international community.Y'' Sieghart claims "there is now a
superior international standard, established by common consent, which may be used for
judging the domestic laws and the actual conduct of sovereign States within their own
territories and in the exercise of their internal jurisdictions, and may therefore be regarded as
ranking in the hierarchy oflaws even above national constitutions.t'Y' Vogler says that "[t]he
extent of peremptory rules in international human rights law is constantly widening.'.422
Obviously, states are willing to give priority to human rights where they conflict with other
417 Bystricky in Eide & Schou (eds), 83.
418 Bystricky in Eide & Schou (eds), 84.
419 Shaw, 196,204.
420 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 195.
421 Sieghart, 15.
422 Vogler in Matseher & Petzold (eds), 669.
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provtsions.
4 3 The Influence of International Human Rights on the Law of
Extradition
The core of human rights is to protect individuals against encroachment by the authorities.
Human rights developed as a corrective to the law of criminal procedure because it involves
restraints on individuals' freedom. Human rights and extradition law developed side by side
for some decades, as two separate sets of rules. Where the defendant has fled abroad
extradition is normally a necessary prerequisite for the conclusion of domestic criminal
proceedings. The process 0 f extradition h as a lso gradually been affected by human rights.
Obviously, extradition involves restraining the freedom of individuals as well.
As human rights have gradually come to influence the law of extradition, this has given rise to
new problems for states as they have suddenly found themselves with two conflicting
obligations on their hands, derived from human rights treaties and extradition treaties
respectively. Undoubtedly there exists potential conflict between human rights and extradition
obligations. The propriety of dividing human rights law and extradition law into two separate
categories of law can be discussed.423
The suppression of crime, being the ultimate object of the law of criminal procedure and
extradition, serves the interest of the community. The transformation of the nature, pattern
and extent of crimes has produced a corresponding transformation in international co-
operation in criminal matters.424 This development calls for stronger protection of the
individual. Striking a fair balance between a strong and efficient system for preventing and
punishing crimes and the protection of the individual in the process, has dominated the
continuing development of domestic criminal procedure law and international human rights
law. Modern bilateral extradition treaties also seek to obtain a balance between the ideals of
co-operation between nations, and the protection of the rights of the individua1.425
423 Gilbert, 6, seems to view extradition a san i ntegral part of international human rights law, whereas other
authors, for instance Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, treat international human rights and extradition law as two
separate fields oflaw that recently have fused.
424 Woltring, "Politics, Crime and Criminal Justice", www.isrcl.org.
425 Aughterson, 12.
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Furthermore, new forms of international co-operation in criminal matters are more offender
oriented such as, for instance, transfer of criminal proceedings, execution of foreign
judgements and transfer of offenders.426
In 1989 the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom,427 dealing with
extradition and human rights, said the European Convention on Human Rights comprises "a
search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and
the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights.,,428
Soering was a West German national who had murdered his girlfriend's parents in the state of
Virginia in the United States, and then fled to the United Kingdom. The United States
requested his extradition, but he petitioned the European Commission of Human Rights,
which referred the case to the European Court of Human Rights. The court held that potential
violations of the Convention in the United States qualified as an obstacle to extradition. Given
his young age and mental health, it was held that keeping Soering on death row would cause
unnecessary suffering and thus constitute a breach of the Convention's article 3, prohibiting
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.
Whether balancing the interests of the international community and the individual has been an
aim of international extradition law all along or whether it is a new concept introduced by
modem human rights ideologies, can be disputed. It is probably correct to say that the
question of ensuring individuals' rights has been addressed through traditional extradition law,
but gained more attention with the latest developments regarding human rights in other areas.
After the Soering decision it became clear that international human rights are relevant to
extradition proceedings.F" Soering was among the first decisions to acknowledge that an
extradition as such could violate human rights obligations. This case opened up new ways of
impeding extradition and it has now become more common to invoke actual or potential
human rights violations in extradition cases. Where a treaty and domestic statute do not
provide for human rights as an exception to extradition, lawyers have started invoking, with
426 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 45.
427 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 European Court of Human Rights, (Series A) (1989).
428 Paragraph 89.
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varying degrees of success, human rights provisions found in other instruments, for example
domestic legislation, constitutions and international conventions. The new development has
opponents. Harrington claims this is "an attempt to carve out some form of 'human rights
exception' to otherwise valid requests for extradition.,,430
The European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly limit the scope of
extradition.431 The Convention 0bligates state parties tor espeet the provisions within their
domestic legal systems and contains no provisions forbidding extradition or deportation to a
state where these provisions may be violated. On the other hand, one could read the obligation
as being intended to protect everyone within their own jurisdiction from the risk of such
treatment. This view is confirmed by the C ommission.432 Before Soering there was also a
general conception that conditions in the requesting state, particularly the use of torture, were
of relevance in extradition proceedings.
The Commission had declared before Soering that the Convention does not contain provisions
on extradition law and procedure, though there has been agreement on the fact that an
extradition could violate article 3, where the extraditee is in danger of being tortured in the
requesting state. Another question is whether extradition in cases where the fugitive will not
receive a fair trial upon his return to the requested state, can be a violation of article 6. This is
hardly a settled matter.433 The evaluation of foreign legal systems that these two situations
involve is in strong opposition to the Anglo-American rule of non-inquiry.
The protection of human rights is not an entirely new concept within the law of extradition.
Extradition treaties and extradition statutes contain provisions designed to protect the
individual. These provisions are casuistic and sporadic and do not form part of a systematic
catalogue of individual rights as found in general human rights treaties and bills of rights. The
United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, 1990, is one of the few exceptions, listing
mandatory and optional human rights grounds for refusing extradition in article 3 and 4
429 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 191. The authors say human rights have influenced treaties, executive acts and
judicial decisions on extradition, 187. See also Harrington, "Human Rights Exceptions to Extradition Moving
Beyond Risks of Torture and Ill-Treatment", www.isrcl.org.
430 Harrington, www.isrcl.org.
431 Vogler in Matseher & Petzold (eds), 663.
432 According to Vogler in Matseher & Petzold (eds), 666-667, the Commission has confirmed this view in its
decision 10479/83.
433 Vogler in Matseher & Petzold (eds), 663-665.
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· I 434respective y.
It would be wrong to assert that traditional extradition law was completely void of human
rights impulses in its creation. As international communication and awareness increased,
many nations became concerned about the treatment of extradited individuals; and the
preservation of the fugitive's fundamental human rights became an important factor for many
nations considering extradition requests.435 Because each nation had different standards
concerning the treatment of criminals, a complex web of procedural extradition requirements
developed, ensuring that a fugitive would not be prosecuted for an act not considered criminal
by both nations or for acts not falling within the scope of the extradition treaty.
Extradition law, created mainly in nineteenth-century Europe, thus came to contain an
ambience of that era's liberalism such as, for instance, protecting political activism in
autocratic regimes.t'" A fugitive may, for instance, plead that he will suffer prejudice due to
his race, nationality, religion or political opinion, as stipulated in the European Convention on
Extradition article 3 paragraph 2.
Long established barriers to extradition are, for instance, the political offence exception.Y' the
double jeopardy rule,438 the principle of specialty,439 the non-extradition of nationals and the
principle of double criminality. With the exception of the double jeopardy rule, these
principles apply to the extradition process only and are of no relevance in a domestic
prosecution. The principles obviously protect the fugitive, but it would be incorrect to explain
them entirely in human rights terms.440 Harrington claims the traditional extradition obstacles,
though perceived by s orne as motivated by state interests, were nevertheless" intended, or
434 This document is however, as the name suggests, only a model for other extradition treaties. The Model
Treaty embodies a set of general and commonly agreed standards developed by experts in the field. As there
exists no global extradition treaty, the United Nations has sponsored this Model Treaty as a guide to countries
negotiating new extradition treaties, Harrington, www.isrcl.org.
435 Hafen, 193.
436 Gilbert, 15-16.
437 The political offence exception ensures the requested state's neutrality in a political struggle in the requesting
state at the same time as it accepts the legitimacy of resistance to oppression and prevents unfair trials of political
activists. It is stipulated in the European Convention on Extradition article 3.
438 The principle of double jeopardy forbids extradition where the fugitive has previously been tried and either
acquitted or convicted for the same offence in another coutnry. It protects individuals against double prosecution
and punishment. It is stipulated in the European Convention on Extradition article 9.
439 The principle of specialty demands that the extradited person is only tried for the offences for which he was
extradited. It the requesting country wants to try the person for other crimes, the prosecutor needs the consent of
the country from which extradition was obtained. It iss tipulated in the European Convention on Extradition
article 14.
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accepted, as giving some degree of protection to the individual extraditee from abuse, and that
abuse can be described today in human rights terms.,,441
General instruments on human rights and conventions dealing with specific human rights are
likely to influence extradition law, whether or not they deal explicitly with extradition.442 The
relevance of human rights treaties to the law of extradition depends on the subject matter and
the level of state participation.Y'
International extradition law is not the arena where general international human rights norms
have developed. This has resulted in a relatively weak position of human rights in extradition
law. Extradition Iaw has, however, entered a new phase where international human rights
norms have emerged as a new set of rules requiring compliance. However, where obligations
arising from human rights treaties conflict with an obligation to extradite, the outcome is still
not clear.
4 3 1 Is There a General Human Rights Exception to Extradition?
There is a long list of rights and prohibitions comprising the body of human rights.444 Some of
these human rights are more pressing than others. For instance, the prohibition of torture is a
jus cogens rule, and its obligatio erga omnes could include a total prohibition on extradition
to states where fugitives risk torture. There is no agreement as to which human rights are
particularly important. The content a nd scope of several human rights have no clear legal
definition. There is no system by which one can identify and determine the content of human
rights.445 Together with the uncertainties as to their application in the extradition process, one
440 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 188.
441 Harrington, www.isrcl.org.
442 The Torture Convention is one of few human rights conventions that mentions extradition. Article 3
paragraph 1 says "No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."
443 Carnegie, "The Extradition and Return of Fugitive Offenders. Applicability of Human Rights Consideration"
in San Jose (ed) Seminar for Caribbean Judicial Officers on International Human Rights Norms and the Judicial
Function" (1995), 86.
444 Human rights that may obstruct extradition are procedural conditions, for example lapse of time, personal
conditions, for example the fugitive's fragile mental and physical health, and conditions in the requesting state,
for example the danger of corporal and capital punishment.
445 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 210.
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cannot speak of a general human rights exception to extradition.446
4 3 2 Compliance of Human Rights by the Requested or the Requesting
State?
Each state is responsible for ensuring that human rights are observed within its borders. One
could argue that as long as the requested state complies with international human rights
standards in the extradition process itself, for example, during detention, questioning,
procedures before the court, etc., the state does not violate international human rights. The
process, however, aims at sending the individual to another country. Are states obliged to take
into consideration actual or potential human rights violations awaiting the fugitive in the
requesting state?
Courts in many countries, including the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom,
interpret extradition laws and treaties in favour of enforcement because this promotes both
justice and friendly relations with foreign states.447 This has led courts to adopt the rule of
non-inquiry, which means they do not inquire into non-justiciable matters such as the
requesting state's motive for seeking extradition and the procedures or treatment which await
a surrendered fugitive in the requesting country.448 Enquiry into foreign practices is held to
infringe the principle of sovereignty and reciprocity.T'" Nursing good relations with other
states is given preference over human rights. The rule of non-inquiry does not affect the rule
of double criminality. The court will accept the criminality of the offence by means of an
affidavit provided by the requesting state.
Resentment against inquiring into foreign criminal systems has softened over the last decades.
Most states accept an inquiry into conditions in the requesting state where there is a
considerable probability that the extradited person will be deprived of fundamental rights.45o
446 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert launch two solutions to the problem of conflicting extradition obligations and
human rights. Either states could make more use of conditional extradition and monitoring of trial and
punishment, or they could implement a system of aut dedere aut judicare, allowing them to refuse extradition
where human rights may be violated and instead prosecute the fugitive themselves, 206 ff.
447 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 189.
448 Wiehl, 772.
449 Henning, 351.
450 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 190-191. In the United States the executive branch may considering policies
and practices in the requesting state that are fundamentally unfair and contrary to United States public policy,
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Because extradition involves arresting and detaining an individual in the interest of the
requesting state, the requested state should represent the requesting state in its human rights
obligations as well. Human rights violations in the requesting state would then affect the
extradition proceedings. After all, human rights aim to protect the individual against
encroachments by the government, irrespective of formal proceedings.
The European Court of Human Rights established in Soering that the conditions awaiting the
fugitive in the requesting state are of relevance in the extradition process. In three decisions
by the United Nations Human Rights Committee the question arose whether extradition as
such would violate human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. In all the cases the United States sought extradition from Canada of fugitives charged
with murder, risking the death penalty. In Kindler, influenced by Soering, and followed by Ng
and Cox, the Committee declared that if the requested state did not consider potential
violations 0 f the Covenant int he requesting state, t he former would be in violation 0 f the
Covenant itself by allowing extradition.Y'
Through these decisions it is clear that extraditing states must ensure that the requested state
complies with the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. When evaluating extradition, the court must examine the human
rights situation int he requesting s tate. I f it chooses to extradite, t he extraditing s tate is in
breach of its international obligations. Indirectly, the requested state will be held responsible
for violations of human rights in the requesting state. It must, however, be borne in mind that
these decisions were made by institutions created with the sole purpose of promoting the
rights contained in the respective conventions. The sole task of the European Court of Human
Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee is to evaluate whether their
respective conventions have been or will be violated.452
thereby permitting exercising executive discretion and refusal to surrender the person otherwise judicially found
extraditable, Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 3 ed (1996), 489.
451 De Merieux, "Extradition as the Violation of Human Rights. The Jurisprudence of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights", Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights p. 23 Vol. 14 (1996) gives a description
of Kindler v. Canada, CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993), Ng v. Canada, CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1994), and Cox
v. Canada, CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993 (1994). In Kindler the Committee accepted that the methods of executing
the death penalty or conditions on death row could lead to violations of the prohibition of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and political Rights. In Ng
Canada was held to have violated the same article by extraditing Ng to California where he risked execution by
gas asphyxiation, which could take up to ten minutes to work before reaching point of death.
452 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 195.
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4 3 3 The Subjects of International Law: Do Individuals have Standing?
International law is the law between states. Traditionally the subjects of international law
have been states only.453This is the inevitable consequence of a set of rules that depends on
the will and consent of its constituents, expressed in treaties and custom. Another
consequence is the fact that when one state treats a national of another state in a manner that
violates international law, then this is regarded as an offence committed against the other state
and not against the injured person himself.454 The maltreatment amounts to a violation of the
"personal sovereignty" of the national state.455
Even treaties that directly affect individuals have been apprehended as concerning interstate
relations, with the states being the subjects.456 Fugitives requested for extradition have
traditionally not been considered to be subjects of international law and hence have not
possessed individual rights.457 This confirms the attitude that extradition was purely a matter
of solving issues between states. State sovereignty was the main concern.
After the Second World War international organisations were gradually accepted as subjects
of international law.458 The progress was slower for individuals, but already in 1950
Lauterpacht claimed that, as a result of the Charter of the United Nations and other general
changes in international law, the individual had acquired a status and a stature that
transformed him from an object oflaw into a subject oflaw.459
The improved status of individuals within international law is connected to the development
of international human rights law.46o Traditionally human rights belonged to the domestic
sphere of law and politics and were of international concern only where other states' interests
were affected, for instance, where its nationals were involved.ê'" But evidently people are as
much in need of protection from their own governments as from foreign authorities. By giving
453 Dugard, 235, Pyle, 2.
454 Castberg, 30.
ass Sieghart, Il.
456 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, p. 188.
457 Blakesley & Lagodny, 44.
458 The International Court of Justice delivered an Advisory Opinion in 1949 stating that the United Nations was
a subject of international law, Shaw, 39.
459 Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (1950), 4.
460 Shaw, 182.
461 Jacobs & White, 4-5.
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individuals standing in cases involving breaches of human rights, one ensures that the
breaches actually are addressed. Dugard says one of the principal aims of international law
today is to protect the human rights of the individuals against their own govemments.462
Several general conventions on human rights h ave established institutions t hat can receive
complaints from individuals.463
States have, however, not been willing to confer total standing to individuals in international
law. The general rule is that individuals lack standing to assert violations of international law,
including breaches of treaties, unless the state of nationality consents in the complaint. This
has been the traditional situation in extradition cases as well.464 This picture is gradually
changing. States do confer particular rights on individuals, which can be enforced in
international law, independently of national law.465 Treaties on human rights have taken to
establishing systems for individuals to complain about breaches of the conventions. The
extent of individuals' rights will depend on an interpretation of the treaties.
4 4/s Double Criminality an International Human Rights Norm?
We have seen that international human rights have become an important field of international
law. Human rights have affected both criminal and extradition procedures, and strengthened
the position and standing of individuals within the international law system in general. Courts
deciding on extradition have to consider whether the fugitive will be subjected to human
rights violations through the extradition. However, the scope of human rights is unclear.
The influence of international human rights on international extradition law is indisputable.
The new impetus of focusing on human rights, most likely also involves a strengthening of
traditional extradition provisions protecting the individual. In this new environment one has to
462 Dugard, 234.
463 For instance, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has
established a system where persons can submit complaints about violations of the Convention to a Commission
on Human Rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 28 established the Human
Rights Committee. According to the preamble of the Optional Protocal, the Committee is enabled "to receive
and consider ... communications from individuals claiming to be victims 0 f violations 0 f any 0 f the rights set
forth in the Covenant." The American Convention on Human Rights 1969 article 33 establishes a Commission
on Human Rights, which according to article 44 can receive complaints of violations of the Convention lodged
by individuals.
464 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 189.
465 Shaw, 183.
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question to what extent the established rights and duties of states may have become part of
human rights law as rights of which the fugitive is entitled to take advantage.f" The principle
of double criminality was created as a protection of state sovereignty, but its property of
protecting the fugitive has gradually become its main justification. Has the principle of double
criminality become a rule of international human rights law?
4 4 1 General Considerations
One could argue that the inherent qualities of the double criminality principle as a protection
of individual rights could make it a human rights norm. However, even though human rights
protect individuals from encroachment by the authorities, one cannot deduce from that fact
that all provisions purporting to protect individuals are human rights. Several aspects
distinguish the principle 0 f double criminality from 0 rdinary human rights i n international
extradition law.
Double criminality i n extradition law has t he same function as 0 rdinary human rights i n a
domestic criminal case. It is a rule that applies to the process itself. It represents directions to
and restrictions on the court deciding on extradition. This differs from the invocation of
traditional human rights in extradition law, which actually refers to the human rights situation
in the requesting state and not in the state deliberating on extradition. The new trend of
considering human rights in extradition law has to do with evaluating potential or actual
human rights abuses in the requesting state. The rule of double criminality entails an
examination of conditions within the requested state.
The nature of the conditions that require examination also differs between double criminality
and traditional human rights. Double criminality requires examination of statutes, whereas the
application of human rights in extradition requires examination of actual conditions, for
example, whether the requested s tate has a history 0 f practising torture on prisoners. This
difference can be illustrated with an old extradition case from Canada.
In 1860 the United States requested that John Andersen be extradited from Upper Canada to
Missouri to answer charges of murder. Anderson was a black slave who, during his escape
466 Carnegie in San Jose (ed), 89.
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from Missouri to Canada, had killed a man who tried to capture him. The victim was not only
authorised but also obliged by law to attempt to prevent slaves from fleeing. The institution of
slavery and appurtenant laws did not exist in Canada. The court, however, construed the
double criminality principle to say that if a man kills another man whilst resisting a lawful
apprehension, it would amount to murder in Canada.467
Today it is beyond doubt that a fugitive slave would not be returned to a state practising
slavery. In 1860 there existed no international human rights that would obstruct extradition
where the fugitive would be tortured, enslaved and executed upon his return. In the case of
Anderson, the court naturally had to base its decision on existing extradition law. The task of
double criminality is not to prevent violations of human rights in the requesting state. Other
provisions are created to deal with that aspect.
The principle of double criminality has developed through extradition law and the law of
international assistance in criminal matters. Though the principle partly purports to protect
individual rights, it has not been part of the development of traditional human rights. Because
it has been a rule of international extradition law, with states being the subjects of the law, the
principle has not been allowed to develop in international jurisprudence like other principles
of individual rights. In comparison, the legality principle in criminal law has become part of
every major human rights treaty. The double criminality principle does not form part of
traditional human rights law. Furthermore, it is a right that only applies to criminal fugitives
and not to putative offenders in general.
Though double criminality is accepted as a fundamental rule of extradition law in the
protection of individual rights, it is not denominated as a human right in literature nor
generally perceived as a "human right." The principle is not yet per se part of any human
rights conventions.
The U nited Nations Model Treaty on Extradition does n ot classify double criminality as a
human right in the lists of mandatory and optional obstructions to extradition in articles 3 and
4, but as part of the extraditable offence requirement in article 2. This is basically how all
extradition treaties and domestic statutes "classify" double criminality, including the
467 Bedi, 70-71, La Forest, 53.
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European Convention on Extradition. Though double criminality is not expressly stipulated as
a separate human right or individual right, it is made mandatory through the extraditable
offence clause. It is thus made a fundamental and mandatory extradition requirement.
4 4 2 The Relation to the Legality Principle
Establishing double criminality is not an end in itself, but indirectly represents other values.
International human rights a re generally purposeful per s e, for example, the prohibition of
torture and discrimination. Next to ensuring state sovereignty, it ensures that a person is not
treated any differently from the rest of the population. This individual right is closely
connected with the legality principle in criminal law.
Given the fact that both the legality principle and the double criminality principle aim to
protect the individual from being treated arbitrarily and differently from the rest of the
population of a given country, one obviously has to evaluate the legality principle as a human
right in order to examine whether the principle of double criminality also represents a human
right. One could argue that the principle of double criminality has to be considered, indirectly
through the legality principle, as part of international human rights.
The right to liberty is a basic human right, expressed in numerous human rights
instruments.468 Criminal procedure and extradition are, however, accepted exceptions to the
right ofliberty. For instance, the European Convention on Human Rights declares the right of
everyone to liberty and security of person, except in certain procedures, such as criminal
proceedings, deportations and extradition.t'" Deprivation of liberty can only take place in
these specific procedures and only as described by law. Only in this manner can one avoid
arbitrariness. This is called "the rule of law" and has been described as a fundamental human
right.470 The legality principle lies at the core of the concept of the rule oflaw.471
The legality principle appeared in an undeveloped form in the Magna Carta in 1215, though
468 For example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 3, the European Convention on Human
Rights article 5, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 9.
469 Article 5 (1).
470 Sieghart, 18-19. Disputes must furthermore be decided by independent and impartial courts.
471 Loucaides, 32, Jacobs, 120.
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Aristotle had previously outlined it.472 Later it formed part of the American Constitution and
constitutions i n Europe and elsewhere. It was also expressed int he Declaration 0 f Human
Rights adopted by the French legislative assembly in 1789.473 The modem doctrine of legality
emerged from European revolutions against the oppression, despotism and authoritarianism of
contemporary rulers, and the philosophy of separation of powers, as developed by
Montesquieu.Y" It was gradually accorded universal recognition. In 1935 the Permanent
Court of Justice recognised the legality principle.475
The legality principle represents a right for the individual with correlative duties on the
authorities. The legality principle comprises a directive to the legislature (on how to formulate
penal provisions) and to the judiciary (on how to interpret them).476 The legislature, when
adopting penal provisions, must define the crimes clearly, avoiding vague and ambiguous
terms. It is essential that criminal provisions are as specific as possible so that individuals
expected to comply with them can be certain about their rights and duties. Also vital is the
threat of punishment. It is not enough to describe the prohibited conduct; the punishment must
also be clearly defined. Otherwise the conduct would not constitute a crime.477
The criminal nature of an act depends exclusively on the law and cannot be left to the
discretion of the courtS.478 This conforms to the doctrine of separation of powers. The
legislature makes the laws and the judiciary applies them; these roles should not be confused.
In common law jurisdictions (like South Africa) an exception to the strict separation of
powers used to be ability of the courts to create new crimes. In South Africa the list of these
crimes is now closed and no new crimes may be added.479 As to the role of the judiciary, the
legality principle demands that the penal provisions be strictly construed.48o The judiciary
should interpret the penal statutes as so to find the intention of the legislature and may use the
extensive, restrictive or teleological method of interpretation, but interpretation of penal
statutes by analogy is not consistent with the legality principle.Y'
472 Loucaides, 32.
473 Castberg, 19-20, Sieghart, 287.
474 Burchell & Milton, 57.
475 Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees, PCU (1935), Loucaides, 33.
476 Jacobs, 120.
477 Burchell & Milton, 60-61.
478 Loucaides, 35.
479 Burchell & Milton, 59.
480 Burchell & Milton, 63.
481 Loucaides, 35-38.
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The legality principle has generally been interpreted in the context of domestic law. This is
the general view among scholars and also confirmed by state practice.482 International
instruments that encompass the legality principle, however, occasionally include "national or
internationallaw.,,483 This formulation expands the traditional view by including international
crimes in the list of crimes for which national authorities can prosecute. This is in line with
developments in international criminal law since 1945.484
Today the legality principle is a most fundamental protection of individual rights in both
domestic and international criminal law. It forms part of domestic criminal laws, constitutions
and bills of rights,485 human rights conventions.Y" and other instruments of international
law.487 The legality principle in the international instruments is not to be deviated from under
any circumstances.v" It is a justiciable right that the individual can invoke where a state starts
a prosecution for something that is not clearly criminal, or where the penal provision is
ambiguous or has to be applied by analogy.
The fact that the legality principle is included in all major human rights treaties has led some
authors to conclude that it is a human right.489 This assumption would also be supported by
the fact that the development of human rights was clearly influenced by the liberalism of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when people fought for freedoms from arbitrary
encroachment by the state.
It is not obvious, however, that the legality principle is a human rights norm. The scope and
482 Jacobs, 123.
483 The Universal Declaration 0 f Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
European Convention on Human Rights.
484 Jacobs, 123.
485 For instance in the South African Bill of Rights section 35(3)(l)-(n) and the Norwegian Constitution
(Grunnlov) §§ 96 and 97.
486 For instance in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 15, the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms article 7, the American Convention on Human
Rights article 9, the African Charter on Human Rights and People's Rights, 1981, article 7. The texts contain
only minor differences.
487 For instance in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights article Il. The Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and for the Former Yoguslavia respectively also contain references to the legality
principle, Schabas, "Perverse Effects of the Nulla Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals",
European Jounral of International Law p. 521 (2000), 521.
488 Sieghart, 286, Schabas, 522.
489 Schabas, 522. Van den Wyngaert advocates that the legality principle is a human right, "Applying the
European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?", in Dugard & Van den
Wyngaert (eds), International Criminal Law and Procedure (1996),218-219.
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content of human rights are still not agreed upon and, even though the legality principle
provides protection to the defendant, the principle is not in literature generally referred to as a
human right. The Human Rights Committee has warned against presuming that non-derivable
rules are the same as human rights.49o The question is thus unresolved.
Whether the legality principle is a human right or not, it nevertheless represents a rule of both
domestic a nd i nternational law t hat requires compliance. When examining whether double
criminality is a human right, it could be relevant to ask whether an extradition for an act that
is not criminal within the requested state violates the legality principle.Ï"
The legality principle forbids punishment for something that is not criminal. Extradition is not
tantamount to a punishment.Y' Extradition does not involve allocation of punishment, but
merely provides the requesting state with personal jurisdiction over the offender for purposes
of prosecution. To detain and arrest someone is not included in the legality principle. Such
action naturally demands a statute and is generally included in constitutions, etc., but entails a
rule other than the legality principle.Y' Vogler supports the approach that, because extradition
is not equivalent to a punishment, the offender's liability to punishment under the law of the
requested state is irrelevant.Ï"
The legality principle furthermore stipulates a strict interpretation of the penal code. The
individuals are entitled to know in advance what conduct is punishable. This reasoning does
not apply to the extradition process. When the question of extradition arises, the fugitive has
already violated the law and most likely become a fugitive for this very reason. As to the strict
interpretation of penal statutes in criminal cases, state practice has shown that many states
adhere to the in abstracto interpretation, which does not consider all aspects of the law.
Obviously, the requesting state needs to satisfy the legality principle. If the legality principle
is a human right and the requested state has to consider potential human rights violations in
the requesting state, the requested state has to ensure that the conduct for which extradition is
requested actually is criminal in the requesting state. The practice of merely accepting an
490 Schabas, 522.
491 Van den Wyngaert in Jareborg (ed), 53.
492 Blakesley & Lagodny, 52, Vogler in Matseher & Petzold (eds), 671.
493 For instance, the Norwegian Constitution contains a provision prohibiting arrest without law, § 99.
494 Vogler in Matseher & Petzold (eds), 671.
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affidavit of the criminality of the conduct in the requesting state when examining double
criminality, would probably suffice in this respect.
Irrespective of the close and indisputable link between the legality principle and the double
criminality principle, the examination of the legality principle has shown that it does not
support the view that double criminality is a human rights norm.
4 4 3 Is Double Criminality a Justiciable Right in the Extradition Process?
A justiciable right is a right that can be taken to court in order to enforce it. Is the double
criminality requirement of such a nature that an extraditee has standing before a court to claim
that the rule is not satisfied?
Individuals will usually have standing to assert that the domestic extradition statute will be
violated. But in certain states the statute is auxiliary to the treaty. For instance, in the United
States there is no general federal extradition act and the extradition process is regulated
entirely by treaties. But even where the state has national extradition statutes, it could be that
international extradition law gives the fugitive better protection. A fugitive would naturally
wish to invoke rules of international law where these may obstruct his extradition.
What does it mean that individuals are subjects of international law? Are they given the right
to petition national and international tribunals and institutions where their international human
rights are violated? According to Lauterpacht, "[t]he fact that the beneficiary of rights is not
authorized to take independent steps in his own name to enforce them does not signify that he
is not a subject of the law or that the rights in question are vested exclusively in the agency
which possesses the capacity to enforce them.,,495
The p osition of the fugitive offender has traditionally been discussed in the context 0 f the
principle 0 f territorial asylum. Extradition law developed with the sovereignty principle in
mind. The network of extradition treaties was seen as purely consensual limitations on the
privilege of the state granting territorial asylum.496 The main rule is that individuals do not
495 Lauterpacht, 27.
496 Carnegie in San Jose (ed), 85-86.
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have standing. As shown above, this view is gradually changing. The question of standing is
likely to vary according to what rules the extraditee wants to invoke for his release.
Lauterpacht says individuals' status as subjects of international law and an inherent capacity
of enforcement of international rights, will depend 0 n the given situation and the relevant
international instrument.
The law in the United States 0 narrest, detention and extradition 0 f international fugitives
forms a separate body of law apart from the law of arrest and detention of suspects in
domestic criminal cases, even to the extent that constitutional protections given to defendants
in domestic cases are not given to fugitives a waiting e xtradition.Ï" The United States has
considered the extradition process to be a creation of international law, conducted partly by
the executive, and not being of a criminal nature, as guilt or innocence is not determined.
However, recent decades have witnessed a t rend i nU nited States extradition law to allow
fugitives more procedural rights, which will obviously strengthen the fugitives' opportunities
to assert violations of human rights. An argument against giving fugitives more procedural
rights is that doing so will make it more difficult for the United States to extradite fugitives as
well ast 0 0 btain extradition from 0 ther states. Also, s orne allege it could have a negative
impact on the United States' negotiation of new extradition treaties. Wiehl claims the
liberalising trend may affect the United States government's foreign policy in general and its
relations with foreign countries and "may serve to undermine the process of international
extradition. ,,498
Though the trend in international law clearly allows for a more lenient attitude towards
individual standing, it has so far been confined to specific human rights conventions and
institutions. There are no indications of a state practice that supports standing for fugitives in
international extradition law.
497 Pyle, 4, Wiehl, 731-732. For instance, to obtain a provisional warrant of arrest of a fugitive from the courts,
the government does not have to show probable cause, as opposed to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition that
"no Warrants shall issue, but on probable cause", applying in domestic cases, 734 (probable cause will be
established during the extradition hearing, which usually follows months after the arrest, 751). In the question of
bail, the government has the burden of proof in domestic cases, whereas in extradition cases the burden of proof
is placed on the fugitive, 735, 741. The fugitive may not cross-examine anyone who testifies at the extradition
hearing, nor may he cross-examine affiants or deponents on whose affidavits or depositions the foreign
complaint is based, and the fugitives right to present evidence is limited etc, 742.
498 Wiehl, 738-740.
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4 4 4 Is Double Criminality a Justiciable Right after Surrender?
The only legitimate means by which a fugitive can be sent to a state for purposes of
prosecution, is by extradition. Both requested and requesting states have, however, in the past
resorted to illegitimate means where extradition was barred.
According to the sovereignty principle, a state is free to deport unwanted foreigners.
Deportation is a legitimate procedure in international law by which states send out unwanted
foreigners from their territories according to their immigration statutes. Deportation law and
extradition law are separate sets of rules that serve different purposes. Because of the criminal
proceedings awaiting the extraditee, he has been granted special protection in the law of
extradition that are not granted deportees in the law of deportation. However, states are
known to make use of disguised extradition through deportation where domestic law forbids
extradition.
Some states have been involved in abductions of fugitives. Abductions have been carried out
by officials of the state or by private citizens. Abductions take place where a request for
extradition has been denied, or where no request has been put forward because the custodian
state for political or legal reasons will not extradite. Sometimes the custodian state has tacitly
consented to, or clandestinely aided, the abduction in cases where returning the fugitive was
desirable but not legally feasible.
Whether a person has been abducted, illegally deported or extradited contrary to the double
criminality principle, the question remains the same. Is the double criminality principle a
justiciable international human right that the individual can invoke during criminal
proceedings? Technically, neither a deportation nor an abduction is an extradition as defined
by scholars and there has been no extradition process in which the fugitive could have
invoked protections offered him by extradition law. The reality is, however, that the fugitive
has been returned to the prosecuting state in contravention of laws and treaties, thus violating
provisions safeguarding individual rights, such as the double criminality principle.
The question could be asked to what extent the fugitive offender's position is one of loss of
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rights by comparison to other offenders.499 The following example will illustrate the problem.
Two persons commit a serious crime together and then one escapes abroad whereas the other
remains in the country. Later they are both arrested, the former abroad and the latter in the
state where the crime was committed. The person arrested abroad is extradited or returned by
other means contrary to the double criminality principle. Joint criminal proceedings are
instigated against the two culprits. Is it fair that the person who escaped abroad before being
returned is entitled to invoke a breach of the double criminality principle in the requested state
as a breach of international human rights and thus go free, whereas his fellow culprit will be
punished?
In the United States the question of standing in criminal cases has been the subject of several
judicial decisions where a person who has been extradited from a foreign state has claimed the
United States has violated the principle of specialty. The denial of standing to the individual is
premised on the doctrine that states and not individuals are subject to international law, and
this effectively deprives the individual of the right to raise objections in both the requested
and the requesting state.500 This reasoning is likely to apply where any violation of
international extradition law is invoked, including the double criminality principle, if the
prosecuting state does not regard individuals as subjects of international law.
If breaches of extradition law committed by the prosecuting state are not allowed to be
invoked in a criminal case, then breaches of the extradition law by a foreign state are even
less likely to be allowed to be invoked. Where a person who already has been surrendered
invokes a breach of double criminality, he is actually complaining about circumstances related
to another state. If the person was illegally extradited or deported, it was the requested state
that breached the double criminality principle, not the requesting state. In this case an
assertion of a breach of double criminality will most likely be ignored. Can the indicted
person invoke the breach of double criminality as a violation of his human rights?
In the case of deportation and irregular extradition the fugitive's appearance on the territory
of the prosecuting state gives such a state personal jurisdiction without it breaking domestic or
international law. Where the prosecuting state has indulged in abduction, it has obtained
personal jurisdiction by breaking international law and probably also the domestic law of both
499 Carnegie in San Jose (ed), 107.
500 Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, 189.
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states. This does not necessarily mean that it cannot prosecute the person.
First of all, the legality principle does not, as concluded above, exclude prosecution where the
principle of double criminality has been violated. Secondly, the kidnapping itself could bar
prosecution according to domestic law, but some states have chosen to accept illegal means of
obtaining personal jurisdiction. The rightfulness of kidnapping, however, is not the issue here.
The question is whether double criminality is an international human right that prevents
prosecution when the fugitive was kidnapped.
Courts of several states have dealt with cases where fugitives have been kidnapped or
irregularly deported. The cases are not concerned with a possible violation of the double
criminality rule, but whether the irregular means by which the defendants were brought to the
prosecuting states were lawful. The cases may, however, shed some light on the human rights
aspects of double criminality as well, or they could be interpreted by analogy with double
criminality.
The United States is among those states that have resorted to abductions where an extradition
request was unsuccessful. 50 I One of the first cases before the United States Supreme Court
involving the legality of extraterritorial abductions was Ker v. Illinois.502 It was held that
forcible abductions do not deprive the court of personal jurisdiction. This rule was upheld in
Frisbie v. Collins, where it was held that "the power of a court to try a person for a crime is
not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a
forcible abduction. ,,503
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine means that there exist no restrictions on how courts in the United
States obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Some courts have, however, construed
exceptions to this doctrine where the extradition treaty or the defendant's due process rights
have been violated.504
In 1990 a Mexican national, Mr. Alvarez-Machain, was kidnapped from Mexico to stand trial
501 Blakesley & Lagodny, 9.
502 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
503 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
504 Henning, 363.
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in the United States on charges of torture and murder. In Alvarez-Machain505 the validity of
the abduction itself, a procedure not condoned by the extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico, was questioned. Alvarez-Machain argued the court lacked personal
jurisdiction because he had been forcibly abducted in violation of his due process rights and
because the abduction violated the extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States.
The District Court rejected the claim that Alvarez-Machain's due process rights were violated
and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction.i'" However, the court did find that the
abduction had violated the extradition treaty, even though it did not expressly forbid
abduction by the requesting state's officials. Mexico had launched official protests and these
were held to be sufficient to grant Alvarez-Machain derivative standing to invoke Mexico's
rights under the treaty.507 The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision.
The United States Supreme Court followed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, overruling the district
court decision. It held that the abduction did not violate the extradition treaty and that "the
manner in which an accused came before the court was irrelevant to the jurisdiction of the
court to try the accused. ,,508
This reasoning strongly suggests that any potential objections to an extradition by the state
whose territorial sovereignty was violated are irrelevant to the court in the prosecuting state. If
the court is willing to prosecute the defendant irrespective of the unlawfulness of his arrest,
then the court is not likely to accept the argument that the extradition law of a foreign state
was broken either. Even where the national state has objected to the unlawful treatment of its
national, the United States Supreme Court refused to give the defendant standing. This is
probably not inconsistent with intemationallaw, though it has been accepted for some time
that individuals can be given standing where its national state backs the complaint.
However, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit opened the possibility that defendants may
invoke two exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The defendant was allowed to object to
violations of the extradition treaty and violations of due process rights. The legal weight of
these decisions is difficult to estimate. It is most likely that the fact that the Supreme Court so
505 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 508 U.S. 655 (1992).
506 Henning, 365.
507 Henning, 364-365.
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clearly quashed these decisions supports a continuance of a strict application of the Ker-
Frisbie rule.
Courts in the United States are thus not willing to distinguish between defendants who have
fled abroad and then were retrieved by lawful or unlawful means, and defendants who never
left the country. Any objection the defendant who fled abroad may raise regarding his capture,
is ignored.
What is the situation where there is no treaty and a person is extradited in breach of domestic
law? Does this represent a violation of international human rights law? In the case of
Bennett509 the United Kingdom and South Africa had co-operated in the transfer via London
of a fugitive, who was supposed to be deported from South Africa to New Zealand. This was
a clear case of disguised extradition. The case came before the courts of the United Kingdom.
The extraditee claimed this procedure violated the specialty principle.i'" The outcome of the
case was clearly influenced by considerations of human rights. Lord Griffith, considering the
specialty principle, said:
"Extradition procedures are designed not only to ensure that criminals are returned
from one country to another but also to protect the rights of those who are accused
of crimes by the requesting country ... If a practice developed in which the police
or prosecuting authorities of this country ignored extradition procedures and
secured the return of an accused by a mere request to police colleagues in another
country they would be flouting the extradition procedures and depriving the
accused of the safeguards built into the extradition process for his benefit."Sll
In a case from South Africa a Mr. Ebrahim had been abducted from Swaziland and brought to
trial before the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court on charges of treason.
Ebrahim had been abducted from Swaziland by informers of the South African National
Intelligence Service and brought into the custody of the police in South Africa before he had
been officially arrested. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Ebrahim
508 Carnegie in San Jose (ed), 99, Henning 365.
509 Bennet v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court (1993) 3 All E.R. 129.
510 See Carnegie in San Jose (ed).
5111993 (3) All ER at 150.
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successfully appealed to the Appeal Court. In S v Ebrahim5!2 the Appeal Court held that under
Roman Dutch law a South African court has no competence to try a person abducted from
another state by agents of the prosecuting state.
Ebrahim v Minister of Law and Order5!3 heard in the Transvaal Provincial Division in South
Africa was the follow-up of the abduction, where Ebrahim in a civil action sued the
defendants for damages for unlawful abduction, arrest and detention. It was held that the
South African Police knew about the unlawful abduction and transportation and had thereby
formed common purpose and associated themselves with the abductors. One of the defendants
was found liable for damages resulting from these unlawful acts. Though this case was raised
years after the defendant had been released from jail and did not form part of his defence, the
decision includes several important elements. The individual was given standing and was
allowed to invoke the principle that his rights had been violated through the abduction. The
court declared that the abduction was illegal and on this basis imposed a duty of paying
damages.
InMohamed and Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others5!4 the South
African Constitutional Court examined a case where the appellant, Mohamed, had been
handed over by South African customs officials to United States officials in Cape Town and
then allowed to be taken out of the country and flown to the United States. Neither
deportation proceedings nor extradition proceedings were followed. Mohamed was charged in
the United States with a number of capital charges related to the bombing of the United States
embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998.
At the time of the proceedings before the South African Constitutional Court, Mohamed was
standing trial in a court in New York. One would think that a case in South Africa would not
help Mohamed in the United States that applies the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The South African
Constitutional Court held, however, that it would not be futile to pronounce on the illegality
of the government's conduct due to the important issues of legality and policy involved and
due tot he desire to send a signal tot he court inN ew York regarding the w rong done to
Mohamed. The Constitutional Court held the acts of the South African officials to be
512 1991 (2) SA 553 (A).
SI3 Ebrahim v Minister of Law and Order and Others, 1993 (2) SA 559 (T).
514 Mohamed and Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).
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unlawful, whether they were characterised as a deportation or an extradition. It was held that
the authorities should have obtained an assurance from United States authorities that the death
penalty would not be imposed or carried out.
These decisions by the courts of the different states show that the issue of allowing the
individual standing in cases where international law has been broken, appears regularly in the
courts. However, one cannot deduce from these decisions that individuals generally have
gained standing in international extradition law. The two South African cases did not affect
the defendant in a criminal case, but they nevertheless are very important as they pronounce
on the fundamental rights of the individual. These decisions indicate how a case of a
defendant who has been illegally brought before South African courts would be handled, but
deducing a general standing for international fugitives from these decisions would probably
be too optimistic.
4 5 Concluding Remarks
Though the question of the individual's rights may not have been the original inducement for
states in creating the rule of double criminality, it nevertheless holds these qualities. Double
criminality cannot, however, be classified as an international human rights norm. Irrespective
of this, the fact that human rights have obtained a strong position in international extradition
law will influence the general attitude towards fugitives among states engaging in extradition.
The focus is no longer on state sovereignty, but on the weakest part in the process, the
fugitive. Due to the increasing focus on human rights in extradition law, traditional extradition
requirements protecting the fugitive will become increasingly important as well. Traditional
extradition provisions such as the double criminality requirement will become more important
because they protect the individual.
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5 An Evaluation of Double Criminality
5 1 Introduction
Three opposing interests govern the existence and interpretation of the double criminality
principle in international extradition law. These are the interests of the requested state, the
fugitive, and the international community as such. Whereas the fugitive's interest always
favours a strict interpretation of double criminality, the international community as such
favours an abolition of the principle. In the middle we find the interests of the requested state,
which may benefit from both astrict and a lenient interpretation 0 ft he double criminality
requirement, and even its non-existence, depending on the concrete circumstances. The
double criminality requirement offers no help to the requesting state in the specific case, but it
may of course be of use to the requesting state the day it is requested for an extradition itself.
5 2 State Sovereignty versus International Co-operation
On the one hand, the double criminality principle protects the requested state's sovereignty.
On the other hand, states have come to realise that it is not in their interest to have criminal
fugitives at large in their territories. This has led states to engage in co-operation in criminal
matters, as it is in the interest of the international community to combat crime and punish
criminals.
International co-operation in criminal matters could be negatively affected by the double
criminality principle. A strong enforcement of international criminal law would benefit from
the abrogation of the double criminality requirement. In this respect states have increasingly
accepted restrictions on their sovereignty. Certain international incidents may trigger strong
nationalistic feelings and call for a strong display of state sovereignty and integrity, but this
aspect has become less adamant in international criminal law. Though the double criminality
principle has so far not been abolished, it is likely that the interests of the international
community have led to a more lenient interpretation of this principle.
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The system and magnitude of international law and co-operation have clearly changed over
recent decades. Interstate relations are in transition as new forms of mutual assistance emerge.
The fact that principles laid down at a time when the notion of sovereignty was absolute are
upheld today when inter-state relations are in transition, could cause difficulties.515 As
international co-operation on crime suppression becomes more vital, many states - both those
that request extradition and those that receive such requests - have expressed a wish to
derogate from the double criminality requirement. States have realised that surrendering
fugitive criminals is in their own interests as well. One could thus ask whether double
criminality - a principle described as a fundamental rule of extradition law - has outplayed its
importance as a restriction on extradition.
International co-operation depends on a certain degree of similarity between the cultural,
political, social and legal structures of the states concerned. The increasing or decreasing
significance of the double criminality requirement probably depends on the comparison of
ideological assumptions, political and economic structures, social norms and customs, legal
traditions, etc., which exist in the two states involved in the extradition proceedings.t" One
could assume that the more similarities between the two countries, the less significance the
double criminality requirement has.
Each state, in conformity with its social and cultural standards and values, defines what
conduct should be regarded as criminal in its territory. There are significant diversities within
the international community as to what should be considered as criminal behaviour. States
have not yet reached the stage where they unconditionally accept foreign criminal law and
procedure. Though some states are willing to give up sovereignty in matters of international
criminal law, they still view foreign law with some scepticism. The double criminality
principle represents a compromise. Even if demonstrating state sovereignty as such is no
longer a political goal, it nevertheless plays an important role in securing some level of
conformity between states' legal systems in their co-operation in criminal matters.
515 Schultz, 10.
516 Plachta, 99.
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5 3 The Individual in the Process
The desire in the international community to relax the double criminality requirement is
subdued by the recognition of the need to protect the individual. 517 Is it possible to defy the
double criminality requirement and still respect and protect the individual's basic rights?
Compared with defendants who have not fled abroad after committing a crime, the fugitive
criminal has suffered no loss of right if he is extradited contrary to the double criminality
principle. However, the double criminality principle applies to the extradition process itself.
As human rights law has entered the sphere of the international law of extradition, the basic
rights offered a defendant in an ordinary criminal process are also offered the fugitive in an
extradition process. One could ask whether the double criminality principle still serves the
purpose of protecting the individual against persecution or whether other human rights
provisions give sufficient protection in this respect. Several international human rights
instruments provide for provisions on fair trials and prohibitions of discrimination based on
religion, ethnic background, political opinions, gender, etc. One cannot from these
instruments deduce general universal rights. Neither international extradition law nor general
human rights can substitute for the double criminality principle. The requested state has a duty
to protect individuals within its territory and the double criminality principle imposes a duty
to ensure that the fugitive is not surrendered for acts that are not considered punishable. The
double criminality principle offers considerable protection to the fugitive that cannot be
replaced by other existing rules of international law.
5 4 The Political Side of Double Criminality
Though it could be convenient for a state to overlook the double criminality requirement in
certain cases, there will always be other cases where a state would for several reasons want to
comply with the principle. It serves both the political interests of nations and the interests of
the individual. 518
One could claim the double criminality condition has become so technical and convoluted that
517 Hafen, 208.
518 Hafen, 230.
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it obstructs justice rather than promoting it. Such a statement presumes justice would be
served by extraditing the alleged or convicted criminal. A liberal double criminality rule does
not create many obstacles to extradition, whereas a rule with many prerequisites attached to it
and a strict interpretation would complicate the extradition process. As shown above, there are
wide varieties as to how strictly the double criminality principle is interpreted in the different
states.
Naturally, defendants fight their extradition by taking advantage of the extreme technical
requirements dominating the double criminality principle in certain states. Statutes that are
very technical risk creating legal constructions that may result in illogical and unfair results
appalling to society. In politically sensitive cases there will naturally be different opinions on
what result would serve justice. As the extradition process is historically closely connected
with considerations of politics, one could be tempted to assume that a strict construction of
the double criminality principle actually serves the underlying aspects of what is politically
desirable.
5 5 Final Remarks
As long as the subjects of international law are equal and independent states, and no
supranational legislature, prosecuting authority or judiciary has been established, the different
legal systems will continue to generate different penal statutes and t he principle of double
criminality will most likely not be abolished. It is more likely that the principle will gradually
be liberalised in countries that today apply a strict interpretation. The principle serves its
purposes also if it is interpreted liberally. It is important, however, that it is not interpreted too
liberally as - in the words of Pyle - "no regime on earth can be trusted in all circumstances to
provide wholly apolitical and wholly fair investigation, prosecution, trial, or punishmentv'?"
519 Pyle, 7.
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